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Executive Summary 
Aims and approach 
By applying established regression and decomposition methods to secondary data from the 
2018 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the 2016-2018 Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (QLFS) this report aims to enhance our understanding of the drivers of the 
contemporary gender pay gap (GPG) within the UK public sector. This is done in several 
stages, including through comparisons between the public and private sector, and within the 
public sector on the basis of occupations covered by Pay Review Bodies (PRBs). In both 
cases we consider GPGs at the mean and then across the earnings distribution. Throughout 
our analysis we separate the raw hourly GPG into two elements to better understand its 
drivers. The first element is that part of the raw gap which can be explained by differences in 
observable personal and work-related characteristics between men and women, such as job 
tenure or contract type. The second element is that part of the raw gap which is not 
explained by the observable characteristics in our model and is closer to a measure of 
unequal treatment on the basis of similar characteristics. Evidence of the latter, or what we 
refer to as an unexplained GPG, is of particular interest given the remit of PRBs in relation to 
anti-discrimination legislation under the Equality Act (2010). 
Key results and implications 
Confirming previous evidence, our analysis of ASHE confirms that the raw GPG in the UK in 
2018 is narrower within the public (19 per cent) than the private (21 per cent) sector. 
However, and in contrast to earlier studies, the unexplained component estimated using the 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition method is found to be at least as large within the public 
sector as the private sector. This questions the extent to which, as has previously been 
claimed, the public sector remains a ‘beacon of good practice’ in terms of gender equality 
and suggests renewed emphasis might be required.  
Further exploration of the GPG across the distribution highlights a prominent ‘glass ceiling’ in 
the public, but not in the private sector. That is, the unexplained GPG is particularly 
pronounced towards the top end of the wage distribution in the public sector, where it 
accounts for most of the GPG. This suggests that, despite evidence of a compressed wage 
distribution, public sector employers need to pay particular attention to gender inequality 
among higher earners. 
Comparisons within the public sector indicate that, on average, there is a narrower GPG in 
occupations covered by the five PRBs considered here, than those occupations that are not 
covered by PRBs. However, the GPG in PRB occupations is largely unexplained. As a 
result, the unexplained GPG is actually at least as large in PRB occupations as in non-PRB 
occupations, despite the remit of the PRBs. This reinforces the important distinction between 
the GPG as a measure of the average wage gap and the adjusted or unexplained GPG as a 
measure of earnings inequality. Analysis across the wage distribution also indicates a 
pronounced ‘glass ceiling’ in PRB occupations, confirming the need for attention beyond the 
mean GPG, and particularly towards the top end of the earnings distribution, within PRBs. 
There is, however, considerable heterogeneity identified across the five PRB occupations 
analysed, consistent with the increasing emphasis on within occupation analysis of the GPG 
and highlighting the need for greater recognition and exploration of differences within the 
public sector. The largest raw GPG is within the Review Body on Doctors’ and Dentists’ 
Remuneration (DDRB) (20 per cent) and it is narrowest in the NHS Pay Review Body 
(NHSPRB) (5 per cent) and Police Remuneration Review Body (PRRB) (8 per cent). The 
extent to which these can be explained by gender differences in productivity-related 
characteristics is relatively small and, as such, an unexplained GPG exists across all of the 
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PRBs. The magnitude of the unexplained GPG continues to vary across PRBs and is largest 
within the DDRB (15 per cent) suggesting the current review of the GPG in medicine is 
particularly timely.  
Although the analysis highlights substantial and largely unexplained gender differences in 
workforce composition across PRBs, including in the NHSPRB which is predominately 
female (nearly 80 per cent) and the PSPRB and PRRB which are predominately male (about 
65-70 per cent), the contribution of gender differences in the allocation of women into and 
across PRBs within the public sector is found to play a relatively minor role in determining 
the public sector GPG. Indeed, while the raw public sector GPG would be 15 per cent if 
there was no gender difference in the probability of working across PRBs, it would only be 4 
per cent if there were no GPGs within public sector occupations.  
Although Performance Related Pay (PRP) is much less prevalent in the public than the 
private sector and, within PRBs in particular, there is evidence of an unexplained gender gap 
in the probability of receipt of PRP, with females less likely to receive PRP, particularly in the 
public sector. Conditional on receipt of PRP, there is also a gender gap in the amount of 
PRP, but this is considerably larger within the private sector. On this basis, future plans to 
introduce PRP in the public sector should pay particular attention to the potential drivers of 
the observed gender gap in receipt of PRP, that is, who receives PRP.  
Limitations and extensions 
The availability of reliable information on pay, and personal and work-related characteristics 
in our data is key to separating the explained and unexplained components of the GPG. 
Nevertheless, despite the comprehensiveness of the approach which combines analysis of 
ASHE and the QLFS, there will inevitably be important productivity-related characteristics 
which are unobserved (e.g. personality) or only partially captured within our analysis (e.g. 
actual labour market experience). As such, the unexplained gap can only ever be a proxy for 
wage inequality, and we cannot directly measure unequal pay or discrimination within this 
analysis. We further condition on the observable characteristics of workers in different 
sectors and occupations without accounting for the complex selection processes that 
determine who is in work and where they work, and the role of the employer, through for 
example occupational barriers, in such outcomes. More detailed analysis of gender 
differences in the probability of working across PRBs, which takes into account the complex 
relationships with subject choice and parental occupation, may be useful in this regard.  
The use of large scale, nationally representative, secondary data permits analysis across the 
public and private sector and facilitates comparison across PRBs. Nevertheless, to enhance 
the depth of analysis within specific PRB occupations it should be supplemented by further 
examination of specific occupations, including those within PRBs not covered by this report. 
This would be best achieved by using organisational administrative payroll data and a 
census of workers, rather than the relatively small samples available within these specific 
occupations in broader surveys. This would also facilitate a more detailed understanding of 
the role of the nature of pay scales and pay awards to gender pay equality, aligned to recent 
requirements in terms of reporting organisational GPGs. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and background  
The gender pay gap (hereinafter, GPG) has attracted increasing policy attention in the UK 
since the then Prime Minister announced his aim to “end the gender pay gap in a 
generation” (David Cameron, October 2015). The introduction of GPG reporting 
requirements for large organisations in 2017 formed part of a strategy to make GPGs more 
transparent and encourage employers to explore and address the drivers of their GPG. The 
publication in April 2018 of over 10,000 organisational GPGs, across both the public and 
private sector, and the associated media attention, together with the GPG among high paid 
employees at the BBC which emerged as a result of a requirement to disclose individual 
salaries, has further raised public, legal and media attention on the issue of gender 
inequality in the UK.1  
The new reporting requirements extend the obligations of public sector organisations in 
England and statistical evidence confirms a consistent GPG in favour of men but also one 
that varies considerably across public sector organisations and has failed to narrow over 
time.2 Nevertheless, as a whole, the public sector has been found to have a narrowing 
influence on the UK GPG, particularly through a lower within sector GPG but also through a 
relative concentration of women in the public sector, which on average offers a pay premium 
relative to the private sector (Jones et al., 2018). This report aims to provide an in-depth 
exploration of the contemporary drivers of the public sector GPG, focusing in particular on 
specific occupations within the public sector, principally those covered by the Pay Review 
Bodies (hereinafter, PRBs).3 
The GPG, the difference in the average wage between men and women, is distinct from 
unequal pay or pay discrimination. The former is determined in part by unequal pay but is 
also a function of the distribution of women and men within the labour market (e.g. in terms 
of occupation), and their productive characteristics (e.g. education and work experience), 
often referred to as structural features of the labour market. In contrast, the latter is the pay 
gap that exists between comparable men and women, that is, after adjusting for differences 
in personal and work-related characteristics. The existence of an adjusted or ‘unexplained’ 
GPG, that is, between men and women with similar characteristics is aligned to the principle 
of ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ explicit within the NHS PRB Terms of Reference and 
the requirement across PRBs to take account of the broader legal environment in terms of 
anti-discrimination legislation under the Equality Act (2010). Nevertheless, information on the 
magnitude of the GPG and, that part which can be explained, or is due to differences in 
characteristics, remains important, with the government arguing GPG transparency informs 
female career choices in particular (Business in the Community, 2015). 
In terms of academic research there has been considerable interest in quantifying the size of 
the public-private pay differential and tracking its movements over time, with a consistent 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, public including campaigns such as #PayMeToo. 
2
 See for example, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/30/nine-out-of-10-public-sector-bodies-pay-men-more-than-
women, https://www.channel4.com/news/public-sector-reveals-gender-pay-gap,  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/31/gender-pay-gap-widens-public-sector-women-men and 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/apr/03/nhs-trusts-gender-pay-gap-public-sector. 
3
 The OME provides the secretariat to eight PRBs which make recommendations on the pay of about 2.5 million workers or 45 
per cent of public sector employees: Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body (hereinafter, AFPRB), Review Body on Doctors’ and 
Dentists’ Remuneration (hereinafter, DDRB), NHS Pay Review Body (hereinafter, NHSPRB), Prison Service Pay Review Body 
(hereinafter, PSPRB), School Teachers’ Review Body (hereinafter, STRB), Senior Salaries Review Body (hereinafter, SSRB), 
Police Remuneration Review Body (hereinafter, PRRB), National Crime Agency Remuneration Review Body (hereinafter, 
NCARRB). Due to data restrictions this report considers six of these, which we collectively refer to as PRBs throughout. We are 
unable to consider either the NCARRB or SSRB due to their limited coverage and occupational composition and we are only 
able to consider the AFPRB within our supplementary (Quarterly Labour Force Survey) data due to the exclusion of the Armed 
Forces from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. As such, our attention tends to focus on five PRBs. 
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finding being a greater raw and adjusted public sector pay premium for women (Blackaby et 
al., 2012; Cribb et al., 2014a). Consistent with this, analysis of the GPG by sector finds 
smaller gaps within the public than the private sector (see Chatterji et al., 2011; Stewart, 
2014a; Jones et al., 2018). Moreover, such analysis finds that, although smaller in 
magnitude, a significant ‘unexplained’ pay gap exists within the public sector, a potential 
indicator of gender pay inequality. In contrast to the narrowing trend in the GPG since the 
1970s, Jones et al. (2018) find that the raw GPG has been unchanged since 2010 across 
both sectors and this has been attributed to a stalling of the long-term narrowing of the 
‘explained’ gender gap, or that women’s characteristics are no longer converging with men. 
Future narrowing might, therefore, require a more proactive approach, with particular 
attention on the unexplained pay gap, which has been largely flat in the public sector, 
despite the introduction of a range of equality initiatives, including most recently, the Public 
Sector Equality Duty 2011. 
Occupational segregation by gender is a key feature of the UK labour market and an 
established determinant of the GPG (Blau and Kahn, 2000), with women being concentrated 
in lower paying occupations such as caring, leisure and other services. Within the public 
sector, PRBs cover occupations with pronounced gender segregation (e.g. nurses and the 
armed forces) and substantial variation in pay (e.g. nurses compared to medical 
practitioners). Such segregation is reflected in concerns about workforce diversity in selected 
PRBs such as the armed forces (AFPRB, 2017), where targets have been set to increase 
female recruits.4 However, recent analysis by Stewart (2015) shows that, in Britain, about 
half of the GPG can be attributed to differences in the GPG within occupations and, 
occupations such as medical practitioners and prison service officers, both covered by 
PRBs, are among the twenty occupations found to have the highest GPG. The more 
disaggregated within occupation focus of this report is also aligned to recent attention within 
specific government departments.5   
Although policy and public attention on the GPG tends to focus at the middle of the earnings 
distribution, making comparisons between the average man and woman, academic evidence 
is increasingly concerned with the entire pay distribution (see, for example, Arulampalam et 
al., 2007). Indeed, how the GPG and its unexplained and explained components vary across 
the distribution has the potential to enhance our understanding of the drivers of the GPG, 
including in relation to ‘glass ceilings’ and ‘sticky floors’ i.e. barriers for women at the top and 
bottom of the earnings distribution respectively. Such evidence is therefore important to 
inform and more effectively target government policies and PRB practices.    
While the majority of evidence on the GPG examines a measure of usual hourly pay, recent 
organisational reporting highlights that gender bonus gaps are pronounced, consistent with 
bonuses being a less transparent form of pay. Although it remains relatively limited (Bryson 
et al., 2017), there is increasing emphasis on performance related pay (hereinafter, PRP) in 
the public sector, which has seen a movement from automatic progression to PRP as an 
incentive for effort. In exploring gender differences in the prevalence of PRP and providing 
some initial evidence in relation to the PRP GPG in the public sector, this project will provide 
insights on the potential implications of different payment systems for gender equality.6  
                                                          
4
 Although we are unable to consider this explicitly, workforce diversity is a strategic priority for the SSRB, motivated by the 
need to be more representative of society and the workforces for which they have responsibility (SSRB, 2017). Particular 
concerns are raised in relation to gender diversity among senior police officers and officers in the armed forces. 
5
 For example, in May 2018 the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care Jeremy Hunt promised to “eradicate the GPG in 
medicine”. For further information see: https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/news/rcp-president-professor-jane-dacre-lead-nhs-pay-
gap-review. 
6
 Equality concerns have, for example, been raised in relation to pay progression and performance awards in the Prison 
Service (PSPRB, 2019).     
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1.2 Research aims  
This project aims to comprehensively explore the contemporary GPG in the UK public 
sector. It will quantify the size and determinants of the GPG across the public and private 
sector and within the public sector, in particular distinguishing between the influence of other 
personal and work-related characteristics to identify the unexplained pay gap which exists 
among otherwise comparable workers. In doing so, it will address the OME’s research 
interest in the ‘drivers of GPGs in public sector workforces’ but will also contribute to 
understanding gender diversity within individual PRB occupations. The analysis will be 
enhanced by consideration of the pay distribution and PRP.  
The specific objectives of the research are as follows: 
1. To measure and model the contemporary GPG in the public and private sector, at the 
mean and across the earnings distribution. To identify and distinguish between explained 
and unexplained components of the GPG to form an estimate of wage inequality and identify 
gender differences in personal and work-related characteristics which are important drivers 
of the public sector GPG. 
2. To estimate the contribution of ‘within’ and ‘between’ occupation GPGs to the public 
sector GPG and to provide comparable evidence of GPGs between PRB and non-PRB 
occupations, and across PRB occupations. To further quantify pay inequality within PRB 
occupations and distinguish this from other drivers of PRB occupation GPGs. 
3. To identify gender differences in the probability of working within PRB occupations and to 
examine the extent to which these differences are a result of gender differences in personal 
characteristics.  
4. To further explore public sector gender gaps in rewards in relation to PRP and provide 
estimates of gender inequality in PRP as appropriate.  
These aims will be achieved through undertaking econometric analysis of secondary data, 
predominately from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (hereinafter, ASHE), a 
nationally representative and reliable source of earnings information in the UK. These data, 
which are based on mandatory reporting by employers to ONS, cover a 1 per cent sample of 
employee jobs from HMRC’s PAYE system, are made available annually and contain 
accurate information to identify sector and occupation, as well as a range of other personal 
and work-related characteristics which determine pay. Supplementary analysis will be 
performed on the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (hereinafter, QLFS), the largest household 
survey in the UK, which collects information on pay, sector and a comprehensive set of 
personal and work-related characteristics, but from individuals themselves. ASHE provides 
the ONS headline measure of the GPG but both data sources have been extensively used to 
explore public sector pay (see, for example, Bryson and Forth, 2017; Stewart, 2014a; Cribb 
et al., 2014a; and Blackaby et al., 2012). 
The analysis will have three core elements. First, analysis of the GPG will be undertaken 
between the public and private sector to explore the determinants of public sector GPG 
across the distribution and in comparison to the private sector. This will be followed by a 
more detailed analysis of the drivers of the GPG within the public sector and across PRB 
occupations in particular. In both cases the focus will be on quantifying the determinants of 
the GPG at the mean and across the earnings distribution through established regression 
and decomposition based approaches (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Machado and Mata, 
2005), which isolate the contribution of observable characteristics of workers and their jobs 
from unobserved influences, where the latter will include unequal treatment in the labour 
market. In addition to exploring the individual GPG for each PRB occupation, we also 
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quantify and model gender differences in the probability of working in different PRB 
occupations, allowing us to separate the role of ‘within’ and ‘between’ occupation GPGs to 
the overall public sector GPG.  
Achieving these objectives will provide the following high quality and timely evidence 
relevant to government policy and the PRBs: 
1. It will provide contemporary evidence after a period of public sector wage restraint in an 
era of austerity on differences in the size and drivers of the GPG across the earnings 
distribution and quantify the role of gender differences in characteristics and gender 
inequality in public sector GPGs. Further, understanding both explained and unexplained 
pay gaps will help to identify potentially effective levers for government policy in narrowing 
the UK GPG.  
2. By providing the first evidence on GPGs within particular PRB occupations it will facilitate 
comparisons within the public sector and fill evidence gaps recognised by the PRBs (e.g. in 
relation to unexplained GPGs), in order to identify and inform areas in need of greater policy 
action, including in which occupations pay inequality appears to be most pronounced.7 
Assessing the size of unexplained occupation GPGs will be particularly important in ensuring 
PRBs can evidence their commitment to relevant legal anti-discrimination obligations.8 At the 
organisational level, this information could be used to inform the development of proactive 
action plans to address departmental GPGs as part of annual GPG reporting. Further, in 
comparing PRB occupations to the rest of the public sector, where pay is determined by 
collective bargaining, the analysis will also provide more general insights into differences 
within the public sector.   
3. By providing the first consistent evidence on the scale and drivers of gender segregation 
within PRB occupations it will facilitate comparisons across PRBs and enhance OME 
understanding of workforce diversity within PRBs. This will be useful in predicting the impact 
of structural change and differential investment across government departments and in 
considering issues of recruitment and retention in relation to gender. Further, in using this 
information to identify that part of the public sector GPG which is driven by the allocation of 
men and women across PRBs, rather than that which is due to GPGs within PRBs, it will 
provide further evidence on the drivers of the public sector GPG. 
4. By providing the first evidence on GPGs in PRP by sector, and within the public sector, 
the analysis will provide insights into the impact of different pay systems on pay inequality. 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter two provides an overview of 
relevant economic theory and summarises the extensive empirical evidence in this area, 
focusing particularly on the UK. Chapter three outlines the principal data source, ASHE, in 
detail and explains the use of supplementary data from the QLFS. It also describes and 
discusses the measures and introduces the statistical methods employed. Chapter four 
presents and discusses the results. Chapter five concludes and provides some areas for 
future research. 
  
                                                          
7
 The analysis will be complementary to specialised and occupation specific evidence, for example, that arising from the 
recently commissioned review of the GPG in medicine which will use data based on departmental pay records.   
8
 The NCARRB (2018) explicitly recognise and are making efforts to address risks of equal pay litigation. The STRB (2019) also 
highlights the need for further research into the equality implications of the teachers’ pay system. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In what follows, we briefly summarise the main theories that have been commonly used in 
the literature to explain the GPG, namely human capital and discrimination theories. Then, 
based on findings from previous empirical research, we discuss the main drivers of the UK 
GPG. These include productivity-related characteristics (e.g. education and work 
experience) and pay discrimination, but also the distribution of women and men within the 
labour market (e.g. occupation and public/private sector) and other institutional factors. Then 
we review the findings of the existing literature on the sectoral and occupational differences 
in workforce composition and the GPG with a particular attention to the UK public sector and 
PRB occupations. Finally, we present the findings of previous studies on gender differences 
in PRP. 
2.2 An overview of GPG theory 
Several economic theories have been put forward to explain the GPG in the labour market. 
The main explanations can be classified into two general perspectives: The first one, human 
capital theory, explains the GPG based on the gender differences in observed productivity-
related characteristics, and the second one attributes the pay differential to the unequal 
treatment of women in the labour market – discrimination theories. In this section, we outline 
these two theories and look at the findings of the empirical literature in relation to these.    
2.2.1 Human capital theory   
Human capital is a term that is used to refer to a person’s knowledge, skills or experience, 
which determine individual’s productivity in the labour market (see Schultz, 1960, 1961; 
Becker, 1964; Ben-Porath, 1967; Mincer, 1958, 1974). According to human capital theory, 
individual earnings depend on productivity and this is influenced by human capital which can 
be enhanced through investments in formal education and on-the-job training. This approach 
to the GPG suggests that women are paid less than men as a result of their lower human 
capital (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1985). According to this theory, traditional 
gender division of labour within the household results in women accumulating less human 
capital than men as women put less time and effort into market work or choose careers that 
are compatible with family responsibilities but for which on-the-job-training is less important 
(Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Becker, 1985). Women might also anticipate more interruptions 
in employment, mainly due to having children and, as a result, they have lower incentives to 
invest in formal education and on-the-job training (Becker, 1985). Moreover, interruptions in 
employment involve foregone time that could be used for further human capital accumulation 
and might result in depreciation of existing human capital (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; 
Sandell and Shapiro, 1980; Mincer and Ofek, 1982). Men, on the other hand, invest their 
time and effort in the labour market, enhancing their human capital and productivity, 
widening the gap between genders.  
Historically human capital theory has been the most common approach to explaining gender 
differences in pay. One prominent method used in the literature to identify the role of human 
capital on the GPG has been the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, a regression-based 
decomposition method, which separates differences in average pay into a part that is 
explained by differences in human capital (e.g. education and work experience) and an 
unexplained component that is taken to reflect inequality in treatment (Oaxaca, 1973; 
Blinder, 1973). Using this type of decomposition analysis, recent studies show that, over the 
last few decades, human capital has become much less important in explaining the GPG. 
This is mainly due to the convergence between men and women in human capital 
investments, in particular to the increase in women’s relative education and work experience 
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(Goldin, 2014; Blau and Kahn, 2017).9 Previous studies for the UK also show that gender 
differences in human capital explain a shrinking proportion of the GPG (see, for example, 
Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007; Joshi et al., 2007; Makepeace et al., 2004; Manning and 
Swaffield, 2008; Olsen et al., 2010). Indeed, a recent contribution by Jones et al. (2018) find 
that the downward trend in the explained differential has stalled since 2010 and that 
women’s human capital characteristics are no longer converging with men.   
2.2.2 Discrimination theories 
The fact that the GPG persists despite the women’s relative improvements in human capital 
suggests that the remaining unexplained difference in pay between men and women may be 
driven at least partially by the persistence of discrimination (Brynin, 2017). Labour market 
discrimination is defined as “a situation in which persons who provide labour market services 
and who are equally productive in a physical or material sense are treated unequally in a 
way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race, ethnicity, or gender” (Altonji 
and Black, 1999). Economic theories put forward a number of reasons why labour market 
discrimination may arise. The first, by Becker (1957), is personal prejudice or ‘taste-based 
discrimination’. Becker’s taste-based discrimination model argues that differences in the 
treatment of men and women in the labour market arise if at least some employers, workers 
or customers prefer or dislike interacting with members of a particular group and if they are 
willing to pay a price, such as by sacrificing profits, to avoid this interaction. For example, 
employers who are prejudiced against women may act as if female workers are more 
expensive to hire than they truly are and, as such, hire men at a higher wage than they 
would actually need to pay for an equally productive woman. On the other hand, the source 
of discrimination might be employees, who are prejudiced against members of a particular 
group and demand a wage premium to work alongside them, or it might be customers who 
get lower utility from purchasing services if they have to interact with the members of a 
particular group of workers. According to Becker’s taste-based discrimination model, these 
preferences will create incentives for segregation in the labour market. An implication of this 
is that, in the absence of costs associated with segregation, workplace/firm segregation of 
workers will reduce the effect of taste-based discrimination on wage differentials. 
As noted by Becker (1957) and later articulated by Arrow (1973), the taste-based 
discrimination model predicts the elimination of discrimination through competitive forces in 
the long run as prejudiced employers, who are willing to sacrifice profits by discriminating, 
will be driven out of business. This contrasts to the evidence of the existence and 
persistence of unexplained gender pay differentials. Subsequent research, however, has 
pointed out that Becker’s taste-based discrimination model is in fact consistent with the 
evidence in the presence of imperfect information in the labour market about the location 
and preferences of customers, employees and employers (see Altonji and Black, 1999 for a 
review of this strand of the literature).  
The second leading theory by Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972), ‘statistical discrimination’ 
suggests that discrimination by employers may in fact be rational and not driven by 
prejudice. The presence of imperfect information in the labour market about workers’ 
productivity leads employers to discriminate on the basis of predicted or actual differences 
between the average man and woman, i.e. stereotyping. In fact, as pointed out by earlier 
                                                          
9 
The literature highlights several factors as contributors to this convergence, such as increased control over fertility via the 
introduction of oral contraceptives (Goldin and Katz, 2002; Bailey, 2006); the introduction of new and improved household 
technologies (Greenwood et al., 2005); the introduction of bottle feeding and the medical advances that improved maternal 
health (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2016); gender biased technological change (Goldin, 1990; Galor and Weil, 1996) and the 
expansion of service sector (Ngai and Petrongolo, 2017) that increased demand to skills that women have a comparative 
advantage; decrease in child care costs (Attanasio et al., 2008); and cultural factors (Fernández et al., 2004; Fernández and 
Fogli, 2009; Fernández, 2013). 
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research, employers face uncertainty about worker productivity implying that statistical 
discrimination is plausible (Altonji and Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2017). Although it is an 
empirical challenge to quantify labour market discrimination and disentangle the effects of 
taste-based and statistical discrimination, the empirical evidence finds support for both 
theories (see, for reviews, Altonji and Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2017). 
What taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination models have in common is that 
they begin by assuming discrimination arises due to agents acting individually or in other 
words in a competitive framework. Instead, in the monopsonistic discrimination model 
developed by Robinson (1933) imperfect competition in the labour market is the mechanism 
that drives the GPG. According to this model, a single employer, a monopsonist, can set 
wages below the productivity of their workers to obtain higher profits and if the labour supply 
of women is less sensitive to wage changes, then they may earn less than men even if they 
have the same productivity. A recent literature that builds on the monopsonistic 
discrimination model argues that women are less likely to leave their employer in response 
to changes in firm and market conditions (Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2009; Hirsch et al., 2010; 
Ransom and Oaxaca, 2010), as they may have different valuations for employer-provided 
amenities or face smaller effective labour markets due to limited geographic mobility or 
higher commuting costs caused by domestic responsibilities (see, for a review, Hirsch, 2016; 
Manning, 2011). Collective models, on the other hand, assume that discrimination in the 
labour market arises if one group acts against another. For instance, in Bergmann's (1974) 
overcrowding model, exclusion of women from certain occupations can result in women 
crowding into a small number of occupations, depressing wages there for otherwise equally 
productive workers. Consistent with this, previous research finds evidence that both men 
and women employed in occupations where women are over-represented tend to earn lower 
wages (see, for example, Blau and Kahn, 2017; Goldin, 2014; Levanon et al., 2009). It is, 
however, important to note that collective action is only one possible explanation of 
overcrowding of women in certain occupations which is also consistent with employer 
discrimination and human capital theories (see Altonji and Blank, 1999 for a discussion). For 
example, women’s concentration in certain occupations may be a result of the existence of 
more severe employer discrimination in other occupations. On the other hand, gender 
differences in pre-labour market human capital investments (e.g. subject choice) may lead to 
gender differences in comparative advantage across occupations and occupational 
crowding. Additionally, individual preferences for the characteristics of occupations may 
differ between comparable men and women.  
2.3 Evidence 
Although the UK GPG has decreased in recent decades, on average women still earn less 
than men (ONS, 2018). For instance, in April 2017, the overall GPG was 18.4 per cent, 
which is higher than the GPG for full-time employees (9.1 per cent) as well as that for part-
time employees (-5.1 per cent).10 This section reviews the existing evidence regarding the 
UK GPG. We start with an overview of the recent empirical findings on the drivers of the 
GPG at the mean and across the earnings distribution. Then, we summarise the findings of 
previous studies on the sectoral and occupational differences in workforce composition and 
the GPG with a particular attention to public sector and PRB occupations. Finally, we 
present the findings of the existing studies on gender differences in PRP.  
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 Although the overall GPG may therefore appear surprising, it is explained by the prevalence of part-time work among women 
which tends to pay less per hour than full-time work (see discussion below). Latest ONS figures show that around 40 per cent 
of female employees work part-time compared to 12 per cent of men or, around 77 per cent of part-time jobs are held by female 
employees (see ONS Labour Market bulletin, October 2018). 
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2.3.1 Drivers of the UK GPG  
Work experience 
Gender differences in work experience and labour force attachment are important 
contributors to the GPG. Historically, women have had lower labour force participation rates, 
and conditional on participation they work fewer hours and/or experience more career 
interruptions than men (Blau and Kahn, 2017). Consequently, they have less years of work 
experience and general training, and as a result, accumulate less human capital than men. 
Moreover, human capital depreciation during career interruptions further lower women’s 
wages upon their return to the labour market. In fact, there is considerable evidence that 
gender differences in work experience account for a significant portion of the GPG (see, for 
a review, Blau and Kahn, 2017). For the UK, using regression-based decomposition 
techniques discussed above, the evidence suggests that up to 56 per cent of the UK GPG 
can be attributed to work experience if detailed work-life history variables, such as prior 
experience of full-time and part-time work as well as years spent in unpaid care work are 
considered (Olsen et al., 2018). Consistently, Swaffield (2007) finds that the unexplained 
portion of the GPG reduces by almost 40 per cent if more detailed work history measures 
are used.11 
Educational qualifications 
Another important determinant of human capital, formal educational qualifications, have a 
substantial impact on pay, but is found to be relatively unimportant in explaining the 
contemporary UK GPG. Olsen and Walby (2004), using data from the British Household 
Panel Study (hereinafter, BHPS), find that only 8 per cent of the GPG can be explained by 
the level of education. Nevertheless, recent studies stress that differences in the quality or 
type of education may be an important factor in explaining the GPG, in particular among 
college graduates. For example, for UK graduates in their early career, the difference 
between subject of study by men and women has been found to have an impact on the GPG 
(e.g. Machin and Puhani, 2003; Chevalier, 2002, 2007). This is mainly driven by the fact that 
subjects studied by women are associated with higher risk of unemployment and lower pay 
in general, while men dominate subjects offering the greatest prospects after graduation 
(Chevalier, 2002). An important question is then, why gender differences in subject choice 
emerge and whether they arise from personal choice, reflecting underlying gender 
differences in preferences, or inequality in access, through for example, pre-labour market 
discrimination. 
Other personal characteristics 
The GPG also varies significantly by age. In the UK, the gap is found to be insignificant at 
school-leaving age, becomes positive but narrower for women in their 20s or 30s, then rises 
to a peak pay gap level for women at the age of 45 and then declines slightly (Olsen et al., 
2010). One possible explanation for this pattern is the differences across cohorts. Younger 
cohorts of women are not only more educated than older counterparts (Blau and Kahn, 
2017), but also, they “begin their career in a more gender-equal world” (Wharton, 2009). 
Alternatively, it might also be that the GPG increases with age because women are less 
likely than men to get training (Manning and Swaffield, 2008) or be promoted in their careers 
(Harkness, 2005; Brynin, 2017). Consistent with the former, historical British evidence 
showed that women are less likely to receive work-related training than men (see, for 
example, Blundell et al., 1996), while more recent evidence suggests that this trend has 
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 In the absence of actual work experience, most of the empirical literature relies on proxies such as age or potential work 
experience, that is age minus years of formal education (minus the school starting age). However, these measures potentially 
overstate women’s actual labour market experience as women experience more interruptions in employment than men. 
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been reversed, with women now being more likely to receive any training, on- and off the-job 
training, and off-the-job training with an employer contribution (Jones et al., 2008). 
Regarding gender differences in promotions, the empirical evidence indicates that women in 
Britain actually have higher promotion rates than men, but they receive a lower wage reward 
to promotion, and the gender difference in these rewards increases by age (Booth et al., 
2003a).  
An alternative explanation of the increase in the GPG with age is that the events that take 
place over the lifecycle, such as marriage and childbearing, might have different impact on 
women’s and men’s pay (Harkness, 2005; Rubery, 2008). It is well-documented that men 
experience a ‘marriage premium’ (see, for recent reviews, Ribar, 2004; Rodgers and 
Stratton, 2010).12,13 On the other hand, there is less consensus in the literature regarding the 
effect of marital status on women’s pay.14 The findings of empirical studies for the UK are 
mixed, and even sometimes contradictory (see, for example, Dolton and Makepeace, 1987; 
Waldfogel, 1997; 1998; Budig and England, 2001). However, empirical studies tend to agree 
that the impact of marriage on women’s pay, if there is any, is at least partly connected to 
having children. In fact, the presence/the number of dependent children itself has previously 
been identified as one of the key contributors to the UK GPG (e.g. Waldfogel, 1998; Joshi et 
al., 1999; Viitanen, 2014). A potential explanation is that women move out of paid work after 
childbirth, which results in depreciation of human capital during this period. Consistent with 
this argument, a recent study by Costa Dias et al. (2018), using data from the BHPS and the 
Understanding Society (hereinafter, USoc), shows that until the arrival of the first child, the 
GPG is relatively small and fairly stable (around 7-12 per cent), but gradually increases over 
the following years, until it reaches around 33 per cent. Costa Dias et al. (2018) also find that 
the steady increase in the gap after childbirth is not only driven by women’s tendency to 
move out of paid work but also to move to part-time work. Differences in cumulative work-
experience therefore provide an important explanation for the increasing GPG over the 
lifecycle. 
Previous research has also shown that other personal characteristics, such as ethnicity also 
play a role in determining a worker’s pay. The evidence for the UK suggests that, with only 
few exceptions, on average, men from ethnic minorities tend to earn less, overall, than White 
men, while women in ethnic minorities do not to face a double disadvantage in the labour 
market from gender and ethnicity (Longhi and Brynin, 2017). In fact, using the QLFS data for 
the period 2002-2014, Longhi and Brynin (2017) find that many ethnic minority women 
actually experience a pay advantage relative to White British women and men of the same 
ethnicity, and this is mainly due to higher qualifications of ethnic minority women as well as 
their concentration in occupations and regions, where pay is comparatively higher. 
Although most of the empirical studies on the GPG account for regional differences in 
earnings, only few explicitly deal with its regional dimension. Notable exceptions include 
Phimister (2005) who studies differences in urban wage premia by gender and Robinson 
(2005) who analyses the effect of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) on the GPG across 
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 The explanations put forward to explain the marriage premium for men include positive selection of men into marriage on the 
basis of wages or wage enhancing characteristics (Becker, 1981; Cornwell and Rupert, 1997), employer favouritism (Hill, 1979; 
Bartlett and Callahan, 1984) and the argument that marriage makes men more productive (Becker, 1981; Korenman and 
Neumark, 1991; Loh, 1996; Ginther and Zavodny, 2001).   
13
 Cross-sectional evidence for men in Britain reports a ‘marriage premium’ ranging from 10 per cent to 14 per cent (see, for a 
review, Bardasi and Taylor, 2008). On the other hand, using panel data from the BHPS, covering the period 1991-2003, 
Bardasi and Taylor (2008) find that more than half of the ‘marriage premium’ for men in Britain is explained by unobserved 
individual-specific heterogeneity and/or selection effects. Nevertheless, a small but statistically significant marriage premium 
remains even after controlling for a wide range of characteristics including time-invariant individual specific unobserved 
characteristics. Their further analysis suggests that intra-household specialisation is in fact an important explanation of the 
wage premium observed for married men in Britain. 
14
 See, for example, Ginther and Sundström (2008), Hill (1979), Korenman and Neumark (1991), Killewald and Gough (2013) 
and Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2009). 
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regions. A more recent example is the paper by Stewart (2014b) which investigates the 
geographic variation in GPGs by focusing on the difference between London (or the south-
eastern corner more generally) and the rest of Great Britain. Stewart (2014b) uses region of 
employment information from the 2012 ASHE data and finds that London has a higher GPG 
compared to the rest of Great Britain in the upper half of the wage distribution. At the median 
the entire regional difference in GPG is due to differences in individual and work-related 
characteristics between London and the rest of Great Britain, and it is only in the top one-
third of the wage distribution that the higher GPG in London is not a consequence of 
characteristics. Using region of residence and 1995-1997 and 2004-2007 BHPS data, Olsen 
et al. (2010) also show that inner and outer London and the South East have larger GPGs. 
Their findings, however, suggest that the contribution of the regional differences on the size 
of the overall GPG is negligible. 
The empirical evidence for the UK consistently suggests that disabled workers experience a 
pay penalty relative their non-disabled counterparts (see, for a review, Jones, 2008). 
Moreover, evidence suggests that gender and disability, when combined, create a double 
pay disadvantage for disabled women. Further, using data from the QLFS and focusing on 
gender differences in disability effects, Jones et al. (2006) find that the gender gap in 2003 
was larger for the disabled compared with 1997, indicating the worsening position of 
disabled women in the UK labour market. Using regression-based decomposition techniques 
discussed above, they also find that the ‘unexplained’ component of the GPG was greatest 
for those whose disability is work-limiting. Using data from the QLFS between 2004-2007, 
Longhi and Platt (2008) also show that disabled men and disabled women are 
disadvantaged compared to non-disabled men. They find that disabled men (women) had a 
pay gap of 11 (22) per cent relative to non-disabled men.15   
Recent studies also highlight the role of gender differences in individual characteristics that 
are not usually available in standard datasets, such as personality traits, including labour 
market motivation, attitudes and aspirations, on pay gaps. Gender differences in personality 
traits may arise due to perceptions of men and women with respect to gender roles shaped 
by cultural values, which may be imposed by society and reflect a form of pre-labour market 
discrimination. There is some evidence suggesting that differences in perceptions of gender 
roles influence the negotiation skills of men and women which are crucial in determining the 
starting salaries and pay rises (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). In the UK, although earlier 
studies find an effect of personality traits on GPG (Chevalier, 2002; Chevalier, 2007; 
Swaffield, 2000), Manning and Swaffield (2008) highlight that this effect is only marginal. 
Swaffield (2007) also shows that although the differences between women in gender role 
values have an impact on female wages, these attitudes are not a main component of the 
UK GPG. 
Work-related characteristics 
Pay is not entirely determined by personal characteristics but has also been found to depend 
on the characteristics of the individual’s job and employer. Previous research has 
consistently demonstrated that part-time employment in the UK is associated with lower pay 
and inferior quality work relative to full-time jobs (e.g. Connolly and Gregory, 2008; 
Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007; Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). As such, part-time 
employment contributes to occupational downgrading and occupational segregation (see 
below). Moreover, due to difference in hours of work, over the same period of employment, 
part-time workers accumulate less human capital through work experience than full-time 
workers (Kunze, 2018). There is also evidence that part-time work experience has either no 
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 There is a further literature on wage gaps relating to sexual orientation which find the results vary by gender (see, for 
example, Bryson, 2017).  
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or even a negative effect on pay (Joshi et al., 2007; Olsen and Walby, 2004) and it is only 
full-time work experience that has substantial benefits in terms of human capital 
accumulation (Costa Dias et al., 2018). On the other hand, recent evidence by Olsen et al. 
(2018) suggests that part-time experience may be a new protective factor of the GPG in the 
UK, as they find that part-time work experience decreases the GPG. They partly attribute 
this to an increasing proportion of female workers having negotiated part-time employment 
as a form of job retention with more comparable job quality to that of their previously full-time 
positions. 
In addition to full-time/part-time employment, the type of employment contract is also found 
to play a role on determining a worker’s pay, with workers on temporary contracts earning 
less than their counterparts in permanent employment. As argued by Arulampalam et al. 
(2007), if the prevalence of temporary contracts varies between men and women, it could be 
an important determinant of the GPG. In fact, for Britain, there is evidence that women are 
more likely than men to be on temporary contracts, and workers on temporary contracts 
receive lower wages than their permanent counterparts (Booth et al., 2002, 2003b). 
However, although temporary work affects the pay of men and women negatively and the 
effect is much larger on men than women (Booth et al., 2003b), it has only a small effect on 
the overall GPG (Brynin, 2017).   
In addition to general skills acquired through work experience, firm-specific skills also have a 
positive impact on pay and promotion opportunities (see, for an overview, Evertsson, 2004). 
Tenure, measured by the number of years an employee has been working for the same 
employer or in the same job, is considered to capture the firm/job specific training of the 
worker (see, among others, Abraham and Farber, 1987; Altonji and Williams, 2005; Mincer 
and Jovanovic, 1981; Topel, 1991). Recent evidence for the UK indicates that women have 
shorter job tenure relative to men, mainly due to child-rearing, however, this has only a small 
impact on the size of the GPG (Brynin, 2017; Olsen et al., 2018). 
Occupational segregation by gender is a key feature of the UK labour market and another 
established determinant of the GPG (Blau and Kahn, 2000), with women being concentrated 
in lower paying occupations such as caring, leisure and other service occupations. Although 
there is much debate over whether to control for occupation in estimating the GPG, most 
empirical studies include occupational dummies in order to take into account occupational 
segregation.16 On the other hand, Mumford and Smith (2007) suggest a more direct 
measure of occupational segregation based on the number of females in any given 
occupation, known as the ‘femaleness’ of the occupation.17 In fact, using a similar measure 
(the percentage of males in the occupation), Olsen et al. (2010) find that occupational 
segregation, accounted for 15 per cent of the GPG in 1997, 17 per cent in 2007, and 19 per 
cent in 2014/2015 (Olsen et al., 2018) while Mumford and Smith (2009) show that combined 
with workplace segregation (see below for further discussion), occupational segregation, 
makes a significant contribution to the GPG between male and female part-time employees 
but not for full-time workers.   
Gender differences in the type of tasks performed within occupations, and work 
responsibilities may also influence the GPG. In relation to the former, evidence for the UK 
shows that gender inequality with respect to tasks remains substantial within occupations 
(Lindley, 2012). Using data from the UK Skills Surveys and the EU KLEMS database, 
Lindley (2012) finds that within broad industries men undertake a range of numeracy tasks 
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 As occupational segregation itself might be partly due to discrimination, controlling for it will underestimate the unexplained 
component of the GPG that is taken to reflect inequality in treatment. On the other hand, if occupational segregation is driven 
by individual choices, not controlling for it will overstate discrimination (see, for a further discussion, Blau and Kahn, 2000).  
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 As noted by Mumford and Smith (2007), the impact of occupation on the GPG might be wider than the one captured by the 
‘femaleness’ of the occupation. 
20 
   
that are positively correlated with the technical change, while women do not. Similarly, 
Felstead et al. (2002) show that in Britain men are more likely to work in jobs that require 
complex and advanced computer applications than women. Regarding responsibilities, 
Drolet (2011) argues that if men have more opportunities than women to undertake 
managerial or supervisory responsibilities or work-related tasks such as budgeting and/or 
staffing decisions, or if men receive higher returns to these responsibilities and tasks than 
women, then the GPG will persist. 
Similar to gender differences in occupational distribution, there exist significant differences in 
the concentration of women and men across industries. By controlling for broad categories 
of industry in wage regressions, Olsen et al. (2018) find that 29 per cent of the UK GPG in 
2014/2015 could be attributed to the industry allocation of men and women, while the 
contribution of specific industries to the gap ranged from 0.6 per cent (financial sector) to 
16.8 per cent (manufacturing). The variation across industries is mainly driven by gender 
segregation, with females dominating industries where the pay is lower (e.g. human, health 
and social work). However, similar to occupation (see discussion above), including controls 
for industry in analysing the GPG is debated as it is not obvious whether gender segregation 
by industry is a result of individual choices or discrimination (Blau and Kahn, 2000). 
It is well-established in the empirical literature that working in large firms leads to a 
significant wage premium (see, for a review, Troske, 1999), however, the link between firm 
size and GPG is less clear. In relation to the latter, the empirical evidence is mixed, and 
even sometimes contradictory (see, Mitra, 2003 for the US; Akar et al., 2013 for Turkey; 
Heinze and Wolf, 2010 for Germany). For Britain, using data from three different sources 
(the BHPS of 1991, the General Household Survey of 1983, and the establishment-level 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 1984 and 1990), Green et al. (1996) find that 
there are larger firm size effects for women in the private sector than men, and in particular 
the wage penalty for working in smaller establishments is much larger for women.   
Working in the public sector and being a trade union member are two institutional factors 
that are considered to favour women (Olsen et al., 2010). In relation to the former, the 
probability of working in the public sector is higher for women (Jones et al., 2018). It is also 
well established that there exists a public sector wage premium which is greater for women 
(Blackaby et al., 2012; Bozio and Disney, 2011). As a result, the GPG, both raw and 
unexplained, is lower in the public sector (see, for example, Olsen et al., 2010; Chatterji et 
al., 2011; Jones et al., 2018). Recent evidence by Jones et al. (2018) also shows that the 
main determinant of the national GPG is within sector gender pay differentials rather than 
the different gender sector allocations. In fact, Jones et al. (2018) find that in the absence of 
within sector GPGs, women would earn more than men, on average.  
In relation to union membership, women now are more likely to be members than men and 
the membership rates are much higher in the public sector than in the private sector 
(Chatterji et al., 2011). Similar to the public sector wage premium, the empirical studies for 
the UK have shown that there exists a union membership wage premium which is around 10 
per cent (Bryson, 2014). Although recent studies show that the premium has declined over 
time (see, for example, Forth and Bryson, 2015), it continues to be sizeable both in the 
public and private sectors, being much larger in the former than in the latter (Blanchflower 
and Bryson, 2010). In terms of gender differences, the evidence suggests that the union 
wage premium in Britain is larger for women than men, and as a result, it narrows the GPG. 
A recent study by Blanchflower and Bryson (2010) also confirms that unions have a larger 
positive impact on pay for women, both in the public and private sector. However, its role in 
determining the overall GPG is found to be relatively small (Olsen et al., 2010, 2018). 
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Workplace characteristics 
While previous studies focus mainly on personal and work-related characteristics, the 
availability of nationally representative linked employee-employer datasets, has shifted the 
attention to the role of firm and workplace in driving the GPG. In relation to the workplace, 
Chatterji et al. (2011) use data from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(hereinafter, WERS) 2004 and show that characteristics, including the presence of PRP 
schemes, company pension schemes and family-friendly work policies play an important role 
in the determination of individual earnings. However, their results indicate that the major 
component of the earnings gap between full-time male and female employees in Britain 
remains unexplained even after accounting for workplace in addition to individual and work-
related characteristics. Similarly, a recent study by Jewell et al. (2018) uses data from the 
ASHE and explores how much of the UK GPG between years 2002-2016 was due to the 
distribution of workers across firms, i.e. which workers were employed by which firms. 
However, their findings suggest that the contribution of the differences between men and 
women in whom they work for on GPG is small (less than 1 percentage point), pointing to 
the importance of within-firm gender wage inequality. Interestingly, they also find that despite 
the significant variation across occupations in terms of pay, the contribution of gender-
occupational segregation was only 1 percentage point to the overall UK GPG. Consistent 
with this result, Mumford and Smith (2009) find that segregation at the workplace level is in 
fact even more important than occupational segregation in determining the GPG in Britain. 
Their analysis of the WERS data suggest that only 2.6 per cent of the GPG in 1998 was 
related to occupational segregation, compared to the 29.1 per cent that was related to 
workplace segregation.     
2.3.2 UK GPG across the earnings distribution 
Although attention on the GPG tends to focus at the middle of the earnings distribution, 
making comparisons between the average man and woman, international evidence is 
increasingly concerned with the entire distribution (see Albrecht et al., 2003 for Sweden; de 
la Rica et al., 2008 for Spain; Jellal et al., 2008 for France; Arulampalam et al., 2007 for a 
comparison of eleven European countries including Britain).  
In the UK, Olsen et al. (2010) show that male and female wages diverge over the pay 
distribution. Although the drivers of the GPG are found to be largely similar over the 
distribution, their results show that education has a larger positive effect on pay at the top of 
the wage distribution. Based on the latter, they argue that, women’s relative improvements in 
education will have a more equalising effects on the GPG at the middle or top of the pay 
distribution. A recent study by Chzhen and Mumford (2011) also find that the GPG increases 
across the pay distribution indicating the presence of a ‘glass ceiling’ effect, or vertical 
segregation, among British full-time employees. They show that high skilled, white-collar 
occupations and carrying out managerial duties are strongly associated with the glass ceiling 
effect. Another recent contribution by Fortin et al. (2017) documents the under-
representation of women at the top of the annual earnings distribution using data from the 
ASHE. Their further analysis based on the QLFS reveal that under-representation of women 
among top earners accounts for the half of the average hourly GPG in 2015. Focusing at the 
other end of the wage distribution, Bargain et al. (2018) find surprisingly little impact of the 
NMW on the UK GPG.    
2.3.3 The role of the public sector  
There has been considerable interest in quantifying the size of the UK public-private pay 
differential and tracking its movements over time, with a consistent finding being a greater 
public sector pay premium for women (see, for example, Blackaby, et al. 2012; Cribb et al., 
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2014a). A recent contribution to this strand of the literature by Singleton (2018) uses data 
from the ASHE for the years 2002-2016. Interestingly, he finds that women working in the 
public sector received an average premium of 4 per cent compared with those working in 
private sector, while there was no significant public sector premium for men. Consistent with 
this result, analysis of the GPG by sector finds smaller gaps within the public than the private 
sector (see, for example, Chatterji et al., 2011; Stewart, 2014a; Jones et al., 2018).18 The 
recent study by Jones et al. (2018), for example, documents an average GPG of 36.5 per 
cent in the private sector, while the gap is 24.5 per cent in the public sector. In terms of 
employment, women are also concentrated in the public sector, which accounts for about 30 
per cent of employment for women, about double that for men (Millard and Machin, 2007; 
Matthews, 2010). In the UK, therefore the public sector makes an important narrowing 
contribution to the national GPG, particularly through a lower within sector GPG but also 
through the presence of a relative concentration of women in the public sector, which on 
average offers a pay premium relative to the private sector (Jones et al., 2018). 
Given the existence of gender differences in sectoral employment, it might be important to 
account for possible selection of workers into sectors, that is the extent to which workers 
with certain characteristics are likely to be employed in the public versus the private sector, 
in analysing the wage differentials. In fact, an earlier study by Blank (1985) provides 
evidence that wages for public and private sector workers in the US are affected by the 
selection of workers into sectors. Moreover, she finds that workers’ sectoral choice itself is 
influenced by wage differences across sectors. Using data from the BHPS of 2000, 
Heitmueller (2006) quantify this effect for Scotland and finds evidence of gender differences. 
He finds that a 1 per cent increase in expected pay increases the probability of employment 
in the public sector by 1.3 per cent for men and 2.9 per cent for women. He also finds that 
the public sector wage premium is 10 per cent for males and 24 per cent for females, 
however, after controlling for double sample selection from participation and sector choice, 
there exists a male private sector wage premium, while there is no evidence of a sample 
selection bias for females. In contrast, Disney and Gosling (2003) find that the public sector 
premia in Britain is robust to selection of workers into sectors. As part of exploring the 
contribution of the public sector to the UK GPG, Jones et al. (2018) model sector choice 
separately for males and females and find that the higher probability of public sector 
employment for females is largely unexplained by personal and work-related characteristics. 
Although controlling for occupation has a critical role, about half of the gender gap in the 
probability of public sector employment remains unexplained and may therefore reflect 
gender differences in individual preferences and/or different barriers to entry.  
The wage distribution has also been identified as important in terms of the public-private 
sector pay premium, with a greater premium evident at the lower tail of the distribution, and 
that a premium for women exists throughout the majority of the distribution except the top, 
while the public-private pay differential is negative at the top of the earnings distribution for 
men (Blackaby et al., 2012). Stewart (2014a) finds a greater GPG in the private sector for 
full-time workers regardless of the point on the distribution at which it is measured, but also 
that the wage gap increases throughout the distribution in both sectors. This is consistent 
with previous evidence of a ‘glass ceiling’ in the public sector in Britain (Arulampalam et al., 
2007). 
Although smaller in magnitude, a significant ‘unexplained’ pay gap is also found within the 
public sector, a potential indicator of gender pay inequality. Several arguments have been 
put forward to explain why this is lower in the public relative to the private sector (Chatterji et 
al., 2011). These include distinctive nature of the public sector in embracing cultural values 
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 This is not confined to the UK (see, for example, Arulampalam et al., 2007 and Cai and Lui, 2011).  
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as a ‘fair’ employer (Beaumont, 1981; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010)19 and more highly 
developed equality practices (Hoque and Noon, 2004), including greater provision of flexible 
working and family friendly practices (Chatterji et al., 2011). There may also be indirect 
effects arising from centralised pay-setting and collective bargaining in compressing the 
earnings distribution (Grimshaw, 2000) as well as an influence of unions on equality 
practices (Hoque and Bacon, 2014). Stewart (2014a) also highlights the role of more 
transparent and structured pay systems within the public sector. 
Stricter regulatory controls also apply to public sector pay, for example the Single Status 
Agreement (1997) and the NHS Agenda for Change (2004) impose common pay structures 
for employees in local government and the health sector (outside top clinical grades), and 
additional statutory duties require all public service organisations to take proactive action to 
redress patterns of disadvantage, to promote equality and to eliminate discrimination in 
employment and recruitment practices. Indeed, in terms of pay this has tended to include 
formal job evaluations as part of equal pay assessments. More recently, as part of the 
Equality Act 2010, the Public Sector Equality Duty 2011 requires that public authorities take 
additional steps to “advance equality of opportunity”. However, in contrast to the narrowing 
trend since the 1970s following the Equal Pay Act, Jones et al. (2018) show that the GPG 
across both sectors has been unchanged since 2010. Further, the unexplained gap has 
been stable for two decades suggesting such policies have not influenced the treatment of 
women in the public sector. 
2.3.4 The role of occupation 
In a similar manner to sector, occupational segregation affects the GPG in two ways (see 
Brown et al., 1980) and, as such, the overall GPG can be broken down into within 
occupation and between occupation components, where the latter arise from gender 
differences in the occupational distribution.20 Occupational segregation is an established 
driver of the overall GPG (see above discussion). An important issue is therefore why 
women tend to be concentrated in different occupations to men and, whether this itself is a 
function of personal characteristics or unexplained, potentially reflecting discrimination or 
gender differences in preferences in terms of the nature of jobs (see, for example, Lordan 
and Pischke, 2016), in particular the ability to combine work and family. Despite the 
evidence of occupational segregation, few studies have explored the role of occupational 
selection on the UK GPG. A notable exception is an early study by Dolton et al. (1989) which 
uses a sample of British college graduates in arts and social science and provides evidence 
of sample selection effects on earnings from both the female participation decision and the 
occupational choice decision. More recently, Lekfuangfu and Lordan (2018) use data from 
three cohorts (1958, 1970 and 2000) and find a decline in the extent of occupational 
segregation by gender which they attribute to societal change. However, they find much less 
progress among the most male dominated occupations, such as engineering, and that males 
remain unlikely to select into traditionally female occupations, including some important 
public sector occupations such as social work, nursing and primary school teaching. 
Similarly, Brynin (2017) finds that the effect of occupational segregation has become a less 
important determinant of the UK GPG over time and that this is true, but to a lesser extent, 
for the within occupation GPG, increasing the relative importance of the latter. Indeed, recent 
analysis by Stewart (2015) shows that, in Britain, about half of the GPG can be attributed to 
differences within occupations, which are found to be pronounced (see also Goldin, 2014 for 
a similar discussion relating to the US). Moreover, he finds that the within occupation GPG is 
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 This is consistent with recent reference by Jeremy Hunt to the NHS as a “shining beacon of equality among all” being a 
particular motivator to reduce the GPG in medicine (May 2018). 
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 There is an argument that low wages arise in female dominated occupations because pay practices are ‘socially constructed’ 
(Brynin, 2017) and undervalue women’s labour. 
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typically larger in higher paid occupations and lower in occupations with a higher proportion 
of female employees.  
While within occupation analysis of GPGs has made an important contribution to the recent 
literature, particularly in identifying the pre-requisites for greater gender pay equality, almost 
all evidence on within occupation gender differences comes from the US. Further, although 
comparisons between occupations have provided important insights, for example, into the 
detrimental role of long hours on the GPG (see Goldin, 2014), studies often focus on 
individual case study occupations. For example, Goldin and Katz (2016) examine the GPG 
among pharmacists in the US and find a gender earnings gap of about 25 log points for 
annual earnings controlling for productivity-related characteristics. However, a majority of the 
gap among pharmacists can be explained by the gender differences in hours of work. They 
find that conditional on hours of work, female pharmacists earn 4-7 log points less than 
comparable male pharmacists. An earlier study by Reyes (2007a) also focuses on the US 
gender pay differentials among obstetricians and gynaecologists. He finds that in 2002, the 
gender pay differential of 18 per cent can largely be explained by female physicians 
choosing to see fewer patients, perform fewer surgical procedures, or practice in less 
financially rewarding settings. Using data from a staff survey in 1994, Pudney and Shields 
(2000a and 2000b) analyse gender differences in promotion among the registered nurses 
working in the UK NHS. They find that estimates of the impact on life-time earnings are 
sensitive to the methodology applied, but that gender has a minimal impact.21 Turnbull and 
Williams (1974) provide a rare exception in relation to teachers and find that gender 
differences in length of service largely explain the gender difference in earnings, particularly 
in secondary schools.22 
Within the public sector, PRBs cover occupations with pronounced gender segregation (e.g. 
nurses and the armed forces) and substantial variation in pay (e.g. nurses compared to 
medical practitioners and dental practitioners). Despite the increasing literature on workforce 
composition in the UK public sector (Millard and Machin, 2007; Matthews, 2010; Cribb et al., 
2014b), there has been limited consideration of differences across occupations. 
Nevertheless, as Cribb et al. (2014b) note, there are important gender differences in 
employment composition within the public sector. For example, 75 per cent of women in the 
public sector are employed in health or education, compared with just 43 per cent of men, 
who are more likely to work in public administration and defence. Moreover, changes in the 
composition of public sector employment over time, and the relative protection of some 
areas during austerity, has led to an increase in the concentration of women. While studies 
have considered the influence of sector (Jones et al., 2018) and occupation (Stewart, 2015) 
on the GPG, the interaction between these, and therefore evidence relating to the 
occupational contribution to the public sector GPG, has been overlooked.23 The only UK 
exception, by Stewart (2014a), considers how the GPG varies within the public sector, 
particularly between central government and local authorities, where interestingly he finds a 
pronounced difference, with it being lower in local authorities.24 
On the other hand, there is a long-standing evidence from the US medical studies that 
explore GPG among physicians (Apaydin et al., 2018; Baker, 1996; Jagsi et al., 2012; 
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 The exception being when career history and training are assumed to be endogenous in a model of promotion with constant 
thresholds, which is subsequently rejected by these data (Pudney and Shields, 2000b). 
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 McNabb and Wass (1997) use unique personnel data on academic staff in old universities (1975-1992) and find that a 
significant part, but certainly not all, of the 15 per cent wage differential is explained gender differences in seniority. Wass and 
McNabb (2006) also consider the GPG among solicitors in the UK. Also, historically for the UK, Siebert and Young (1983) 
consider librarians. 
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 This is despite international evidence which highlights the interaction between occupation and sector (see for example, Baron 
and Cobb-Clark, 2010 for analysis of Australia). 
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 Brynin (2017) also provides descriptive evidence of a smaller GPG in the public sector for graduates. 
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Ohsfeldt and Culler, 1986; Weaver et al., 2015), obstetricians and gynaecologists (Reyes, 
2007b), and nurse practitioners (Greene et al., 2017; Muench et al., 2016). Evidence from a 
non-US study for the male and female GPs in England reports an 11 per cent pay differential 
in log hourly wage which is much smaller than the difference in average annual earnings of 
45 per cent (Gravelle et al., 2011). After controlling for personal and workplace (practice) 
characteristics as well as area characteristics, the study finds that the unexplained portion of 
the GPG is around 6 per cent for hourly wages and 30 per cent for annual pay suggesting 
that there are significant gender differences in hours of work between male and female GPs 
but also that hours worked have different effects on pay for male and female GPs. By 
contrast, even the international evidence on other public sector occupations such as 
teachers or the armed forces is scarce.25 Lee and Smith (1990) and Verdugo and Schneider 
(1994) provide notable exceptions for the US. Lee and Smith (1990) focus on differences 
between public, Catholic, and other private secondary schools and find a significant female 
penalty after controlling for personal and work-related characteristics which is largest in 
private schools (12 per cent compared to 5 per cent in the public sector). While Carroll et al. 
(2018) highlight the importance of occupational segregation within teaching, with women 
dominating primary education, Verdugo and Schneider (1994) find a relatively small 
influence of the level of education and subject taught on the GPG among teachers. Indeed, 
similar to Lee and Smith (1990), they find a 5 per cent earnings penalty for females after 
adjusting for personal and work-related characteristics.  
2.3.5 PRP 
While the majority of evidence on the GPG relates to usual hourly pay, there is a growing 
body of literature that emphasises gender gaps in PRP, pay systems in which a part of 
remuneration is based on performance.26 As Forth et al. (2016) argue, PRP schemes are 
more prevalent in some industries and occupations than others. For example, piecework is 
more common in manufacturing, while commission on sales is associated with retail and 
bonus payments in financial industries. Although it remains relatively limited (Work 
Foundation, 2014; Bryson et al., 2017), there is also increasing emphasis on PRP in the 
public sector (e.g. Makinson Report, 2000; Winsor Review, 2011), which has seen a 
movement from automatic progression to PRP as an incentive for effort, including, from 
2013, in relation to teachers’ progression (STRB, 2013). The existing literature, however, 
has highlighted the challenges of using the PRP schemes in public sector due to the nature 
of its activities and objectives, where outcomes are complex, difficult to measure and 
potentially have a wide social impact, and the delivery of these outcomes requires 
involvement of a variety of agents working collaboratively (see, for a review, Bajorek and 
Bevan, 2015). A number of studies also suggest that public sector employees have ‘public 
service motivation’, that is the intrinsic motivation derived from the providing the service, 
rather than its financial reward, and question whether the implementation of PRP schemes in 
public sector is optimal (see, for reviews, Bajorek and Bevan, 2015; Lewin, 2003; Wright, 
2001). Nevertheless, there are some examples of the PRP schemes in the UK public sector, 
such as the Quality and Outcomes Framework, which was introduced on 1 April 2004 for 
general practitioners, rewarding them for achievement of a range of targets across a range 
of domains (NHS Employers, 2014). Reviews by Prentice et al. (2007) and more recently by 
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 Rapaport (1995) uses public sector teachers in California to explore the role of non-discretionary contracts and Ransom and 
Lambson (2011) use Missouri school teachers to explore the predictions of a monopsony model. Both studies find evidence of 
a GPG after accounting for personal characteristics, despite the tight regulation over pay imposed by the contracts. Ransom 
and Lambson (2011) suggest that this might arise due to gender differences in additional responsibilities.  
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 The most common types of performance related pay are (i) piecework schemes, (ii) payment by results, (iii) plant or 
organisation wide incentives, (iv) performance related pay - bonus earnings or pay progression through a pay scale are based 
on an assessment or appraisal of an employee’s (or team’s) performance against previously set objectives, usually as part of a 
performance management system; (v) merit pay, (vi) competence based pay, and (vi) profit related pay (see, UNISON, 2017, 
for a detailed description of these pay schemes). 
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the Work Foundation (2014) also present evidence on PRP for civil servants, healthcare 
workers and teachers. While they found no evidence of applications of PRP systems in the 
armed forces, police or prison service, there is recent reference to performance related 
progression and pay awards by the PSPRB in their annual reports.   
The few empirical studies that focus on gender differentials in PRP show that women are 
less likely than men to be employed in jobs in which compensation is based on performance 
(see Manning and Saidi, 2010 for the UK; McGee et al., 2015 for the US; Xiu and 
Gunderson, 2013 for China). Consistent with this, experimental evidence suggests that 
women are often more reluctant to enter competitive environments (see, for example, 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). While gender differences in PRP might reflect differences in 
the preferences of women to enter competition, it is important to note that these preferences 
might be shaped by cultural values, which may reflect stereotypes or discrimination. In fact, 
evidence suggests that conditional on receipt of PRP, women receive a lower share of PRP 
in total compensation relative to males (Xiu and Gunderson, 2013), in particular among the 
highest paid employees (Albanesi et al., 2015). Moreover, gender gap in PRP is greater than 
the gap in base pay (Xiu and Gunderson, 2013) and displays a ‘glass ceiling’ pattern (de la 
Rica et al., 2015). Nevertheless, its role in determining the overall hourly GPG is found to be 
relatively small (Manning and Saidi, 2010). 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data sources and measures 
The main source of data used in this project is ASHE, which is well-established to be the 
most reliable and largest source of information on individual pay in the UK (ONS, 2018). 
These data, which are based on mandatory reporting by employers to ONS, cover a 1 per 
cent sample of employee jobs from HMRC’s PAYE system and are made available annually, 
with a reference date in April of each year.27 Although these data are available 1997-2018, 
we focus on the ‘current’ (2018) period.28,29 
In terms of achieving the aims of this project, ASHE has several benefits relative to other 
sources of data. Since information on sector is provided by the employer it is possible to 
identify public and private sector organisations accurately using information on legal status 
rather than employee perceptions. The latter may be subject to differences in information on, 
and interpretation of, the definition of sector. ASHE also contains detailed objective 
information on pay from payroll records which is less susceptible to individual non-response 
or, recall or measurement error, than self-reported information. It also contains a detailed 
range of measures of pay, including PRP. Further, the large sample size facilitates 
comparisons within the public sector, including across occupations, important given the 
distinct remit of the PRBs (see below).  
Sector and PRBs 
In ASHE, sector is classified based on the legal status of the enterprise from the Inter-
Departmental Business Register (hereinafter, IDBR). According to this classification workers 
employed in public corporations and nationalised industries, central government or local 
authority are classified as public sector; those employed by a private company or are a sole 
proprietor or in a partnership are classified as private. Workers employed in non-profit bodies 
or mutual associations are classified as a separate category that we refer to as the non-profit 
sector throughout.30 
Detailed occupation information is available using established measures (4-digit Standard 
Occupational Classification, hereinafter, SOC) within these data and has previously been 
used to identify public sector occupations including school teachers, doctors and dentists, 
police officers and prison service staff (see Bryson and Forth, 2017). As ONS considers 
some of the annual 4-digit estimates of the GPG as ‘reasonable’ or ‘low quality’, we pool 
data across 4-digit SOC groups to define PRB occupations and generate more reliable 
estimates.31 For example, while detailed 4-digit occupations would enable ‘medical 
practitioners’ to be separated from ‘dental practitioners’, we pool these to form the DDRB 
PRB. It is important to note that ASHE is not able to provide a complete coverage of PRBs. 
For example, some General Practitioners covered by the DDRB are excluded from the 
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 ASHE is a mandatory survey; however non-response to the survey, particularly among small employers implies that the 
sample of employees is actually lower than 1 per cent. Nevertheless, the response rate in ASHE is known to be substantially 
higher than many household survey data sets in Britain (see, for a discussion, Cribb and Emerson, 2016). For more 
information, see ONS Information Paper (2013) on the coverage and non-response in the ASHE. 
28
 The 2018 data is currently released as provisional but is routinely used, including by ONS, in this format. The robustness of 
the main findings from 2018 are, however, tested using the 2017 data.  
29
 Since ASHE data are confidential and potentially disclosive, they are only available from the UK Data Archive (hereinafter, 
UKDA) via the Secure Data Service (hereinafter, SDS) for projects where the researchers are accredited and where there is a 
clear public benefit. This project was approved for the use of these data and all outputs have been subject to disclosure control.  
30
 While the non-profit sector is often included as part of the private sector our preliminary analysis suggested a significantly 
lower GPG in the non-profit sector relative to the private sector. As such, we primarily focus on comparisons between the public 
and private sector (excluding non-profit sector) in our empirical analysis. 
31
 See   
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/datasets/annualsurveyofhoursan
dearningsashegenderpaygaptables.  
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analysis since the survey does not cover the self-employed.32 The AFPRB, SSRB and 
NCARRB are also excluded from analysis as ASHE does not cover jobs within the AFPRB 
and the occupations relevant for the SSRB and the NCARRB cannot be identified separately 
due to their limited coverage and occupational composition.33 We also make some further 
adjustments to match the coverage of PRBs more closely. For example, some PRBs only 
cover England and Wales while other PRBs extend to Scotland, but in these cases we also 
use regional information available to identify PRB remit employees.34 Additionally, in some 
occupations (e.g. teachers), there are practitioners both within the PRB system (e.g. in state 
schools) and those outside it (e.g. private schools). In these cases, the public sector 
identifier is used to identify the remit group.35 Some occupational codes also group jobs 
across different industrial activities (e.g. SOC 2010 code 1173 Senior officers in fire, 
ambulance, prison and related services). In these cases, industry information measured by 
the Standard Industrial Classification (hereinafter, SIC) 2007 is used to identify the remit 
group. Full details are provided in Appendix Table A.1, which is largely a replication of 
Bryson and Forth (2017), although we only focus on SOC 2010 and additionally define the 
AFPRB in the QLFS. We refer to the PRBs in aggregate as PRB occupations and, in a 
similar manner to Dolton et al. (2015), individuals employed within the public sector but 
outside these occupations are defined as non-PRB public sector workers throughout. This 
includes workers in central and local government such as the civil service and social 
workers. 
Pay  
ASHE contains detailed information on employee’s earnings and hours during the pay period 
(the week or the month depending on whether the employee is paid weekly or monthly) that 
includes the survey reference date in April, as well as the gross annual earnings and PRP 
received during the preceding year. As such, it is possible to measure hourly pay in multiple 
ways. Our benchmark hourly pay measure is the ONS recommended measure based on 
gross hourly pay for the reference period, excluding overtime, but we also explore sensitivity 
of the analysis to the precise measure employed.36 The alternative measures include hourly 
pay including overtime and, an hourly pay measure derived from annual gross earnings and 
annual PRP (following Bryson and Forth, 2017).37 We also recode pay observations as 
missing if gross hourly pay (including overtime) is more than £99.38 To explore gender gaps 
in PRP specifically, we use the amount of PRP received during the preceding year, in order 
not to exclude bonus payments that are not paid in the pay period covered by ASHE’s April 
survey date.39 PRP is measured in ASHE to include the amount paid to an employee as a 
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  More generally, information on earnings from the self-employed is well-established to suffer from considerable measurement 
error and is not typically available in survey data (including the QLFS).  
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 Analysis of the AFPRB is possible with the QLFS (see below) but is restricted by sample size. Based on the analysis of their 
own data the SSRB (2019) report the GPG in the Senior Civil Service as 5.1 per cent. 
34
 Some PRBs also cover Northern Ireland, but the ASHE data in the SDS does not. We restrict analysis of the QLFS to Great 
Britain for comparability. 
35
 As academy schools are classified by the IDBR as public sector, it is not possible to distinguish academy school teachers 
who are not within the STRB remit from teachers who are covered by the STRB. This might be important for our results since 
according to GPG Reporting 2018-2019 multi-academy trusts that run academy schools have among the largest GPGs within 
the public sector. 
36
 Our benchmark measure of gross hourly pay is calculated as gross weekly earnings (basic weekly earnings + incentive pay 
that relates to this pay period + additional premium payments during the pay period for shift work and night or weekend work 
not treated as overtime + pay received in the pay period for other reasons) excluding overtime for the reference period divided 
by basic weekly paid hours worked. This measure is also aligned to the GPG Reporting measure of hourly pay. 
37
 This measure divides gross annual earnings in the preceding year by an annualised measure of hours worked, based on 
working hours in the reference period. While in principle it better reflects total bonus payments made over the year (Bryson and 
Forth, 2017), it does not allow the separation of overtime payments from gross annual pay. It further assumes that working 
hours during the reference week are an accurate reflection of average working hours per week during the year which, using 
data from the Annual Population Survey, Bryson and Forth (2017) find is a reasonable assumption.  
38
 This is for consistency with the QLFS, where this is the ONS recommended filter.  
39
 This is consistent with that required by GPG reporting regulations. See 
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/m/4/Managing_gender_pay_reporting_04_12_17.pdf. The regression analysis which follows 
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result of meeting a performance or productivity objective, such as profit sharing, bonuses, 
piecework and commission payments.  
Our analysis sample is restricted to adults in their main job who have valid individual and 
enterprise identifiers and whose earnings is not affected by absence. We further remove 
individuals who have missing information on any of the variables of interest.40 ASHE 
provides calibration weights to adjust for sample selection and imputes for item non-
response. We keep imputed cases and use calibration weights throughout our data analysis, 
so the estimates are representative of the population, but in each table, we also present the 
unweighted number of observations. 
Explanatory variables 
ASHE also contains detailed information on the nature of the job and employer, including 
firm size, location, tenure, coverage of collective agreements, permanent/temporary contract 
and contracted hours of work which are all important control variables in the analysis of pay 
and the GPG (see Section 2.3.1). Information on contracted hours of work will also enable 
comparisons between full and part-time employees, where it is well-established that the 
GPG differs considerably (Petrongolo and Manning, 2008).41 
In terms of personal characteristics, ASHE contains information on gender (unless specified 
otherwise, a binary indicator that takes a value of 1 for females and 0 for males). Our control 
variables include other personal characteristics such as age (and age-squared) and (work) 
region, as well as work-related characteristics such as tenure measured by the total number 
of years in present organisation (and tenure-squared), part-time (a binary indicator that takes 
a value of 1 if the job is part-time and 0 otherwise), temporary employment (a binary 
indicator that takes a value of 1 if the job is temporary/casual and 0 otherwise), firm size 
measured by the number of employees in the enterprise on the IDBR (in logarithmic form), 
collective bargaining (a binary indicator that takes a value of 1 if the employee’s pay is set 
with reference to a collective agreement and 0 otherwise), and occupation information 
measured by SOC 2010 code major groups.42,43  
Table 1a presents summary sample statistics from ASHE for the explanatory variables 
employed in our analysis by sector for all employees and by gender. They confirm a number 
of key and well-established differences between public and private sector employment, in 
particular in terms of the more extensive coverage of collective bargaining and the 
prevalence of professional occupations within the public sector. As expected, gender 
differences in part-time employment are also pronounced in all sectors and there is evidence 
of occupational segregation, for example, females are disproportionately represented in 
‘Administrative and secretarial occupations’ and ‘Caring, leisure and other service 
occupations’ and, in the private sector males are concentrated among ‘Skilled trade 
occupations’ and ‘Process, plant and machine operatives’. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
takes into account that there might be differences between full-time and part-time workers if, for example, bonuses are paid on 
a pro-rata basis. 
40
 We retain 158,740 individuals from the initial sample of 178,942 observations. 
41
 Although Dolton et al. (2015) focus on full-time employees in their analysis of the impact of PRBs, Bryson and Forth (2017) 
also consider part-time employees. We adopt the latter approach and explore the role of part-time employment, first by 
introducing a control for full-time/part-time employment within our analysis and then, sample sizes permitting, by estimating 
separate models for full-time workers as sensitivity analysis. 
42
 ASHE defines full-time employees as those who work more than 30 paid hours per week or those in teaching professions 
working 25 paid hours or more per week. 
43
 Since major groups do not vary within some PRBs (e.g. DDRB), within PRB analysis uses occupation information measured 
by the 4-digit SOC 2010 codes. 
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Table 1a. Sample statistics for explanatory variables, by sector 
 Public Private Non-profit  
 All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female 
Age  43.50 43.22 43.63 40.17 40.47 39.75 43.57 43.48 43.63 
Work region (per 
cent) 
         
North East 4.54 4.35 4.63 3.55 3.40 3.75 4.09 4.26 3.97 
North West 12.05 11.50 12.32 10.84 10.81 10.89 9.21 9.21 9.22 
Yorkshire and 
Humber 
8.82 8.48 8.98 8.07 8.22 7.85 7.72 
 
7.78 
 
7.68 
 
East Midlands 6.17 5.75 6.38 7.51 7.64 7.32 6.02 5.56 6.31 
West Midlands 7.57 7.04 7.83 9.25 9.55 8.82 7.92 8.08 7.82 
South West 7.75 7.29 7.97 8.67 8.60 8.76 8.89 8.11 9.39 
East 7.63 6.92 7.98 9.50 9.36 9.69 8.88 8.58 9.08 
London 14.69 18.32 12.91 16.24 16.06 16.50 17.54 19.47 16.30 
South East 11.88 10.93 12.35 14.83 14.85 14.79 16.51 16.10 16.78 
Wales 5.91 6.13 5.81 3.91 3.96 3.84 4.18 4.01 4.28 
Scotland 12.99 13.29 12.84 7.64 7.53 7.78 9.04 8.84 9.18 
Tenure (years) 9.80 10.44 9.48 6.97 7.44 6.30 7.15 7.57 6.88 
Contract type (per 
cent) 
         
Temporary 
employment 
8.25 
 
7.77 
 
8.48 
 
5.58 
 
4.99 
 
6.42 
 
13.49 
 
14.34 
 
12.95 
 
Part-time 28.69 11.00 37.34 25.23 13.43 41.87 34.32 21.64 42.49 
Firm-size (number 
of employees)   
11,469 
 
12,682 10,876 12,410 11,018 14,375 2,297 2,562 2,127 
Collective 
agreement (per 
cent) 
89.09 
 
89.54 
 
88.86 
 
21.75 
 
22.98 
 
20.03 
 
51.50 
 
54.50 
 
49.58 
 
Occupation           
Managers, 
directors and 
senior official 
4.12 
 
6.47 
 
2.98 
 
12.54 
 
14.52 
 
9.74 
 
8.90 
 
9.29 
 
8.64 
 
Professional 
occupations 
41.90 
 
39.22 
 
43.21 
 
13.49 
 
15.82 
 
10.21 
 
34.7 
 
44.46 
 
28.42 
 
Associate 
professional and 
technical 
occupations 
16.82 
 
26.59 
 
12.04 
 
14.15 
 
14.58 
 
13.54 
 
16.43 
 
15.83 
 
16.81 
 
Administrative and 
secretarial 
occupations 
12.99 
 
8.76 
 
15.06 
 
11.24 
 
4.95 
 
20.10 
 
11.60 
 
6.16 
 
15.11 
 
Skilled trades 
occupations 
1.73 
 
3.71 
 
0.76 
 
9.44 
 
14.56 
 
2.22 
 
3.11 
 
6.14 
 
1.16 
 
Caring, leisure 
and other service 
occupations 
15.25 
 
7.40 
 
19.09 
 
6.11 
 
2.18 
 
11.65 
 
16.23 
 
9.43 
 
20.60 
 
Sales and 
customer service 
occupations 
1.21 
 
1.36 
 
1.13 
 
11.25 
 
7.35 
 
16.75 
 
2.02 
 
1.56 
 
2.31 
 
Process, plant 
and machine 
operatives 
1.04 
 
2.90 
 
0.13 
 
8.15 
 
12.37 
 
2.20 
 
0.96 
 
2.02 
 
0.28 
 
Elementary 
occupations 
4.95 
 
3.59 
 
5.61 
 
13.63 
 
13.66 
 
13.59 
 
6.05 
 
5.10 
 
6.67 
 
Population size  
Number of 
obs.(unweighted) 
5,627,309 
 
35,841 
1,847,778 
 
10,717 
3,779,530 
 
25,124 
16,620,206 
 
109,713 
9,725,304 
 
60,689 
6,894,901 
 
49,024 
2,090,050 
 
13,186 
818,876 
 
4,683 
1,271,174 
 
8,503 
 
Table 1b presents additional summary sample statistics for the same explanatory variables 
for employees within the public sector and by gender, but separately for PRB and non-PRB 
occupations. The main difference is in terms of occupation, with the majority (63 per cent) of 
PRB workers in ‘Professional occupations’ compared to 24 per cent in non-PRB 
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occupations. Conversely, ‘Administrative and secretarial occupations’ and ‘Caring, leisure 
and other service occupations’ account for a larger proportion of non-PRB workers.  
 
Table 1b. Sample statistics for explanatory variables, within the public sector 
 Non-PRB public PRB 
 All Male Female All Male Female 
Age  44.71 44.33 44.92 42.06 41.65 42.24 
Work region (per cent)       
North East 4.13 3.86 4.28 5.02 5.04 5.02 
North West 11.24 10.39 11.71 13.01 13.08 12.97 
Yorkshire and Humber 8.68 8.26 8.90 8.99 8.80 9.07 
East Midlands 6.42 5.51 6.92 5.88 6.08 5.80 
West Midlands 6.88 5.73 7.51 8.39 8.91 8.17 
South West 7.59 7.46 7.66 7.93 7.06 8.30 
East 6.80 5.58 7.47 8.62 8.81 8.54 
London 15.52 19.45 13.35 13.70 16.72 12.44 
South East 11.65 10.44 12.32 12.15 11.62 12.37 
Wales 5.99 6.26 5.85 5.82 5.93 5.77 
Scotland 15.11 17.07 14.03 10.48 7.94 11.55 
Tenure (years) 10.59 11.50 10.09 8.85 8.92 8.82 
Contract type (per cent)       
Temporary employment 7.92 6.09 8.93 8.64 10.16 8.00 
Part-time 31.20 11.50 42.06 25.73 10.29 32.23 
Firm-size (Number of 
employees) 
12,390 13,659 11,690 10,381 11,298 9,995 
Collective agreement (per 
cent) 
88.77 89.25 88.51 89.46 89.95 89.25 
Occupation        
Managers, directors and 
senior official 
5.77 
 
8.32 
 
4.37 
 
2.18 
 
3.85 
 
1.47 
 
Professional occupations 23.73 27.47 21.68 63.35 55.86 66.50 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
19.94 
 
27.14 
 
15.97 
 
13.13 
 
25.80 
 
7.78 
 
Administrative and 
secretarial occupations 
17.67 
 
12.74 
 
20.39 
 
7.47 
 
3.14 
 
9.29 
 
Skilled trades occupations 2.93 5.73 1.38 0.31 -
* 
-
*
 
Caring, leisure and other 
service occupations 
18.89 
 
7.47 
 
25.18 
 
10.95 
 
7.29 
 
12.49 
 
Sales and customer service 
occupations 
1.97 
 
2.19 
 
1.86 
 
0.30 
 
0.19 
 
0.34 
 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
1.69 
 
4.34 
 
0.23 
 
0.27 
 
-
* 
-
*
 
Elementary occupations 7.40 4.60 8.94 2.05 2.14 2.01 
Population size  
Number of obs.(unweighted) 
3,046,955 
20,193 
1,082,841 
6,597 
1,964,113 
13,596 
2,580,354 
15,648 
764,936 
4,120 
1,815,417 
11,528 
    Notes: *Figure is not presented due to lack of sufficient number of observations.   
 
The QLFS  
Despite its advantages (see discussion above), ASHE does, however, have some 
weaknesses in the context of the literature on the GPG (see Section 2.3.1). Most 
importantly, it contains a fairly basic set of personal characteristics and while this includes 
key variables such as age and gender, an important omission, given the focus on human 
capital, is educational attainment, an important determinant of productivity and pay. While 
information on occupation can be used as a proxy (see Gibbons et al., 2014), this is inferior 
to information on highest qualification. Also excluded is information on marital status and the 
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presence/number of dependent children. The latter, in particular, has previously been 
identified as a key contributor to the UK GPG (see Costa Dias et al., 2018). In light of these 
limitations the robustness of the findings is explored by using supplementary data from the 
QLFS.  
The QLFS is the largest household survey in the UK and is available for non-commercial use 
from the UKDA. It collects information on pay, sector and a comprehensive set of personal 
and work-related characteristics from individuals themselves in a largely consistent manner 
since 1998. Due to the smaller sample size within the QLFS, data from each of the four 
quarters in 2016/2017/2018 are pooled to construct a contemporary cross sectional data 
set.44 These data have been extensively used to explore the public sector pay premium 
(Cribb et al., 2014a; Blackaby et al., 2012) and in recent analysis of the GPG in the public 
sector (Jones et al., 2018). We try to keep our analysis as comparable as possible to ASHE, 
and restrict our sample to adult personal interviews, and focus on employees in their main 
job.45,46 Since we pool information from the QLFS over time to enhance the sample size we 
report unweighted figures throughout which, therefore reflect the composition of the sample, 
rather than population averages. 
Unlike ASHE, information on sector is self-reported by the employee. Employees are 
classified as working in the public, private or non-profit sector based on a series of questions 
about the nature of their employer. The public sector is defined as that ‘owned, funded or run 
by central or local government’ (see Millard and Machin, 2007).47 Our definition of the private 
sector includes everything outside this excluding the non-profit sector defined to include 
‘charities, voluntary organisations or trusts’. The QLFS overestimates the size of the public 
sector relative to the National Accounts definition and, following Dolton and Makepeace 
(2011), those in Universities, Polytechnics or other grant funded educational establishments, 
and those who are temporary agency workers, are reclassified to the non-profit and private 
sector respectively.48 Descriptive statistics (see Table 2) suggest the QLFS definition of the 
non-profit sector might be narrower than that in ASHE.  
Detailed information is collected on occupation from employees using the same classification 
as ASHE and from which we perform similar analysis within the public sector across PRBs. 
Within the QLFS some of the definitions are modified slightly given differences in data 
collection (see Appendix Table A.1). For example, Local Authority is defined using ‘Local 
government or council (including police etc)’. Unlike ASHE, the QLFS contains observations 
from the AFPRB, which is defined following Dolton et al. (2015) to include ‘Officers in UK 
armed forces’ (SOC 1171) and ‘COs and other ranks’ (SOC 3311). 
Information on gross hourly earnings is derived from employee self-reported information in 
the QLFS. There are two limitations with this, first it is subject to a more limited response 
                                                          
44
 It is standard academic practice to pool QLFS microdata across quarters and years to enhance the sample size (see, for 
example, Clark and Lindley, 2009). The LFS is a quarterly survey with a rotational panel design such that, in every quarter, 20 
per cent of individuals are in their first wave and 20 per cent are in their fifth and final wave. Since 1997, earnings data are 
collected in both waves 1 and 5. To avoid having repeated information on the same individual, our sample is restricted to 
individuals in wave 1. Individuals are retained from the following quarters: January - March, 2016 (7985), April - June, 2016 
(8039), July – September, 2016 (8104), October - December, 2016 (8145), January - March, 2017 (8195), April - June, 2017 
(8235), July – September, 2017 (8292), October - December, 2017 (8326), January - March, 2018 (8343), April - June, 2018 
(8381), July - September, 2018 (8407), October - December, 2018 (8447). We acknowledge that the response rate within the 
QLFS has been declining overtime but note that it remains the largest household survey in the UK and is regularly used for 
examination of pay, including in relation to the GPG and sector. Due to the smaller sample size, however, we do not report all 
of the detailed estimates for PRBs that are presented for ASHE. 
45
 Of the total sample, 56,805 individuals are employees and the maximum sample available for analysis of earnings is 49,695. 
46
 About 36 per cent of employees provide information by proxy which is not utilised in this analysis. 
47
 It includes ‘a nationalised industry/state corporation’, ‘Central government or civil service’, ‘Local government or council 
(including fire services and local authority controlled schools/colleges)’, ‘A health authority or NHS Trust’, ‘The armed forces’, 
‘some other kind of organisation’. 
48
 About 25 per cent of employees work in the public sector according to this definition, which is about 3 percentage points 
lower than the original QLFS definition. 
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rate than other questions in the survey and patterns of response may be non-random. 
Second, the self-reported information is subject to greater measurement error. However, the 
QLFS is recognised as being a high-quality source of earnings information and is used 
widely by ONS and in academic research (as noted above). Moreover, the GPG has been 
previously shown to be comparable between ASHE and the QLFS (Leaker, 2008). The 
reliability of the earnings information is also enhanced by eliminating outliers using the 
standard ONS recommended filter so that the maximum hourly wage is £99. 
The standard QLFS measure of hourly pay is derived from gross weekly pay in the 
respondent’s main job on the basis of total usual hours worked (including paid overtime).49 
This differs from the measure of hourly pay in ASHE, which excludes overtime. Since the 
amount of PRP is not available within the QLFS, sensitivity analysis cannot be undertaken 
with respect to this particular element of the analysis.50  
Initially the personal and workplace characteristics used as control variables are selected to 
be as comparable as possible to ASHE.51 However, the main reason for supplementing the 
analysis of ASHE is to enhance the earnings equations and decompositions to consider the 
robustness of the findings to the inclusion of education, marital status and dependent 
children. The analysis of the QLFS also enables us to control for other personal 
characteristics such as ethnicity and disability, important in the wider equalities literature. 
Highest qualification is classified into the following six aggregate groups: degree or 
equivalent; other higher education; A level or equivalent; O level or equivalent; other; none. 
Marital status is measured as a binary indicator (married/non-married) and a binary variable 
also records the presence of dependent children in the household under age 16. Ethnicity is 
measured as a binary variable (white/non-white) and disability is measured as a binary 
variable (disabled/non-disabled according to the Equality Act). All the specifications also 
include controls for quarter, year and their interaction given the data has been pooled across 
time. Throughout the analysis we provide supplementary figures from the QLFS as a 
comparator and to explore the sensitivity of qualitative patterns in the ASHE estimates. The 
corresponding summary statistics for the QLFS are included in Appendix Table A.2 (public 
compared to private) and A.3 (PRB occupations compared to non-PRB occupations). The 
sectoral and gender differences in occupational composition noted above are also evident 
within the QLFS. This is also reflected in the between and within sector comparisons in 
educational attainment, with employees in the public sector and in PRBs in particular holding 
higher level qualifications on average. 
3.2 Statistical methodology 
The statistical analysis has two core elements. First, an analysis of the GPG will be 
undertaken between the public and private sectors which will explore the determinants of 
public sector GPG across the distribution and in comparison to the private sector. This will 
be followed by a more detailed analysis of the drivers of the GPG within the public sector 
                                                          
49
 What was your gross pay, that is your pay before any deductions, the last time you were paid? It is adjusted for the pay 
period (week, month etc) and then usual paid hours (including overtime).  
50
 Self-reported information on why the last pay varies from normal is used to construct a measure of PRP incidence (which 
includes a bonus, profit related pay and piecework payments or payments by results). However, the QLFS does not contain 
information from which to construct an annual measure of PRP. As such, the incidence of PRP is far lower in the QLFS than 
ASHE. Nevertheless, we find the same qualitative patterns, that is, PRP is less prevalent in the public relative to the private 
sector, and among male relative to female employees. However, given the very limited coverage of PRP (less than 1 per cent 
of public sector employees) this is not explored further using the QLFS. 
51
 While it is possible to derive potential work experience using the QLFS, age is used to facilitate comparison with ASHE. The 
QLFS collects information on workplace size rather than firm size and this is collected in discrete bands. Union membership is 
only available in a single quarter (October-December each year) and so is not included as a control in the analysis of the QLFS. 
In many cases the precise definition of variables also differs between ASHE and the QLFS.  
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and across PRB occupations in particular. In both cases the focus will be on quantifying the 
determinants of the GPG through an established decomposition approach, which isolates 
the contribution of observable characteristics of workers and their jobs from unobserved 
influences, where the latter will include the influence of unequal treatment or pay 
discrimination in the labour market.  
Public and Private Sector GPGs 
Initially we estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (hereinafter, OLS) wage equation which 
pools observations from both male and female workers in the public and private sectors and 
explore whether there is a difference in the GPG by sector using an interaction term between 
gender and sector as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑖 =  𝐹𝑖 +  𝒙𝒊𝜷 + 𝛼𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝑖           𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁;       (1) 
where 𝑖 indexes the individual. The log of hourly pay (𝐸𝑖) is regressed on a binary indicator 
of (female) gender (𝐹𝑖), a set of control variables (𝒙𝒊), a binary indicator of (public) sector 
(𝑃𝑖), and the interaction between gender and sector.
52 The GPG in the private sector is given 
by 𝜇, the public sector pay premium is given by 𝛼 and 𝛾 measures the difference in the GPG 
between the public and private sector. A constant is included in all specifications, but the 
control variables vary across specifications (and data sets). Personal characteristics include 
age (and age squared) and region of work, and work-related characteristics include 
temporary or part-time employment, occupation, tenure (and tenure squared) and firm size.53  
When these characteristics are excluded the coefficients provide information on the raw 
GPG. Their inclusion adjusts the GPG for differences in productivity-related characteristics 
between men and women.  
Equation (1) assumes that the return to productivity-related characteristics (𝜷) is equal 
across sectors and genders. Relaxing both these assumptions, a within sector (𝑆) gender 
(𝐺) specific wage equation can be estimated: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑖 =  𝒙𝒊𝑮,𝑺  +  𝑖    𝐺 = 𝑀, 𝐹;  𝑆 = 𝑃, 𝑃𝑅;   𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁𝐺,𝑆;     (2) 
and decomposition techniques (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) can be used to separate that 
part of within sector GPG due to differences in observed characteristics, or what is 
explained, from an unexplained component. The precise decomposition can take alternative 
forms, but an example is given below: 
ln 𝐸𝑀,𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − ln 𝐸𝐹,𝑆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝒙𝑴,𝑺̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝒙𝑭,𝑺̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝒃𝑴,𝑺 + 𝒙𝑭,𝑺̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝒃𝑴,𝑺 − 𝒃𝑭,𝑺)                                     (3) 
where the bar denotes the mean value and, the coefficient 𝒃 is the OLS estimate of ,  the 
‘return’ to characteristics.54 The decomposition separates the difference in earnings between 
the average male (𝑀) and female (𝐹) employee in sector 𝑆 into an explained and 
unexplained component. The former measures that part of the wage differential due to 
differences in the characteristics of men and women while the latter measures that part due 
to differences in the return to those attributes due to gender. The unexplained gap is typically 
interpreted as an upper bound measure of unequal treatment or discrimination since it 
includes the influence of unobserved gender differences in productivity or preferences. The 
                                                          
52
 In our first specification we exclude both the sector variable, the interaction term and the control variables. As such 𝜇 is then 
interpreted simply as the raw GPG across sectors. 
53
 Unless otherwise stated occupation is defined by major SOC 2010 group but sensitivity analysis on the basis of more detailed 
occupation (4-digit group) is also performed.  
54
 Equation (3) uses the coefficients for males from equation (2) under the assumption that these are equivalent to competitive 
returns. Since male-female differences in returns can also reflect discrimination, the use of male equation is intended to 
simulate a non-discriminatory labour market. Moreover, using male returns ameliorate the problems due to non-random 
selection into work since male employment rates are quite stable over time (Blau and Kahn, 1997; Kunze, 2008). The sensitivity 
of the results to using the female coefficients is, however, explored.  
35 
   
total explained gap can be further separated to identify the relative contribution of different 
personal and job-related characteristics to the explained component of the GPG. So, for 
example, the analysis can explore sectoral differences in the role of well-established drivers 
of the GPG such as part-time employment.  
In a similar manner to Chatterji et al. (2011) and Jones et al. (2018) the above analysis 
focuses on average (mean) pay and does not take into account differences in the earnings 
distributions of each sector, with the pay distribution typically found to be narrower in the 
public sector. Moreover, the international academic literature on GPGs suggests that the gap 
is not constant across the wage distribution and an exclusive focus on the mean will neglect 
important insights offered by considering the distribution (see, for example, Albrecht et al., 
2003; Arulampalam et al., 2007). Indeed, while analysis at the median provides a robustness 
test, analysis at the extremes of the distribution will identify where the GPG is most/least 
pronounced i.e. among low or high paid workers or, what are known as, ‘sticky floors’ and 
‘glass ceilings’ in the context of the GPG (Albrecht et al., 2003; Arulampalam et al., 2007). 
We repeat our analysis of the GPG at the mean using quantile regression methods (Koenker 
and Bassett, 1978) to estimate, in a similar manner to equation (1), sectoral differences in 
the GPGs at different points of the pay distribution (e.g. median, 25th and 75th percentiles). 
Formally, the 𝜃th (0 < 𝜃 < 1) conditional quantile of the log of hourly pay distribution is 
assumed to be linear in the set of covariates 𝒙𝒊 along with the binary indicators of gender, 
sector and the interaction between gender and sector that is 𝑞𝜃( 𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑖|𝐹𝑖 , 𝒙𝒊, 𝑃𝑖,𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖) =
 𝜇(𝜃)𝐹𝑖 +  𝒙𝒊𝜷(𝜽) + 𝛼(𝜃)𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾(𝜃)𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖 implying:  
𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑖 = 𝜇(𝜃)𝐹𝑖 +  𝒙𝒊𝜷(𝜽) + 𝛼(𝜃)𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾(𝜃)𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖     𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁;    (4) 
where 𝜃𝑖 satisfies 𝑞𝜃(𝜃𝑖|𝐹𝑖, 𝒙𝒊, 𝑃𝑖,𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖) = 0 and, in a similar manner to equation (1), the 
private sector GPG at the 𝜃th quantile is given by 𝜇(𝜃), and 𝛾(𝜃) measures the difference in 
the GPG between the public and private sector at the 𝜃th quantile. 
Equation (4) imposes the restriction that the return to productivity-related characteristics (β) 
is equal across sector and gender. In a similar manner to above, relaxing both these 
assumptions, a version of equation (4) can be estimated by sector and gender: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊𝜷𝑮,𝑺(𝜽) + 𝜃𝑖   𝐺 = 𝑀, 𝐹;  𝑆 = 𝑃, 𝑃𝑅;   𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁𝐺,𝑆   (5) 
where 𝑞𝜃(𝜃𝑖|𝒙𝒊) = 0. Equation (5) can be estimated using the optimisation techniques 
described in Koenker and Bassett (1978) and the estimated vector of quantile regression 
coefficients, 𝒃𝑮,𝑺(𝜽), can be used to decompose the difference between males and females 
at different points of the log hourly pay distributions into an explained and unexplained 
component using a suitably adapted version of the decomposition method outlined in 
equation (3) by Machado and Mata (2005).55,56 The GPG in sector 𝑆 at 𝜃th quantile can be 
decomposed as: 
𝒙𝑴,𝑺𝒃𝑴,𝑺(𝜽) − 𝒙𝑭,𝑺𝒃𝑭,𝑺(𝜽) = (𝒙𝑴,𝑺 − 𝒙𝑭,𝑺)𝒃𝑴,𝑺(𝜽) + 𝒙𝑭,𝑺(𝒃𝑴,𝑺(𝜽) − 𝒃𝑭,𝑺(𝜽))    (6) 
                                                          
55 
The standard errors and confidence intervals for the quantile regression coefficient estimates are based on asymptotic 
standard errors (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). 
56
 The precise steps of the decomposition can take alternative forms, but an example is given below: 
(1) Generate a random sample of size 𝑚 from a uniform distribution 𝑈[0,1]: 𝜃1, 𝜃2, … , 𝜃𝑚.  
(2) For each 𝜃 estimate the vector of sector specific quantile regression coefficients 𝒃𝑭,𝑺(𝜽) and 𝒃𝑴,𝑺(𝜽) for females and males 
respectively.  
(3) Generate for each gender from each sector a random sample of size 𝑚 (with replacement) and use their characteristics, 𝒙𝑮,𝑺 
and the estimated vector of coefficients, 𝒃𝑮,𝑺(𝜽) to generate three sets of predicted earnings: (i) the simulated female pay 
distribution 𝒙𝑭,𝑺𝒃𝑭,𝑺(𝜽), (ii) the simulated male pay distribution 𝒙𝑴,𝑺𝒃𝑴,𝑺(𝜽), and (iii) the counterfactual pay distribution 
𝒙𝑭,𝑺𝒃𝑴,𝑺(𝜽) that is the pay distribution of females in sector 𝑆 that would have prevailed if women had been endowed with their 
own characteristics but were paid like men. 
(4) Compare the counterfactual distribution in sector 𝑆 with the 𝜃th quantiles of the simulated male and female pay distributions. 
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where the first component is the contribution of differences in productivity-related 
characteristics and the second component is the contribution of differences in the 
coefficients to the difference between the 𝜃th quantile of the male and female pay 
distributions.  
Within Public Sector GPGs 
The GPG within the public sector is also explored in two ways. First between PRB and non-
PRB occupations and then by occupations defined separately by each PRB (as outlined in 
Section 3.1 above), although it is recognised that occupations cannot be identified for all 
PRBs (see above). In a corresponding manner, differences in the GPG between PRB and 
non-PRB occupations are explored using the wage equations and decomposition methods 
set out above (equations (1)-(6)) but where the comparisons are undertaken within the public 
sector. A similar comparison will be undertaken at the mean and across the earnings 
distribution. 
Given the smaller sample sizes within each PRB, the analysis of each PRB will be 
undertaken using a version of equation (1) and, by estimating an equation for each of the 
five PRBs separately which relaxes the assumption of constant returns to characteristics 
across PRBs but retains the assumption of constant returns to characteristics across 
gender.57 In this case, the equations pool males and females as follows: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑖  = 𝑅𝐵𝐹𝑖 +  𝒙𝒊𝑹𝑩  + 𝑖        𝑅𝐵 = 𝑃𝑅𝐵1 − 𝑃𝑅𝐵5;   𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁𝑅𝐵;      (7) 
The PRB specific GPG is given by 𝑅𝐵 . As above the inclusion of productivity-related 
characteristics adjusts the raw GPG for differences in observable characteristics between 
men and women, such that, in the most comprehensive model 𝑅𝐵  can be interpreted in a 
similar manner to a within PRB unexplained GPG (see Elder et al., 2010). This serves as a 
proxy for gender inequality within each PRB and, in doing so, addresses an important 
evidence gap (see DDRB, 2017).  
Occupational choice 
As noted above, some of the PRB occupations are characterised by considerable gender 
segregation. As such, the public sector GPG will be determined by the allocation of men and 
women across occupations in addition to the GPG within occupations which is explored 
above. Using estimates of the probability of being employed in each public sector occupation 
(defined by PRBs) it is possible to separate the public sector GPG into the contribution of 
‘between’ and ‘within’ occupation GPGs as follows:  
ln 𝐸𝑀,𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − ln 𝐸𝐹,𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ (𝑝𝑀,𝑅𝐵 − 𝑝𝐹,𝑅𝐵)𝑅𝐵 ln 𝐸𝑀,𝑅𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + ∑ 𝑝𝐹,𝑅𝐵𝑃 (ln 𝐸𝑀,𝑅𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ln 𝐸𝐹,𝑅𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )              (8) 
The first and second terms on the right-hand side of equation (8) show, respectively, the 
‘between’ occupation differential and the ‘within’ occupation differential, where the probability 
of being employed within each public sector occupation is 𝑝𝑀,𝑅𝐵 and 𝑝𝐹,𝑅𝐵 for men and 
women respectively. That is, it will quantify whether the GPG in the public sector stems from 
men and women working in different occupations (‘between’) or differences in pay within a 
given occupation (‘within’). Within ASHE (QLFS) we consider 5 (6) PRBs and define the rest 
of the public sector as the non-PRB occupation.  
We further explore the impact of gender on occupational choice as measured by the PRB 
and non-PRB public sector occupations using a multinomial logit model as follows:  
                                                          
57
 For those PRBs where the sample size permits, we also perform the full decomposition (equation (3)) by sector and gender 
but the results are qualitatively similar, so we present findings on the basis of a comparable approach across PRBs.  
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Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑅𝐵|𝐹𝑖, 𝒙𝒊) =
exp (𝑅𝐵𝐹𝑖+ 𝒙𝒊𝑹𝑩)
∑ exp (𝑅𝐵𝐹𝑖+ 𝒙𝒊𝑹𝑩)
𝑘=𝑟
𝑘=1
       (9) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is a polychotomous variable indicating the occupation of individual 𝑖, conditional on 
public sector employment. In our case occupation is defined as one of the (𝑘) PRBs (PRB1-
PRB5) and the (non-PRB) public sector (𝑟 = 6). The latter is used as the reference group 
and all the coefficient estimates are estimated relative to this. A multinomial logit model is 
selected since occupation has more than two possible discrete outcomes that have no 
natural order. We build up the model such that the coefficient 
𝑅𝐵
 identifies the influence of 
being female on working in each of the PRBs (relative to the rest of the (non-PRB) public 
sector) before and after accounting for other personal characteristics (𝒙𝒊). The model 
therefore assumes that individuals select an occupation which maximises their utility, 
conditional on their personal characteristics. As work-related characteristics are potentially 
outcomes of occupational choice rather than determinants, we do not control for them within 
this model. The narrow range of personal characteristics available in ASHE limits the set of 
control variables available. As such, we estimate an additional specification in the QLFS with 
an extended set of personal characteristics (as discussed in Section 3.1) but nevertheless 
acknowledge the omission of important influences such as subject choice or family 
background/parental occupation. An adjusted gender difference in the probability of working 
within PRBs would, however, be consistent with gender differences in occupational 
preferences or employer hiring and will capture the influence of occupational culture raised 
by the AFRB (2017). In order to quantify the estimates, we present average marginal effects 
(AMEs) which illustrate the percentage point change in the probability of being employed 
within each PRB, rather than coefficient estimates.                              
PRP  
In terms of the final research objective, we investigate the gender gap in PRP between and 
within sectors. The former is motivated by recent attention on PRP within the public sector 
(Work Foundation, 2014; Bryson et al., 2017), evidence that women are often more reluctant 
to enter competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) and widespread 
evidence of a gender bonus gap in organisational GPG reporting. While pronounced sectoral 
differences are evident within these data, the gender bonus gap is typically neglected in 
measures of hourly pay within the academic literature and in previous analysis of sectoral 
GPG differences. Consistent with national reporting measures, our analysis explores 
sectoral gender differences in the incidence of PRP and, the corresponding gender gap in 
the amount of PRP, based on the annual measure outlined in Section 3.1.  
To explore the gender gaps in the incidence of PRP (see, for example, Jirjahn and Stephan, 
2004; Xiu and Gunderson, 2013) in the public and private sector, we estimate a probit model 
of the form: 
Pr(𝐈(𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 > 0)| 𝐹𝑖, 𝒙𝒊, 𝑃𝑖, 𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖) = Φ(𝜇𝐹𝑖 +  𝒙𝒊𝜷 + 𝛼𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖)             𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁;              (10) 
where the indicator function 𝐈(·) takes the value 1 if individual 𝑖 received any incentive 
payments during the preceding year (i.e. 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 > 0) and is 0 otherwise, and Φ(·) is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standardised normal distribution. In a similar manner 
to equation (1) the model pools workers across sectors and by gender so the effect of being 
female on the probability of receiving PRP in the private sector is given by 𝜇, and 𝛾 
measures the difference in the influence of gender between the public and private sector. 
The set of control variables 𝒙𝒊 include the same set of personal and work-related 
characteristics outlined in Section 3.1 above. The empirical evidence suggests that women 
are less likely than men to be employed in jobs in which compensation is based on 
performance (see Manning and Saidi, 2010 for the UK; McGee et al., 2015 for the US) and 
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our analysis will establish whether there are sectoral differences in this regard. As with the 
multinomial logit model above, we present AMEs rather than coefficient estimates to quantify 
the influence of gender and sector on the probability of receipt of PRP. For ease of 
interpretation of the interaction terms, we also present the predicted probability of receipt of 
PRP by gender and sector.  
Given the availability of the amount of PRP within ASHE, we also explore sectoral 
differences in the gender gap in the level of PRP, conditional on receipt of PRP, in a similar 
manner to Albanesi et al. (2015) and Xiu and Gunderson (2013), by estimating an analogous 
equation to equation (1) in which dependent variable is the log of PRP received during the 
preceding year: 
ln 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖 =  𝐹𝑖 +  𝒙𝒊𝜷 + 𝛼𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖𝑃𝑖 + 𝑖           𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑃;                 (11)  
In equation (11), the coefficient on the (female) gender dummy (𝜇) can be interpreted as the 
GPG in PRP in the private sector and 𝛾 measures the difference in this between the public 
and private sector. As above, the inclusion of productivity-related characteristics in this 
model means an adjusted GPG in PRP can also be estimated.58 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
58
 We also estimate a similar version of equations (10) and (11) on public sector employees to identify differences in gender 
gaps between PRB and non-PRB occupations. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
4.1.1 Employment  
In Table 2 we present estimates of employment by PRBs, along with the percentage of 
employees in these occupations who are female. The second panel of Table 2 presents 
these figures for the rest of the (non-PRB) public sector and the final panel presents figures 
by sector for comparative purposes. The PRBs account for about 46 per cent of public sector 
employees, with the NHSPRB alone accounting for nearly 30 per cent (or 63 per cent of 
PRB employees). Consistent with Bryson and Forth (2017), relative to published estimates 
(OME Business Plan 2017-2018), the figures from ASHE over-estimate the coverage of the 
NHSPRB and PRRB and the extent of this is considerable, with OME estimates of 1,356,000 
and 133,000 respectively. The latter in particular is difficult to explain given our estimates are 
based on the occupational codes for senior police officers and police officers. 
In line with existing evidence, women are disproportionately represented in public sector 
employment, accounting for two-thirds of public sector employees. The concentration of 
women is slightly higher within PRBs and the differences across PRBs are stark, with 
females representing about 80 per cent of NHSPRB employees, compared to about 30-35 
per cent in the PRRB and PSPRB.59 Although the precise estimates vary, figures from the 
QLFS show the same qualitative patterns and additionally indicate that the prevalence of 
females in the AFPRB is even lower at 15 per cent.60 
Table 2. Total number of employees and percentage female, by sector and within the public 
sector 
 ASHE QLFS 
 Employees % % female Employees % % female 
PRB  2,580,354 
(15,648) 
45.85 70.36 - 
(4,997) 
40.17       74.86 
DDRB 202,937 
(1,077) 
3.61 44.55 
 
- 
(320) 
2.57        53.75 
NHSPRB 1,632,783 
(10,517) 
29.02 79.09 
 
- 
(2,965) 
23.84        82.83 
PRRB 211,040 
(1,122) 
3.75 29.91 
 
- 
(235) 
1.89        30.21 
PSPRB 23,156 
(120) 
0.41 34.43 
 
- 
(64) 
0.51        28.13 
STRB 510,439 
(2,812) 
9.07 71.03 
 
- 
(1,284) 
10.32        78.27 
AFPRB - - - - 
(129) 
1.04       14.73 
Non-PRB public 3,046,955 
(20,193) 
54.15 64.46 
 
- 
(7,442) 
59.83 68.46 
Public sector 5,627,309 
(35,841) 
23.12 67.16 
 
-  
(12,439) 
25.93 71.03 
Private sector 16,620,206 
(109,713) 
68.29 41.49 
 
- 
(32,362) 
67.46 49.42 
Non-profit sector 2,090,050 
(13,186) 
8.59 60.82 
 
- 
(3,168) 
6.60 68.43 
Notes: (i) Number of observations (unweighted) is in parentheses. (ii) Figures within the public sector are expressed as a 
proportion of public sector employment. Sectoral figures are expressed as a proportion of total employment.  
                                                          
59
 In analysis of its own data the NHSPRB (2019) similarly reports that women account for about 80 per cent of the Agenda for 
Change workforce and the PRRB (2019) report that about 30 per cent of police offers are female. 
60
 This is consistent with data from the Ministry of Defence which suggests 11 per cent of regular and 15 per cent of reserve 
service personnel are female (AFPRB, 2019). Figures from the QLFS are, however, based on small sample sizes. 
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4.1.2 Hourly pay  
Table 3 presents the mean of our dependent variable, gross hourly pay for all, male and 
female employees by PRBs and other (non-PRB) public sector occupations. For comparison 
purposes, the mean hourly pay in the private and non-profit sectors are also included. We 
also explore hourly pay across the distribution in the analysis which follows, including at the 
median which is the preferred measure of the GPG in ASHE. Consistent with previous 
evidence, the raw GPG within the public sector (19 per cent) is narrower than that in the 
private sector (21 per cent). Within the public sector the GPG is similar between PRBs and 
non-PRB occupations. However, there is far greater variation between individual PRBs. The 
highest GPG is in the DDRB (19 per cent) and it is substantially greater than the 7-8 per cent 
gap in the NHSPRB and PRRB. The fact that the GPG for the PRBs in aggregate exceeds 
that within any individual PRB is a likely reflection of gender differences in the employment 
composition across PRBs, that is, women are more likely to be concentrated in PRBs with 
lower average hourly pay and we explore this further in Section 4.2.2. The data also exhibit a 
well-established raw public sector pay premium, which is proportionally larger for women. 
Within the public sector, and consistent with the occupational distribution noted earlier, 
employees are also paid more on average in PRB occupations than non-PRB occupations. 
The average wage is considerably higher in the DDRB than across the other PRBs.  
As might be expected given differences in the sample, measures and data collection 
methodology, as discussed in Section 3.1, there are differences in the estimates of average 
hourly pay between ASHE and the QLFS.61 The average hourly pay figures in the QLFS are 
consistently lower than ASHE but the sectoral GPGs have a similar pattern. The GPG within 
PRB occupations is, however, considerably narrower than non-PRB occupations in the 
QLFS and the patterns in the GPG across PRBs are not entirely consistent with ASHE, 
although the DDRB has the highest GPG. This might partly be a consequence of the small 
sample sizes for some PRBs in the QLFS. 
Table 3. Mean gross hourly pay (£), by sector and within the public sector 
 ASHE QLFS 
 All  Male Female GPG (%) All  Male Female GPG (%) 
PRB 19.43 22.47 18.15 19.23 16.66 18.72 15.95 14.80 
DDRB 35.24 38.43 31.26 18.66 29.58 32.38 27.16 16.12 
NHSPRB 15.89 16.87 15.64 7.29 14.49 15.17 14.35 5.41 
PRRB 19.36 19.83 18.26 7.92 17.09 17.62 15.88
 
9.88 
PSPRB 14.62 15.34 13.26 13.56 12.74 12.92 -* -* 
STRB 24.70 26.64 23.91 10.25 18.36 19.47 18.06 7.24 
AFPRB - - - - 18.59 18.91 -* -* 
Non-PRB public 15.93 18.34 14.61 20.34 13.85 16.56 12.61 23.85 
Public sector 17.54 20.05 16.31 18.65 14.98 17.31 14.03 18.95 
Private sector 15.71 17.20 13.59 20.99 14.38 16.38 12.35 24.60 
Non-profit sector  16.73 18.95 15.30 19.26 15.22 17.61 14.12 19.82 
Notes: (i) The GPG is calculated as a percentage of the average male wage. *Figure not presented due to lack of sufficient 
number of observations.  
In addition to presenting figures at the mean, Figures 1a and 1b present the percentiles of 
gross hourly pay in ASHE across the distribution by sector and by PRB and non-PRB public 
sector occupations, respectively.62,63 These illustrate the hourly pay range within each 
                                                          
61
 Comparing data for 2018 only and using actual rather than usual hours in the QLFS narrows the differential but average 
hourly earnings remain below ASHE despite the inclusion of overtime pay. This might be a consequence of the measurement 
of pay or hours since the latter are contracted hours in ASHE reported by the employer. 
62
 We do not present the corresponding information for each PRB due to the smaller sample sizes. 
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sector/occupation. That the distribution within the public sector tends to lie above that in the 
private sector in Figure 1a is consistent with a public-sector pay premium across most of the 
distribution. In both sectors the male distribution tends to lie above the female distribution 
consistent with a GPG across most of the distribution. Figure 1b is consistent with higher 
average pay within PRB occupations, but with the difference more pronounced towards the 
upper end of the wage distribution, consistent with the concentration of high-skilled 
professional occupations. The GPG also appears to widen considerably above the 70th 
percentile within PRB occupations. 
 
Figure 1a. Gross hourly pay (£) across the distribution, by sector 
 
Figure 1b. Gross hourly pay (£) across the distribution, within the public sector 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
63
 Tables A.4 and A.5 report (rounded) values for gross hourly pay and an approximate pro-rata annual (salary) conversion at 
selected percentiles (10
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 90
th
) across sectors, and within the public sector, respectively.  
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Next, we explore pay progression by constructing the empirical age-earnings profiles of 
males and females over the lifecycle. Figure 2a presents the sectoral age-earnings profiles 
of male and female employees in ASHE by plotting the average gross hourly pay in each 
age-group (<30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+) for all employees and by gender, while in 
Figures 2b and 2c, we focus on PRB occupations.64 Previous evidence suggests that there 
are significant differences between the lifecycle earning profiles of men and women 
(Manning, 2000). In general, the pattern is of a small initial gap which diverges by age, 
though less so in later years. While the dynamic effects of childbirth are important in 
explaining the gender differences in lifecycle patterns, pay structures and gender differences 
in progression between sectors may also play a role.  
Figure 2a confirms that the raw GPG in the public sector differs by age group. Indeed, the 
raw gap is virtually non-existent for employees below age 30. Although average wages 
increase with age they do so to a lesser extent for women, giving rise to a GPG among 
those aged 30-39. After this point the average female wage declines with age, whereas for 
men the average wage increases and reaches a peak between age 40-49. The GPG thus 
increases with age within the public sector and then remains of a broadly comparable 
magnitude for those aged 50-59 and 60+. Although the GPG displays a similar pattern in the 
private sector, there appears to be a greater GPG for those aged less than 30. However, on 
the basis of these raw figures it is not possible to separate the influence of age, which might 
reflect gender differences in human capital accumulation as discussed in Section 2.3.1, from 
cohort (year of birth) effects, where it is generally assumed that younger cohorts experience 
greater gender equality.  
Figures 2b and 2c present the same information within the public sector. The age-earnings 
profiles are more pronounced in PRB occupations, with higher initial wages and substantial 
wage growth until age 40-49. In both PRB and non-PRB occupations, wage growth is, 
however, more rapid for men giving rise to a GPG by age 30-39. While female wages 
continue to grow until age 40-49 in PRB occupations, the GPG widens in both PRB and non-
PRB occupations. Indeed, since the average male wage continues to grow in PRB 
occupations until age 50-59, perhaps an indicator of opportunities for progression within 
these occupations, there is a further widening of the GPG with age, particularly after age 40-
49. There is no evidence of a GPG for employees below age 30 in any of the separate PRBs 
considered (Figure 2c). The average wages of men and women in the NHSPRB and PRRB 
track each other closely across the age groups. Wage growth with age is more pronounced 
within the DDRB but is slower for women giving rise to an increasing GPG with age. In 
contrast, a GPG emerges within the STRB by age 30-39, but after widening, subsequently 
narrows for those aged 60+. It should, however, be noted that some of the figures for the 
PRBs, particularly for those aged 60+, are based on relatively small sample sizes.   
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 Due to lack of sufficient number of observations, the figures are not presented for PSPRB and the age group 60+ for PRRB. 
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Figure 2a. Age-earning profiles, by sector 
 
Figure 2b. Age-earning profiles, within the public sector 
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Figure 2c. Age-earning profiles, selected PRBs 
 
4.1.3 PRP  
Next we present descriptive statistics on PRP, measured as the component of gross annual 
earnings that comes from incentive payments. The figures show the incidence of PRP by 
gender and by sector, and then within the public sector (in Table 4a) and the average 
amount of annual PRP conditional on incidence (in Table 4b). However, in terms of the 
latter, the small sample sizes preclude meaningful investigation within separate PRBs.  
In comparison to the private sector where over a third of workers receive PRP, there is a 
relatively low incidence of PRP in the public sector (5 per cent) and within PRB occupations 
in particular (2 per cent). Consistent with the existing evidence, females are less likely to be 
paid PRP, although in relative terms the gender differential is larger in the public sector (4 
per cent of women compared to 9 per cent of men). Females are also less likely to be in 
receipt of PRP in most PRBs.65 Conditional on receipt of PRP, workers in the public sector 
also earn a lower amount of PRP. The gender differential is, however, far narrower in the 
public sector at 8 per cent compared to more than 40 per cent in the private sector. The 
latter, which is larger than the GPG, is consistent with existing evidence and the sizeable 
gender bonus gaps noted in company GPG Reporting figures. Conditional on receipt, the 
level of PRP is higher in PRB than non-PRB occupations but the gender gap within each is 
similar at between 11-12 per cent. It should, however, be noted that gender comparisons in 
the annual measure of PRP might be sensitive to the composition of employment in terms of 
full-time and part-time workers, something which we consider in the econometric analysis 
which follows.     
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 The exception is the PSPRB, where the sample size is relatively small, although within the STRB the incidence is similar by 
gender.  
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Table 4a. Incidence of PRP (per cent), by sector and within the public sector 
 All  Male Female 
 PRB  1.83 
(15,648) 
2.98 
(4,120) 
1.35 
(11,528) 
DDRB 2.69 
(1,077) 
3.06 
(543) 
2.22 
(534) 
NHSPRB 1.09 
(10,517) 
2.06 
(2,012) 
0.84 
(8,505) 
PRRB 5.08 
(1,122) 
5.39 
(788) 
4.35 
(334) 
PSPRB 5.14 
(120) 
3.94 
(79) 
7.45 
(41) 
STRB 2.37 
(2,812) 
2.51 
(698) 
2.31 
(2,114) 
Non-PRB public  8.39 
(20,193) 
13.32 
(6,597) 
5.67 
(13,596) 
Public sector 5.38 
(35,841) 
9.04 
(10,717) 
3.59 
(25,124) 
Private sector 36.16 
(109,713) 
39.65 
(60,689) 
31.23 
(49,024) 
Non-profit sector  8.16 
(13,186) 
8.80 
(4,683) 
7.75 
(8,503) 
Notes: Number of observations (unweighted) is in parentheses.  
Table 4b. Average amount of annual PRP conditional on receipt, by sector and within the 
public sector 
 All  Male Female GPG (%) 
PRB  3,414.14 
(273) 
3,644.28 
(125) 
3,200.63 
(148) 
12.17 
Non-PRB public  1,959.31 
(1,604) 
2,056.13 
(862) 
1,833.86 
(742) 
10.81 
Public sector 2,186.66 
(1,877) 
2,272.75 
(987) 
2,080.84 
(890) 
8.44 
Private sector 5,206.68 
(38,124) 
6,146.21 
(23,439) 
3,524.26 
(14,685) 
42.66 
Non-profit sector  1,953.62 
(1,078) 
2,725.49 
(419) 
1,388.68 
(659) 
49.05 
Notes: (i) Number of observations (unweighted) is in parentheses. (ii) The GPG is calculated as a percentage of the average 
male level of PRP.  
4.2 Econometric analysis 
4.2.1 Between sector regression and decomposition analysis 
Regression analysis 
Table 5 reports the OLS pay regression estimates from various specifications of equation (1) 
which pool the sample of public and private sector employees. In the first specification, 
named as Model (1), the log gross hourly pay is regressed on a female dummy variable and 
a constant. The coefficient estimate of the female variable in this model provides a measure 
of the raw or unadjusted GPG that does not take into account any differences between men 
and women in terms of their sector of employment or other characteristics. In Model (2), we 
also control for sector and an interaction term between gender and sector. This facilitates 
comparison of sector raw GPGs. Then, we present three more specifications, Models (3)-(5), 
where we gradually add the personal characteristics, work-related characteristics and 
occupational controls discussed in Section 3.1. In this way, we adjust the GPG (measured 
by the estimate of the female dummy variable coefficient) for productivity-related 
characteristics between men and women. Appendix Table A.6, presents the coefficient 
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estimates on all other explanatory variables but here we focus on our key variables and only 
present the coefficient estimates on the female and sector indicators, and the interaction 
term.66 The final two columns provide estimates from the QLFS, first on the basis of a 
comparable model to Model (5) and then from an enhanced specification (Model (6)) which 
additionally controls for highest qualification, marriage, dependent children, ethnicity and 
disability. The QLFS estimates also include controls for quarter, year and the interaction 
between them given the data is pooled across time. 
The results from Model (1) suggest a significant overall raw GPG of 16 log points, which for 
simplicity and ease of interpretation, we refer to throughout as approximating the percentage 
difference.67 Model (2) separates the raw GPG by sector and, relative to the private sector, 
there is a slightly narrower GPG in the public sector (approximately 2 per cent). The public 
sector also displays a sizeable raw wage premium relative to the private sector at just over 
20 per cent for men. However, this declines and actually becomes a small penalty after the 
inclusion of a full set of control variables (Model (5)). The inclusion of work-related 
characteristics in Model (4) reduces the size of the GPG but it remains significantly narrower 
in the public sector. The inclusion of occupation in Model (5) narrows the adjusted GPG 
further but it now becomes insignificantly different from zero across sectors.68 The adjusted 
GPG remains significant in Model (5), consistent with an unexplained GPG across sectors of 
approximately 11 per cent. The lack of sectoral differential is, however, in contrast to 
arguments of greater pay equality within the UK public sector (see Jones et al., 2018). In 
corresponding analysis of the QLFS, we observe a similar, but slightly larger, unexplained 
GPG which is approximately 2 per cent narrower in the public relative to the private sector. 
The public sector pay penalty evident in ASHE Model (5) is, however, more pronounced in 
the QLFS. Interestingly, the inclusion of additional personal characteristics in the QLFS 
appears to make little difference to the pattern of estimates between Models (5) and (6). 
Table 5. OLS pay regression results, public and private sector 
 ASHE  QLFS 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (5) (6) 
Female -0.164
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.211
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.197
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.132
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.113
***
 
(0.003) 
 -0.147
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.140
***
 
(0.005) 
Public - 0.205
***
 
(0.005) 
0.160
***
 
(0.005) 
0.159
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.005) 
 -0.080
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.101
***
 
(0.008) 
Female × Public - 
 
0.020
**
 
(0.006) 
0.017
**
 
(0.006) 
0.016
**
 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 0.025* 
(0.010) 
0.022* 
(0.010) 
Personal 
characteristics 
x x       
Work-related 
characteristics 
x x x      
Occupation x x x x     
Population size 22,247,515  - 
Number of 
observations 
(unweighted) 
145,554 
 
 44,801 
R
2
 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.25 0.50  0.43 0.46 
Notes: (i) Sample includes public and private sector employees. (ii) Reference category for sector is private sector. (iii) Models 
(1)-(5) are as set out in the text. All models include a constant term. Model (6) includes the following additional characteristics 
available in the QLFS: highest qualification, marriage, dependent children, ethnicity and disability. All estimates based on QLFS 
additionally control for year, quarter and their interaction. (iv) Standard errors in parentheses. (v) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001.  
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 The coefficient on the constant term is omitted as part of the UKDA’s disclosure policy. The coefficient estimates generally 
conform to expectations with a positive but diminishing return to age and tenure, a part-time pay penalty and a premium which 
rises with the average skill level of the occupation. 
67
 More accurately, a -0.164 difference in log points is equivalent to a [𝑒𝑥𝑝(−0.164) − 1] = −15 per cent differential. 
68
 Interestingly it remains significant, if instead, more detailed (4-digit) occupational controls are included.  
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Decomposition analysis 
The results presented in Table 5 are based on equations that assume each control variable 
has the same impact on earnings by gender and by sector (see Section 3.2). By estimating a 
version of these equations separately by gender and sector (see equation (2)), 
decomposition techniques (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) can be used to separate that part 
of within sector GPG due to differences in observed characteristics, or what is explained, 
from an unexplained component, which is closer to a measure of pay inequality. In Table 6, 
we present the decomposition analysis results performed by estimating a comprehensive 
specification including personal, work-related and occupation control variables, separately 
for males and females within each sector. The difference in earnings between the average 
male and female in each sector is presented in the first row (‘Difference in mean log gross 
hourly pay between men and women’). ‘Difference due to characteristics (explained)’ is the 
first component obtained from the decomposition and measures that part of the wage 
differential due to differences in the characteristics of men and women. The second 
component, ‘Difference due to coefficients (unexplained)’, measures that part due to 
differences in the return to those characteristics attributed due to gender and is typically 
interpreted as an upper bound measure of unequal treatment.69    
The results in Table 6 suggest only a relatively small amount of the public sector GPG (21 
per cent) can be attributed to differences in personal and work-related characteristics 
between men and women.70 The vast majority of the 19 per cent public sector GPG is due to 
differences in the coefficients which reflect the returns to these characteristics and is 
therefore unexplained or potentially attributable to unequal treatment or discrimination (see 
Section 2.2.2). Although the raw GPG is larger in the private sector, slightly more than half is 
explained in this sector, which leaves a smaller absolute unexplained GPG relative to the 
public sector. It is also confirmed by analysis of the QLFS, albeit the proportion of the public 
sector GPG which is explained is larger. Moreover, this qualitative pattern is robust to a 
range of sensitivity analysis, including the measurement of pay, different specifications in 
relation to occupation and restriction to full-time employees (see Appendix Tables A.8 and 
A.9). That the unexplained GPG is no narrower in the public relative to the private sector 
contrasts to previous analysis based on earlier data (see, for example, Jones et al., 2018). 
From the cross-sectional analysis here it is not possible to speculate whether this is a 
consequence of wage restraint in the public sector arising as a consequence of austerity or it 
reflects relative improvements within the private sector. Nevertheless, and in a similar 
manner to Jones et al. (2018) who found the unexplained GPG within the UK public sector to 
have been stable over time despite a range of measures to enhance pay equality, it 
questions the extent to which the more stringent equality requirements in the public sector 
are effective.  
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 In Appendix Tables A.8 and A.9, we explore the sensitivity of the results presented in Table 6 to the alternative definitions of 
hourly pay (Table A.8), to the exclusion of occupation from the specification, to the inclusion of detailed occupation, to the 
exclusion of part-time employees from the sample, to the decomposition method, and the year of analysis (Table A.9). 
70
 In further analysis, occupation is found to be the most important factor driving the explained gap within both sectors, 
consistent with the occupational segregation by gender highlighted in the descriptive statistics. In absolute terms the influence 
of occupation is, however, greater in the private sector.  
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Table 6. Decomposition of the GPG, public and private sector 
 ASHE  QLFS 
 Model (5)  Model (5) Model (6) 
 Public Private  Public Private Public  Private 
Difference in mean log gross 
hourly pay between men and 
women 
0.191
*** 
(0.005) 
0.211
*** 
(0.003) 
 0.199*** 
(0.010) 
0.267*** 
(0.006) 
0.199*** 
(0.010) 
0.267*** 
(0.006) 
Difference due to 
characteristics (explained) 
0.041
***
 0.118
***
  0.080*** 0.160*** 0.091*** 0.168*** 
(0.005) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
 [21.2%] [56.0%]  [40.2%] [59.9%] [45.6%] [62.9%] 
Difference due to coefficients 
(unexplained) 
0.150
***
 0.093
***
  0.119*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.099*** 
(0.006) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) 
 [78.8%] [44.0%]  [59.8%] [40.1%] [54.4%] [37.1%] 
Population size 5,627,309 16,620,206  - - - - 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 35,841 109,713  12,439 32,362 12,439 32,362 
Notes: (i) Decompositions are calculated using the relevant male coefficients as the baseline. (ii) Figures in ( ) are standard 
errors; figures in [ ] are proportions of overall GPG. (iii) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Quantile regression and decomposition analysis 
The above analysis focuses on average (mean) pay and does not take into account 
differences in the earnings distributions of each sector, with the pay distribution typically 
found to be narrower in the public sector. To explore whether the GPG and the difference in 
GPG between the public and private sectors differ across the wage distribution, we use 
quantile regression methods (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) and estimate the GPG across the 
pay distribution (see Section 3.2). Table 7 presents these results using the five models 
presented above for selected percentiles. In this table, we again focus our attention on the 
coefficients of interest and present the estimates for gender, sector and the interaction term.  
The results in Table 7 confirm a narrower raw GPG (Model (1)) at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, which is approximately 3 per cent at the 10th percentile. This increases to 
approximately 24 per cent at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution, consistent with the 
presence of a ‘glass ceiling’ i.e. greater gender inequality among high earners. In contrast, 
the male public sector wage premium (Model (2)) is more pronounced below the median. 
However, consistent with analysis at the mean this raw premium diminishes with the 
inclusion of personal and work-related characteristics, particularly occupation. Indeed, after 
accounting for occupation (Model (5)) there is a public sector pay penalty above the median. 
Relative to the private sector, the GPG in the public sector is larger below the median and, 
although the magnitude of this effect is smaller after the inclusion of personal and work-
related characteristics, it remains statistically significant. Above the median, the GPG is 
narrower in the public relative to the private sector, although the effect becomes smaller after 
the inclusion of personal and work-related characteristics. In the most comprehensive 
specification (Model (5)), the narrowing only remains significant at the 75th percentile. Even 
after adjusting for a comprehensive range of characteristics, the adjusted GPG remains 
significant across the wage distribution consistent with an unexplained wage penalty for 
women. This increases in magnitude across the wage distribution to approximately 16 per 
cent at the 90th percentile. Although the unexplained GPG is narrower at the bottom end of 
the wage distribution, it is here where it is significantly larger in the public relative to the 
private sector. In terms of the GPG the patterns are similar, although less pronounced in the 
QLFS, with a widening unexplained GPG moving up the wage distribution but starting from a 
more pronounced GPG at the 10th percentile. Consistent with the analysis at the mean, the 
adjusted public sector pay penalty is larger in magnitude in the QLFS. The relatively 
narrower GPG in the public compared to the private sector is also evident at the 50th and 
75th percentiles in Model (5) and, additionally at the 25th and 90th percentiles in Model (6).  
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Table 7. Quantile pay regression results, public and private sector 
 Percentile of the conditional pay distribution 
 10
th
  25
th
  50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
ASHE (Model (1))      
Female -0.032
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.128
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.196
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.185
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.237
***
 
(0.006) 
Personal characteristics x x x x x 
Work-related characteristics x x x x x 
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
ASHE (Model (2))      
Female -0.021 
(0.013) 
-0.144
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.267
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.286
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.277
***
 
(0.008) 
Public 0.221
***
 
(0.011) 
0.297
***
 
(0.008) 
0.296
***
 
(0.007) 
0.130
***
 
(0.008) 
0.035
*
 
(0.015) 
Female × Public 
 
-0.108 
(.) 
-0.076
***
 
(0.008) 
0.060
***
 
(0.008) 
0.142
***
 
(0.009) 
0.048
**
 
(0.017) 
Personal characteristics x x x x x 
Work-related characteristics x x x x x 
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 
ASHE (Model (3))      
Female -0.075
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.143
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.204
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.239
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.219
***
 
(0.006) 
Public 0.196
***
 
(0.004) 
0.253
***
 
(0.006) 
0.220
***
 
(0.005) 
0.086
***
 
(0.006) 
0.038
***
 
(0.009) 
Female × Public 
 
-0.072
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.071
***
 
(0.007) 
0.039
***
 
(0.007) 
0.126
***
 
(0.008) 
0.056
***
 
(0.012) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics x x x x x 
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14 
ASHE (Model (4))      
Female -0.045
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.068
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.112
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.175
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.180
***
 
(0.007) 
Public 0.149
***
 
(0.005) 
0.200
***
 
(0.005) 
0.186
***
 
(0.005) 
0.107
***
 
(0.007) 
0.099
***
 
(0.012) 
Female × Public 
 
-0.050
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.069
***
 
(0.006) 
0.025
***
 
(0.006) 
0.106
***
 
(0.008) 
0.037
**
 
(0.013) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 
ASHE (Model (5))      
Female -0.044
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.069
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.098
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.125
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.160
***
 
(0.005) 
Public 0.058
***
 
(0.005) 
0.016
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.026
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.090
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.091
***
 
(0.010) 
Female × Public -0.026
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.010
*
 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.022
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation        
Pseudo R
2
 0.22 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.33 
Population size 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 
22,247,515 
145,554 
QLFS (Model (5))      
Female -0.107*** 
(0.008) 
-0.114*** 
(0.005) 
-0.134*** 
(0.005) 
-0.177*** 
(0.006) 
-0.205*** 
(0.009) 
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Public 0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.020* 
(0.008) 
-0.072*** 
(0.007) 
-0.124*** 
(0.010) 
-0.146*** 
(0.013) 
Female × Public -0.005 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.008) 
0.054*** 
(0.011) 
0.029 
(0.015) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation        
Pseudo R
2
 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.31 
QLFS (Model (6))      
Female -0.101
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.112
*** 
(0.005) 
-0.126
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.165
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.189
***
 
(0.008) 
Public -0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.050
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.092
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.145
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.170
***
 
(0.010) 
Female × Public -0.002 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.028
**
 
(0.008) 
0.046
***
 
(0.010) 
0.027* 
(0.013) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation        
Pseudo R
2
 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.35 0.34 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 44,801 
Notes: See notes to Table 5.  
Similar to analysis at the mean, the models presented in Table 7 impose the restriction that 
men and women in both sectors have the same rewards to their characteristics. To examine 
the extent to which the returns to characteristics differ by gender and by sector, we estimate 
the most comprehensive specification, separately for males and females within each sector 
and decompose the difference between men and women at different points of the log pay 
distributions into an explained and unexplained component following the method proposed 
by Machado and Mata (2005). These decomposition results are presented in Figure 3.71 The 
corresponding figures from the QLFS (Model (6)) are presented in the Appendix Figure A.1 
and exhibit the same qualitative patterns. 
The results in Figure 3 suggest that the raw GPG tends to increase across the wage 
distribution in the private sector, at least until the 80th percentile. At the bottom end of the 
distribution the GPG is largely due to the differences in coefficients or the returns to 
characteristics (i.e. unexplained), consistent with unequal treatment. Observable personal 
and work-related characteristics play a more important role above the median, but the 
majority of the GPG remains unexplained even at the top of the wage distribution. In 
contrast, the pattern within the public sector is quite different. The GPG increases sharply 
until about the 40th percentile, after which it narrows until about the 80th percentile, beyond 
which there is a further sharp increase. Characteristics are a more important explanation for 
the public sector GPG at the bottom of the wage distribution, but their influence diminishes 
after the 40th percentile. As such, the public sector GPG above the 80th percentile is virtually 
entirely unexplained. The higher unexplained gap at the 90th percentile (at 19 per cent) 
relative to the 50th or 75th percentile (at 11 and 13 per cent respectively) is consistent with 
the presence of a ‘glass ceiling’ within the public sector.72 This is consistent with previous 
evidence of ‘glass ceiling’ effects among more educated women (Chzhen and Mumford, 
2011) and within the UK public sector (Arulampalam et al., 2007; Stewart, 2014a). The 
analysis also highlights the importance of considering the wage distribution in the 
comparison across sectors. At the median, for example, and in contrast to the mean, the 
unexplained GPG is larger in the private relative to the public sector. This pattern changes, 
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 The key patterns are not sensitive to alternative definitions of hourly pay, the exclusion of occupation, the exclusion of part-
time employees from the sample, to the decomposition method or year of analysis. The full-time GPG is, however, narrower in 
both sectors and virtually entirely unexplained. 
72
 Arulampalam et al. (2007) define a glass ceiling as a 2 percentage point larger unexplained wage gap at the 90
th
 percentile 
relative to a reference point of the distribution (e.g. median). 
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however, at the top end of the wage distribution given the pronounced glass ceiling in the 
public sector.73 
 
Figure 3. Decomposition of the GPG across the distribution, public and private sector 
4.2.2 Within public sector regression and decomposition analysis  
PRB versus non-PRB occupations 
Now we turn our attention to the GPG within the public sector to analyse GPGs across PRB 
occupations. For this purpose, Table 8 presents the OLS pay regression estimates from five 
different models, which are similar to the ones described above. Differently, Models (1)-(5) in 
Table 8 control for public sector PRB occupations (instead of sector) and the interaction 
between gender and PRB occupations (instead of the interaction between gender and 
sector). In this way, we identify differences between the GPGs within the public sector, in 
particular the GPG in PRB occupations relative to the other (non-PRB) public sector 
occupations.  
The results in Table 8 confirm a raw (22 per cent – Model (2)) and unexplained (11 per cent 
– Model (5)) GPG in the part of the public sector that is not covered by PRBs. The latter is 
considerably narrower after the inclusion of occupation. The results also confirm a raw pay 
premium to PRB relative to non-PRB workers, although the magnitude of this diminishes 
with the inclusion of occupation in particular it remains statistically significant at 8 per cent 
(Model (5)). The raw GPG is approximately 4 per cent narrower in PRB relative to non-PRB 
occupations (Model (2)) but the inclusion of occupation in Model (5) reverses this trend, with 
the adjusted GPG now approximately 6 per cent larger within PRB occupations. In contrast 
to ASHE, and despite a narrower raw GPG in PRB occupations (see Table 2), the results 
from the QLFS suggest the adjusted GPG (at approximately 13 per cent) is similar across 
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 This may be an important driver of the large unexplained gap at the mean identified in Table 6. 
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PRB and non-PRB occupations. There is also no evidence of a PRB pay premium after 
accounting for personal, work-related and occupational controls in the QLFS.  
Table 8. OLS pay regression results, public sector 
 ASHE  QLFS 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (5) (6) 
Female -0.191
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.224
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.216
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.174
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.107
***
 
(0.005) 
 -0.135*** 
(0.010) 
-0.129*** 
(0.010) 
PRB - 0.183
***
 
(0.009) 
0.187
***
 
(0.009) 
0.201
***
 
(0.009) 
0.078
***
 
(0.007) 
 0.015 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.014) 
Female × PRB - 0.044
***
 
(0.011) 
0.050
***
 
(0.010) 
0.036
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.058
***
 
(0.008) 
 0.009 
(0.016) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
Personal 
characteristics 
x x       
Work-related 
characteristics 
x x x      
Occupation x x x x     
Population size 5,627,309  - 
Number of obs. 
(unweighted) 
35,841 
 
 12,310 
R
2
 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.51  0.42 0.44 
Notes: (i) Sample is restricted to public sector employees. (ii) Reference category for PRB is non-PRB public. PRBs are defined 
to exclude the AFPRB in the QLFS for comparability. (iii) Models (1)-(5) are as set out in the text. All models include a constant 
term. Model (6) includes the following additional characteristics: highest qualification, marriage, dependent children, ethnicity 
and disability. All estimates based on QLFS additionally control for year, quarter and their interaction. (iv) Standard errors in 
parentheses. (v) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
Similar to our sectoral analysis, in Table 9, we present Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
results for the PRB occupations and non-PRB public sector occupations. The model used in 
the decomposition analysis is the most expanded specification (similar to Model (5) in Table 
8) but estimated separately for males and females and by sector.74 Consistent with the 
descriptive statistics the raw GPG is larger in non-PRB than PRB occupations. However, 
while nearly half of the GPG is explained by the productivity-related characteristics within 
non-PRB occupations, the gap is entirely unexplained in PRB occupations.75 This results in 
the unexplained GPG being larger in PRB occupations. Moreover, the same qualitative 
pattern, that the PRB GPG is typically largely unexplained and at least of comparable 
magnitude in absolute terms to non-PRB occupations is robust to a range of sensitivity 
analysis, including in relation to the measure of pay, decomposition methodology and 
restriction to full-time employees.76 The results, however, appear more sensitive to whether 
and how occupation is included in the models (see Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11) and, in 
particular suggests that gender segregation by occupation defined in narrow as opposed to 
broad groups is important in explaining the GPG within PRB occupations. While the 
magnitudes vary, the same patterns are evident in the QLFS, with the entire GPG being 
unexplained within the PRB occupations (Model (5)). This means that, on average, women 
have comparable productivity-related characteristics to men in PRB occupations and these 
narrow the overall raw GPG in PRB relative to non-PRB occupations.77  
                                                          
74
 In Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11, we explore the sensitivity of the results presented in Table 9 to the alternative definitions 
of hourly pay (Table A.10), to the exclusion of occupation from the specification, to the inclusion of more detailed controls for 
occupation, to the exclusion of part-time employees from the sample, to the decomposition method, and the year of analysis 
(Table A.11). 
75
 In further analysis gender differences in occupation are found to have a dominant role in explaining the GPG in non-PRB 
occupations but this has no role in PRB occupations. 
76
 The full-time raw GPG is, however, much narrower in non-PRB occupations. 
77
 Although not significant in our analysis the negative explained component evident in Table 9 is consistent with females 
having greater productivity-related characteristics than males such that the unexplained gap is more than 100 per cent of the 
entire GPG i.e. gender differences in characteristics serve to narrow the raw GPG relative to our measure of wage inequality. 
53 
   
Table 9. Decomposition of the GPG, public sector 
 ASHE  QLFS 
 Model (5)  Model (5) Model (6) 
 Non-PRB  PRB  Non-
PRB  
PRB Non-
PRB  
PRB 
Difference in mean log gross 
hourly pay between men and 
women 
0.224
*** 
(0.007) 
0.180
*** 
(0.008) 
 0.266*** 
(0.012) 
0.125*** 
(0.016) 
0.266*** 
(0.012) 
0.125*** 
(0.016) 
Difference due to 
characteristics (explained) 
0.109
***
 -0.002  0.145*** -0.023 0.153*** 0.001 
(0.007) (0.008)  (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.019) 
[48.7%] [-1.0%]  [54.5%] [-18.2%] [57.4%] [1.0%] 
Difference due to coefficients 
(unexplained) 
0.115
***
 0.182
***
  0.121*** 0.147*** 0.113*** 0.123*** 
(0.008) (0.009)  (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) 
[51.3%] [101.0%]  [45.5%] [118.2%] [42.6%] [99.0%] 
Population size 3,046,955 2,580,354  - - - - 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 20,193 15,648  7,442 4,868 7,285 4,868 
Notes: (i) Decompositions are calculated using the relevant male coefficients as the baseline. (ii) Figures in ( ) are standard 
errors; figures in [ ] are proportions of overall GPG. (iii) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
To explore whether the GPG differs across the wage distribution within the public sector, we 
estimate the GPG at different points of the pay distribution using the quantile regression 
methods as above. Table 10 presents estimation results using five different specifications for 
selected percentiles. We again focus our attention to the coefficients of interest and present 
only the estimates for coefficients of gender, PRB and the interaction term. There is 
evidence of a consistent raw PRB wage premium across the wage distribution, although this 
is most pronounced at the 90th percentile at approximately 28 per cent (Model (2)). The 
magnitude of this narrows however, particularly after the inclusion of occupation. The raw 
GPG is narrower in PRB relative to non-PRB occupations across most of the distribution 
(Model (2)) but is actually significantly greater (approximately 15 per cent) at the 90th 
percentile. Consistent with analysis at the mean, controlling for occupation has a large 
impact on the results, with the adjusted GPG being significantly greater in PRB occupations, 
although the differential remains most pronounced at the 90th percentile. In contrast to 
ASHE, but consistent with the analysis relating to the mean, the results relating to the QLFS 
suggest the adjusted or unexplained GPG is not significantly different between PRB and 
non-PRB occupations.   
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Table 10. Quantile pay regression results, public sector 
 Percentile of the conditional pay distribution 
 10
th
  25
th
  50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
ASHE (Model (1))      
Female -0.130
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.220
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.208
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.144
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.229
***
 
(0.015) 
Personal characteristics x x x x x 
Work-related characteristics x x x x x 
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 
ASHE (Model (2))      
Female -0.134
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.242
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.294
***
 
(0.009) 
-0.205
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.199
***
 
(0.013) 
PRB 0.114
***
 
(0.017) 
0.201
***
 
(0.011) 
0.180
***
 
(0.009) 
0.153
***
 
(0.014) 
0.289
***
 
(0.023) 
Female × PRB 
 
0.031 
(0.017) 
0.056
***
 
(0.013) 
0.142
***
 
(0.013) 
0.040
*
 
(0.016) 
-0.151
***
 
(0.025) 
Personal characteristics x x x x x 
Work-related characteristics x x x x x 
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.04 
ASHE (Model (3))      
Female -0.155
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.223
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.255
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.171
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.148
***
 
(0.010) 
PRB 0.098
***
 
(0.015) 
0.182
***
 
(0.014) 
0.171
***
 
(0.008) 
0.170
***
 
(0.013) 
0.284
***
 
(0.019) 
Female × PRB 
 
0.056
***
 
(0.015) 
0.067
***
 
(0.015) 
0.143
***
 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.135
***
 
(0.022) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics x x x x x 
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 
ASHE (Model (4))      
Female -0.108
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.138
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.195
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.156
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.143
***
 
(0.010) 
PRB 0.098
***
 
(0.013) 
0.192
***
 
(0.011) 
0.167
***
 
(0.008) 
0.159
***
 
(0.013) 
0.290
***
 
(0.020) 
Female × PRB 
 
0.026 
(0.014) 
0.028
*
 
(0.013) 
0.133
***
 
(0.010) 
0.039
**
 
(0.015) 
-0.148
***
 
(0.022) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation x x x x x 
Pseudo R
2
 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.11 
ASHE (Model (5))      
Female -0.081
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.077
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.097
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.127
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.140
***
 
(0.010) 
PRB 0.023
*
 
(0.010) 
0.045
***
 
(0.008) 
0.065
***
 
(0.007) 
0.064
***
 
(0.009) 
0.166
***
 
(0.019) 
Female × PRB 0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.028
**
 
(0.008) 
-0.049
***
 
(0.008) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.120
***
 
(0.021) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation        
Pseudo R
2
 0.28 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.28 
Population size 
Number of obs. 
(unweighted) 
5,627,309 
35,841 
QLFS (Model (5))      
Female -0.119*** -0.114*** -0.119*** -0.148*** -0.191*** 
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(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
PRB 0.003 
(0.019) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
0.047 
(0.025) 
Female × PRB 0.030 
(0.022) 
0.028 
(0.015) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
0.030 
(0.019) 
-0.033 
(0.027) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation        
Pseudo R
2
 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.25 
QLFS (Model (6))      
Female -0.099*** 
(0.011) 
-0.102*** 
(0.008) 
-0.119*** 
(0.009) 
-0.145*** 
(0.011) 
-0.176*** 
(0.012) 
PRB -0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
0.064* 
(0.025) 
Female × PRB 0.031 
(0.016) 
0.031 
(0.017) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.030 
(0.020) 
-0.036 
(0.027) 
Personal characteristics        
Work-related characteristics        
Occupation        
Pseudo R
2
 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.28 
Number of obs. 
(unweighted) 
12,310 
Notes: See notes to Table 7.  
In a similar manner to Figure 3, Figure 4 presents the Machado and Mata (2005) 
decomposition results using our most expanded specification (similar to Model (5) in Table 
10) separately for males and females and for PRB and non-PRB public sector occupations.78 
The corresponding figures from the QLFS (Model (6)) are presented in Appendix Figure A.2 
and exhibit the same qualitative patterns, albeit the entire GPG is unexplained across the 
distribution in PRB occupations.  
The patterns between PRB occupations and non-PRB occupations are quite different. The 
raw GPG gap increases but then peaks at the median for non-PRB occupations. For PRB 
occupations, there are sharp increases below the bottom 20th percentile and again above the 
70th percentile so the largest GPG is among the highest paid workers. In non-PRB 
occupations characteristics play an important role and contribute more to the GPG than 
coefficients except at the very top end of the wage distribution. Consistent with the analysis 
at the mean, among PRB occupations characteristics have a limited role and this diminishes 
across the wage distribution. Indeed, characteristics have virtually no role above the median 
and, as such, the entire GPG in PRB occupations is unexplained above the median. The 
substantial increase in the unexplained component across the wage distribution is consistent 
with a pronounced glass ceiling within PRB occupations which is not evident for non-PRB 
occupations. While it is not possible to identify the cause of this difference it is consistent 
with unequal treatment of men and women in senior roles and/or unexplained differences in 
progression between men and women in PRB occupations in particular. The latter may 
stem, for example, from differences in motivation for seniority between men and women in 
PRB occupations or differences in specialism or promotion opportunities.79 The findings also 
suggest that PRBs need to pay particular attention to pay rise methods, as for instance, in 
contrast to absolute increases, across-the-board pro-rata proportional increases in pay 
would work to maintain the GPG across the distribution, and hence the glass-ceiling effect. 
                                                          
78
 The key patterns are not sensitive to alternative definitions of hourly pay, the exclusion of occupation, the exclusion of part-
time employees from the sample, to the decomposition method or year of analysis. The full-time raw GPG is, however, much 
narrower (and relatively more is unexplained) than the GPG among all workers in non-PRB occupations. 
79
 In further analysis (not reported) there is evidence of a glass ceiling in the DDRB and the NHSPRB. 
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Figure 4 can also be used to make comparisons across PRB and non-PRB occupations, but 
in a similar manner to the findings at the mean, the raw GPG is larger within non-PRB 
occupations across most of the distribution, with the exception of at the very top. The 
unexplained GPG is, however, generally larger in PRB occupations, particularly above the 
40th percentile, and this difference widens at the top end of the earnings distribution. 
 
Figure 4. Decomposition of the GPG across the distribution, public sector 
Across PRB occupations 
Next we explore the GPG across the separate PRBs. For this purpose, Table 11 presents 
the OLS pay regression estimates from five different specifications which are similar to the 
ones discussed above but, we now disaggregate the PRBs to identify the differences 
between the GPG within each PRB relative to non-PRB public sector occupations. As 
expected, there is substantial variation in average pay across PRBs even after accounting 
for broad occupational groups (Model (5)), with the average male wage in PRBs both above 
(e.g. DDRB, STRB, PRRB) and below the rest of the public sector (e.g. PSPRB, NHSPRB). 
The GPG also varies significantly across PRBs, being narrower than the non-PRB in the 
NHSPRB, PRRB and STRB even after controlling for personal and work-related 
characteristics (Models (2)-(4)). Indeed, the magnitude of the narrowing is large for the 
NHSPRB and PRRB (and to a lesser extent the STRB), such that the unexplained GPG 
within these PRB is small in magnitude and considerably smaller than the rest of the public 
sector (Model (4)). The inclusion of occupation in Model (5) reduces the adjusted GPG in 
non-PRB occupations and narrows the differential with PRB occupations, particularly for the 
STRB. Although, consistent with Table 2, some of the magnitudes vary, the patterns are 
qualitatively similar in the QLFS and do not differ between Model (5) and (6).80 In addition, 
                                                          
80
 The PRRB no longer has a significantly narrower adjusted GPG than non-PRB occupations in Model (6). The narrower GPG 
in the STRB, however, remains significant in the QLFS, even after accounting for occupation.  
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while figures relating to the AFPRB should be treated with caution given the small sample 
size, the results from the QLFS show no wage premium or penalty associated with the 
AFPRB relative to non-PRB occupations and, no significant difference in the GPG in the 
AFPRB relative to non-PRB occupations.  
Table 11. OLS pay regression results, within the public sector 
 ASHE  QLFS 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (5) (6) 
Female -0.191
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.224
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.216
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.173
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.114
***
 
(0.005) 
 -0.138*** 
(0.010) 
-0.133*** 
(0.010) 
DDRB - 0.735
***
 
(0.021) 
0.749
***
 
(0.019) 
0.802
***
 
(0.019) 
0.546
***
 
(0.018) 
 0.466*** 
(0.038) 
0.462*** 
(0.039) 
NHSPRB - 
 
-0.071
***
 
(0.011) 
-0.050
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.031
**
 
(0.010) 
-0.086
***
 
(0.008) 
 -0.083*** 
(0.018) 
-0.080*** 
(0.017) 
PRRB - 0.152
***
 
(0.010) 
0.120
***
 
(0.009) 
0.085
***
 
(0.008) 
0.108
***
 
(0.008) 
 0.026 
(0.020) 
0.057** 
(0.021) 
PSPRB - -0.106
***
 
(0.026) 
-0.124
***
 
(0.027) 
-0.159
***
 
(0.027) 
-0.156
***
 
(0.022) 
 -0.305*** 
(0.069) 
-0.235*** 
(0.069) 
STRB - 0.411
***
 
(0.015) 
0.434
***
 
(0.013) 
0.461
***
 
(0.014) 
0.203
***
 
(0.013) 
 0.057* 
(0.026) 
0.035 
(0.026) 
AFPRB - 
 
- - - -  -0.016 
(0.039) 
0.010 
(0.037) 
Female × DDRB - 0.028 
(0.029) 
0.019 
(0.026) 
-0.016 
(0.026) 
-0.075
**
 
(0.025) 
 -0.018 
(0.052) 
-0.026 
(0.052) 
Female × 
NHSPRB 
- 0.172
***
 
(0.012) 
0.164
***
 
(0.011) 
0.141
***
 
(0.011) 
0.049
***
 
(0.009) 
 0.066** 
(0.020) 
0.078*** 
(0.019) 
Female × PRRB - 0.147
***
 
(0.016) 
0.169
***
 
(0.013) 
0.137
***
 
(0.012) 
0.078
***
 
(0.011) 
 0.084* 
(0.037) 
0.055 
(0.040) 
Female × PSPRB - 0.076 
(0.045) 
0.105
*
 
(0.047) 
0.096
*
 
(0.044) 
0.012 
(0.040) 
 0.099 
(0.103) 
0.101 
(0.101) 
Female × STRB - 0.122
***
 
(0.017) 
0.122
***
 
(0.015) 
0.083
***
 
(0.015) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
 0.076** 
(0.028) 
0.072** 
(0.027) 
Female x AFPRB - - - - -  -0.045 
(0.143) 
-0.046 
(0.141) 
Personal  
characteristics 
  x x       
Work-related 
characteristics 
  x x x      
Occupation   x x x x     
Population size 5,627,309  - 
Number of obs. 
(unweighted) 
35,841 
 
 12,439 
R
2
 0.04 0.23 0.31 0.34 0.57  0.44 0.47 
Notes: (i) Sample is restricted to public sector employees. (ii) Reference category for PRBs is non-PRB public sector. (iii) 
Models (1)-(5) are as set out in the text. All models include a constant term. Model (6) includes the following additional 
characteristics: highest qualification, marriage, dependent children, ethnicity and disability. All estimates based on QLFS 
additionally control for year, quarter and their interaction. (iv) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (v) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. (vi) In the QLFS, estimates are based on a particularly small sample of females in the PSPRB and AFPRB.  
Due to the small sample sizes within some of the PRB occupations when analysed 
separately and by gender we do not present the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results for 
each PRB occupation.81 Instead, for the ASHE, Table 12 presents within PRB GPGs 
calculated on the basis of OLS regression models, estimated separately for each PRB 
occupation but where the sample pools males and females and the unexplained gaps are 
given by coefficient estimates on the gender indicator variable. For consistency with the 
                                                          
81
 These estimates are, however, very comparable to those presented in Table 12 consistent with evidence from Elder et al. 
(2010) which suggests using the pooled model and gender dummy variable provides a reliable measure of the unexplained 
gap. 
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decomposition results presented earlier, we present the results such that a positive gap 
indicates that, on average, men are paid more than women. The raw GPG is presented in 
the first row using the basic model without any additional control variables, while the 
adjusted GPG shows the GPG between men and women with similar productivity 
characteristics. We do this adjustment gradually by adding personal characteristics (in row 
a), plus work-related characteristics (in row b), and plus occupation (in row c) to the basic 
model. It is worth noting that as there is no variation in major occupation groups for some of 
the PRBs (e.g. DDRB) here we control for detailed occupation information measured by the 
4-digit SOC 2010 code. This facilitates a detailed comparison within PRB occupations, for 
example, within specialisms in the NHSPRB and in relation to seniority in the PRRB, PSPRB 
and STRB (see Appendix Table A.1 for details).    
Consistent with the above analysis, the raw GPG varies considerably across PRBs from 
approximately 5 per cent in the NHSPRB to nearer 20 per cent in the DDRB. The latter is 
consistent with evidence from Stewart (2015) who found that the within occupation GPG is 
typically larger in higher paid occupations. Adjusting for personal characteristics tends to 
narrow the GPG across the PRBs. The exception is the STRB where, in total contrast to 
Turnbull and Williams (1974), none of the raw GPG can be explained by the productivity-
related characteristics in our model. This is particularly surprising given the inclusion of 
detailed occupational controls which account for primary and secondary education and 
seniority, which are thought to determine the GPG among teachers. As for the 
decompositions of PRB occupations as a whole, the extent to which the GPG can be 
explained is much less than for the non-PRB occupations. As such, despite having a 
narrower raw GPG, the adjusted or unexplained GPG across several PRB is larger than in 
the non-PRB occupations. The adjusted GPG remains statistically significant across all PRB 
and is most pronounced in the DDRB and PSPRB, and smallest in the NHSPRB and 
PRRB.82 The low unexplained GPG in occupations with a relatively high (NHSPRB) and low 
(PRRB) concentration of females is interesting since it is often thought that occupations with 
a high concentration of females are more likely to have a lower GPG (Stewart, 2015).  
While, as noted above, an unexplained gap does not necessarily imply wage discrimination 
given the potentially important unobserved variables in our analysis, it does point to the need 
for further investigation of GPGs by PRBs, possibly using more detailed administrative 
payroll data, as part of their commitment to relevant legal anti-discrimination obligations. 
  
                                                          
82
 For those PRBs with sufficient observations we perform Machado-Mata quantile decompositions. These confirm the patterns 
described above but also suggest a ‘glass ceiling’ effect in the DDRB, NHSPRB and the STRB (but not the PRRB). 
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Table 12. GPG within the public sector, by PRBs 
 DDRB NHSPRB PRRB PSPRB STRB Non-PRB public 
(1) Raw GPG   0.196
***
 
(0.028) 
0.052
***
 
(0.010) 
0.077
***
 
(0.014) 
0.148
**
 
(0.045) 
0.102
***
 
(0.015) 
0.224
***
 
(0.007) 
R
2
 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.06 
(2) Adjusted GPG        
(a) Control for personal         
characteristics 
0.144
***
 
(0.022) 
0.051
***
 
(0.009) 
0.040
***
 
(0.010) 
0.126
**
 
(0.048) 
0.090
***
 
(0.013) 
0.208
***
 
(0.006) 
R
2
 0.45 0.11 0.46 0.16 0.27 0.16 
(b) plus work-related  
characteristics  
0.154
***
 
(0.022) 
0.047
***
 
(0.009) 
0.046
***
 
(0.010) 
0.082 
(0.049) 
0.115
***
 
(0.013) 
0.136
***
 
(0.007) 
R
2
 0.47 0.14 0.57 0.26 0.34 0.23 
(c) plus occupation 
 
0.153
***
 
(0.022) 
0.034
***
 
(0.008) 
0.042
***
 
(0.010) 
0.122
**
 
(0.040) 
0.101
***
 
(0.012) 
0.079
***
 
(0.005) 
R
2
 0.47 0.55 0.62 0.52 0.39 0.61 
Population size  202,936 1,632,783 211,039 23,155 510,438 3,046,955 
Number of obs. 
(unweighted) 
1,077 10,517 1,122 120 2,812 20,193 
Notes: (i) Each cell presents the OLS coefficient estimate on the gender indicator variable (male 1 and female 0) from separate 
log hourly pay regression for five PRBs and the non-PRB public sector occupations. (ii) Raw GPG includes a male dummy 
variable and a constant term without any additional control variables. (iii) Occupation is measured by the 4-digit SOC 2010 
code. (iv) Standard errors in parentheses. (v)* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. (v) Each R
2
 refers to the specification above. 
(vi) Estimates are not presented for the QLFS due to the small sample sizes for some PRBs. 
PRB occupations 
Since some of the PRB occupations are characterised by considerable gender segregation, 
in what follows we explore the gender differences in occupation, prior to exploring the 
contribution of ‘between’ and ‘within’ PRB occupation GPGs to the public sector GPG.  
In Table 13, we present Multinomial Logit Model results of the within public sector 
occupational choice model, where the influence of gender on public sector occupation before 
(Model (1)) and after accounting for other personal characteristics (Model (2)) can be 
identified. As noted above, we do not control for work-related characteristics since these are 
potential outcomes of occupational choices. For the QLFS we are also able to estimate a 
specification with an enhanced set of personal characteristics relative to ASHE (Model (3)). 
We only present the marginal effects on the female dummy variable as they are the 
estimates of interest.   
Women have a significantly higher probability of working in the NHSPRB (16 percentage 
points) and, to a far lesser extent, the STRB than non-PRB occupations. In contrast, men 
have a higher probability than women of working in the DDRB, the PRRB and to a lesser 
extent the PSPRB. The marginal effects are largely unchanged after controlling for personal 
characteristics, which suggests the gender differences in occupational selection are largely 
unexplained by our model, that is, they are not a consequence of gender differences in age 
or geographical location. Similar raw patterns by PRB are observed when using data from 
the QLFS, where females are also found to be less likely to work in the AFPRB. These are 
also robust to the inclusion of an enhanced set of personal controls consistent with PRB 
occupational choice being largely unexplained by our models.   
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Table 13. Public sector occupational choice model (multinomial logit marginal effects) 
ASHE DDRB NHSPRB PRRB PSPRB STRB AFPRB 
Model (1) 
Female 
-0.033
***
 
(0.002) 
0.161
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.056
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.005
***
 
(0.001) 
0.013
***
 
(0.004) 
- 
Personal characteristics x x x x x - 
Model (2) 
Female 
-0.033
***
 
(0.002) 
0.158
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.054
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.006
***
 
(0.001) 
0.012
***
 
(0.004) 
- 
Personal characteristics      - 
Population size 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 
5,627,309 
35,841 
QLFS DDRB NHSPRB PRRB PSPRB STRB AFPRB 
Model (1) 
Female 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.144*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
Personal characteristics X x x x x x 
Model (2) 
Female 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0.141*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.006) 
-0.025*** 
(0.003) 
Personal characteristics       
Model (3) 
Female 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.137*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
-0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Enhanced personal 
characteristics 
      
Number of obs. (unweighted) 12,439 
Notes: (i) Sample includes only public sector employees. (ii) Figures presented are Average Marginal Effects. (ii) Reference 
group is public sector employees working in non-PRB occupations. (iii) Model (3) additionally controls for marriage, highest 
qualification, ethnicity and disability using data from the QLFS. All estimates based on QLFS additionally control for year, 
quarter and their interaction. (iv) Estimates for the AFPRB are only available from the QLFS. (v) Delta-method standard errors 
in parentheses. (vi)* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
In Table 14, we quantify whether the GPG in the public sector stems from men and women 
working in different occupations (‘between’) or differences in pay within a given occupation 
(‘within’) using the decomposition approach proposed by Brown et al. (1980). The same 
patterns are evident using data from ASHE or the QLFS, that is, the majority of the public 
sector GPG is driven by GPGs within public sector occupations rather than between 
occupations. Gender differences in the allocation of women into and between PRB 
occupations act to increase the public sector GPG but this influence is small in magnitude 
relative to the within occupation effect.83 So, even with an equal probability of men and 
women working across PRBs, when the GPG would be driven entirely by the GPG within 
occupations, it would remain at about 15-17 per cent (or more than 75 per cent of the raw 
public sector GPG). This is consistent with recent emphasis in the literature on analysing 
GPGs within occupations to understand pay inequality. Of course, this analysis only looks at 
public sector occupations. Nevertheless, it is complementary to recent evidence from Jones 
et al. (2018) which found that it is the GPG within each sector that is the main driver of the 
overall UK GPG, rather than the allocation of males and females across sectors. Further, as 
the above analysis in Table 12 demonstrates, and particularly for PRB occupations we are 
unable to explain much of the within PRB GPGs consistent with these raw gaps illustrating 
an important element of pay inequality rather than reflecting gender differences in the 
productivity-related characteristics of men and women within PRBs. The evidence of a 
positive between-occupation gap, nevertheless, indicates that even if the GPG within each 
occupation was zero there would be a GPG within the public sector of 3 to 4 per cent (or less 
than 25 per cent of the current raw public sector GPG). The latter would arise from the 
concentration of females in relatively low paying public sector occupations which, as Table 
13 shows, we are largely unable to explain by gender differences in personal characteristics. 
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 There may, however, be other reasons for PRBs to focus on gender diversity within occupations other than as a determinant 
of the GPG. 
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Table 14. Within and between decomposition of the public sector GPG 
 ASHE  QLFS 
Raw public sector GPG 0.191 0.199 
Within public sector occupations 0.150 
 
[78.6%] 
0.174  
[87.1%] 
Between public sector occupations 0.041 
[21.4%] 
0.025  
[12.5%] 
Population size 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 
5,627,309 
35,841 
- 
12,439 
Notes: (i) Figures in [ ] are proportions of overall GPG. (ii) Analysis of ASHE (QLFS) is based on 5 (6) PRB and non-PRB 
occupations as defined above. 
4.2.3 PRP regression analysis 
In this section we turn to a brief analysis of PRP to supplement the more comprehensive 
analysis of hourly pay. To explore gender reward gaps more generally, we estimate a probit 
model of the incidence of PRP (see, for example, Jirjahn and Stephan, 2004; Xiu and 
Gunderson, 2013) for each sector and present our estimation results in Table 15a. The 
empirical evidence suggests that women are less likely than men to be employed in jobs in 
which compensation is based on performance (see Manning and Said, 2010 for the UK; 
McGee et al., 2015 for the US) and we explore whether there are sectoral differences in this 
regard. Our dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual received any incentive 
payment during the preceding year (i.e. the amount of PRP>0) and is 0 otherwise. We 
estimate five different models, starting from the basic model, where we control for the gender 
indicator and a constant without any additional control variables. The marginal effect of being 
female on the probability of receiving PRP is given by the female indicator (Model (1)). To 
adjust the gender gap in the incidence of PRP for productivity-related characteristics, then 
we gradually add controls to the basic model, such as a sector dummy and the interaction 
between female and sector (Model (2)), as well as personal characteristics (Model (3)), plus 
work-related characteristics (Model (4)), plus occupation (Model (5)). In Table 15a, we 
simply focus on our estimate of interest and present only the marginal effects of the gender 
and sector indicators. For ease of interpretation of the interaction terms the predicted 
probability of the incidence of PRP by gender and sector is also reported.  
Consistent with the descriptive statistics we find that women are about 13 percentage points 
less likely to receive PRP (Model (1)) but that there is a considerable sectoral difference with 
workers in the public sector about 30 percentage points less likely to receive PRP. While the 
influence of gender diminishes with the inclusion of work-related characteristics (Model (4)), 
suggesting part of the differential is due to differences in the jobs men and women hold, the 
effect of sector remains pronounced, consistent with a differential sectoral reward system for 
similar jobs. Even in the most comprehensive specification an unexplained gender gap 
remains evident consistent with gender differences in preferences for PRP or employer 
differences in the use of PRP as a reward strategy by gender. In terms of the interaction 
between gender and sector, the predicted probabilities in the lower panel of Table 15a 
(Model (2)) confirm the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4a. In the public sector, the 
gender gap in the incidence of PRP is about 5 percentage points (or 60 per cent).84 The 
corresponding figure for the private sector, in which the probability of PRP is considerably 
higher, is about 9 percentage points (or 21 per cent). The inclusion of personal, work-related 
characteristic and occupation has a narrowing effect on both the public and private sector 
gender gap in PRP consistent with it partly being a consequence of gender differences in 
personal and work-related characteristics in both sectors. In relative terms the unexplained 
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 The (absolute) percentage point gender gap is calculated on the basis of the difference in the predicted probability for males 
and females within a given sector. It is divided by the relevant predicted probability for men to generate the (relative) different in 
per cent.  
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gender gap (Model (5)) remains far larger in the public (40 per cent) compared to the private 
(10 percent) sector.   
Table 15a. Gender gap in the incidence of PRP, public and private sector (probit model) 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.133
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.077
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.073
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.030
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.002) 
Public  
- 
-0.292
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.297
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.327
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.331
***
 
(0.002) 
Female × public x     
Personal characteristics x x    
Work-related characteristics x x x   
Occupation x x x x  
Male private 
- 
0.397
***
 
(0.002) 
0.397
***
 
(0.002) 
0.390
***
 
(0.002) 
0.395
***
 
(0.002) 
Male public - 0.090
***
 
(0.003) 
0.086
***
 
(0.003) 
0.062
***
 
(0.002) 
0.057
***
 
(0.002) 
Female private 
- 
0.312
***
 
(0.002) 
0.318
***
 
(0.002) 
0.361
***
 
(0.002) 
0.357
***
 
(0.002) 
Female public - 0.036
***
 
(0.001) 
0.035
***
 
(0.001) 
0.033
***
 
(0.001) 
0.034
***
 
(0.001) 
Population size   22,247,515   
Number of obs. (unweighted) 145,554 
Notes: (i) Figures presented in the upper and lower panels are Average Marginal Effects and predicted probabilities by gender 
and sector respectively. (ii) Delta-method standard errors in parentheses.  (ii) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Given the availability of the amount of PRP within ASHE, we also explore within sector 
gender differences in the absolute level of PRP, conditional on receipt of PRP (i.e. if the 
amount of PRP>0). For this purpose, in a similar manner to Albanesi et al. (2015) and Xiu 
and Gunderson (2013), we estimate an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is 
the log of PRP received during the preceding year. The coefficient estimates of the 
interaction term presented in Table 15b can be interpreted as the sectoral differences in 
GPG in PRP adjusted for the productivity-related characteristics included in each model.   
The raw gender gap in the amount of PRP is nearly 50 per cent (Model (1)). The sectoral 
differences in reward are also evident and reflected in a lower amount of PRP conditional on 
receipt in the public sector. The raw GPG in PRP is significantly lower in the public relative to 
the private sector at approximately 14 per cent (Model (2)).85 The inclusion of work-related 
characteristics in particular narrows the gender gap in the private sector but the difference in 
the GPG between sectors remains evident. Indeed, in Models (4) and (5), conditional on 
personal and work-related characteristics, women in the public sector actually earn more 
PRP than men, suggesting there is no evidence of discrimination against women in relation 
to the level of PRP in the public sector conditional on receipt. It should, however, be noted 
that due to the low incidence of PRP within the public sector these estimates are likely to be 
based on a particularly selective sample of workers.  
  
                                                          
85
 This is calculated by the sum of the coefficient estimate on female and female x public i.e. -0.507+0.370 = -0.137.  
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Table 15b. GPG in PRP, public and private sector (OLS regression results) 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.497
***
 
(0.018) 
-0.507
***
 
(0.018) 
-0.472
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.201
***
 
(0.017) 
-0.267
***
 
(0.018) 
Public  
- 
-0.658
***
 
(0.055) 
-0.905
***
 
(0.057) 
-0.661
***
 
(0.058) 
-0.873
***
 
(0.057) 
Female × public - 
 
0.370
***
 
(0.084) 
0.389
***
 
(0.087) 
0.383
***
 
(0.086) 
0.422
***
 
(0.084) 
Personal characteristics x x    
Work-related characteristics x x x   
Occupation x x x x  
Population size   6,312,603   
Number of obs. (unweighted) 40,001 
R
2
 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.20 0.31 
Notes: (i) Reference category for public is private sector. (ii) Standard errors in parentheses.  (iii) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
We undertake a similar analysis within the public sector by exploring gender differences in 
the incidence of PRP and the amount of PRP within the public sector. Parallel to our analysis 
of the public and private sector, in Table 16a we present the marginal effect of being female 
on the probability of receiving PRP within the public sector from a probit model, as well as 
the predicted probability of receiving PRP by gender and PRB occupation, and in Table 16b 
we display the OLS coefficient estimates of the PRP regression within the public sector from 
alternative specifications. Table 16a confirms that there is a gender gap in the incidence of 
PRP within the public sector, with women about 5 percentage point less likely to be in receipt 
of PRP (Model (1)). Workers in PRB (relative to non-PRB) occupations are also about 6 
percentage points less likely to be in receipt of PRP (Model (2)). While the gender gap 
narrows, both of these features remain evident after accounting for productivity-related 
characteristics suggesting they are only partly driven by differences in the nature of jobs 
between men and women or by PRB occupation. The predicted probabilities of being in 
receipt of PRP are presented by gender and PRB occupation in the lower panels of Table 
16a. In Model (2) the gender gap in the predicted probability of PRP is about 8 percentage 
points (57 per cent) in non-PRP occupations compared to 2 percentage points (53 per cent) 
in PRP occupations, where the prevalence of PRP is far lower. Accounting for personal and 
work-related characteristics has a modest narrowing impact on the gender gap in PRP in 
both PRB and non-PRB occupations, consistent with the gaps largely being unexplained. 
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Table 16a. Gender gap in the incidence of PRP within the public sector (probit model) 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.054
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.049
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.045
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.033
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.028
***
 
(0.002) 
PRB 
- 
-0.063
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.063
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.061
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.058
***
 
(0.003) 
Female × PRB x     
Personal characteristics x x    
Work-related characteristics x x x   
Occupation x x x x  
Male non-PRB public 
- 
0.133
***
 
(0.004) 
0.130
***
 
(0.004) 
0.113
***
 
(0.004) 
0.105
***
 
(0.004) 
Male PRB - 0.030
***
 
(0.003) 
0.029
***
 
(0.003) 
0.027
***
 
(0.002) 
0.028
***
 
(0.002) 
Female non-PRB public 
- 
0.057
***
 
(0.002) 
0.058
***
 
(0.002) 
0.062
***
 
(0.002) 
0.063
***
 
(0.002) 
Female PRB - 0.014
***
 
(0.001) 
0.014
***
 
(0.001) 
0.015
***
 
(0.001) 
0.016
***
 
(0.001) 
Population size 5,627,309 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 35,841 
Notes: (i) Sample is restricted to public sector workers. (ii) Figures presented in the upper and lower panels are Average 
Marginal Effects and predicted probabilities by gender and sector respectively. (iii) Delta-method standard errors in 
parentheses.  (iv) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
Table 16b suggests there is a raw gender gap in the amount of PRP, conditional on 
incidence of PRP, in non-PRB occupations. In contrast, there is no evidence of a gender gap 
in the amount of PRP in non-PRB occupations after controlling for other productivity-related 
factors. There is also no significant difference in the level of PRP between PRB and non-
PRB occupations and, the interaction between gender and PRB occupations is also 
insignificant, suggesting there is no unexplained gender gap in the amount of PRP within 
either part of the public sector. 
Table 16b. GPG in PRP within the public sector (OLS regression results) 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.137 
(0.082) 
-0.199
*
 
(0.079) 
-0.198
*
 
(0.077) 
-0.050 
(0.074) 
-0.002 
(0.075) 
PRB - 
 
-0.202 
(0.242) 
-0.167 
(0.257) 
-0.177 
(0.255) 
-0.224 
(0.249) 
Female × PRB - 0.392 
(0.322) 
0.311 
(0.325) 
0.309 
(0.321) 
0.144 
(0.317) 
Personal characteristics x x    
Work-related characteristics x x x   
Occupation  x x x x  
Population size   302,869   
Number of obs. (unweighted) 1,877 
R
2
 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.14 
Notes: (i) Sample is restricted to public sector workers. (ii) Reference category for PRB is non-PRB public sector occupations. 
(iii) Standard errors in parentheses.  (iv) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
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5. Conclusion 
Using large scale, nationally representative data from ASHE 2018 this project applies well-
established econometric and decomposition methods to comprehensively investigate the 
contemporary drivers of the public sector GPG in the UK. In order to do this, our analysis 
undertakes comparisons with the private sector and, within the public sector on the basis of 
the coverage of five PRBs. In this respect it integrates and contributes to two important but 
largely separate strands of evidence within the extensive literature on the GPG, on sector 
and occupation respectively. Our focus is on separating the contribution of observable 
personal and work-related characteristics as productivity-related drivers of the GPG and we 
do this both at the mean of the distribution, which is typically the focus, but also across the 
wage distribution to consider differences in the GPG among high and low earners. We 
further explore the robustness of the findings using a series of alternative specifications 
within ASHE and to pooled data from the QLFS 2016-2018. 
5.1 Key findings 
Consistent with previous evidence the raw mean GPG in the public sector is slightly 
narrower than that in the private sector. However, analysis using the Oaxaca–Blinder 
decomposition method shows that while about half of the private sector GPG can be 
explained by the personal and work-related characteristics in our model, this is true for less 
than half of the public sector GPG. As such, the unexplained GPG, which is typically taken to 
be a measure of unequal treatment in the labour market, is at least as large within the public 
as the private sector. This appears to contrast with earlier evidence which finds a narrower 
unexplained GPG in the public sector (see, for example, Jones et al., 2018) but is robust to 
sensitivity analysis, including using data from the QLFS, and provides a possible indication 
of a worsening of the relative position of the public sector in terms of gender equality. While 
it is not possible to identify the reasons for this without further analysis over time to track 
changes in the GPG within each sector, it does perhaps question the effectiveness of more 
stringent equality legislation within the public sector and highlights the importance of 
renewed emphasis on gender equality.  
Further exploration of sectoral differences across the wage distribution confirms that the raw 
GPG widens across the wage distribution in both sectors. However, in the public sector the 
GPG is particularly pronounced at the top end of the wage distribution. The role of 
characteristics in explaining the GPG also varies by sector. In the public sector 
characteristics become a less important explanation for the GPG across the distribution, 
whereas in the private sector a greater proportion of the GPG is explained at the top of the 
wage distribution. The residual or unexplained gap, our indicator of unequal treatment, is 
thus particularly prominent at the top end of the wage distribution in the public sector 
consistent with a ‘glass ceiling’, or greater gender inequality among higher earners. Focusing 
on the mean GPG thus hides considerable heterogeneity, particularly within the public 
sector, and the evidence would suggest public sector employers need to pay particular 
attention on exploring and addressing earnings inequality at the top end of the distribution. 
Future research comparing the GPG between the public and private sector should also 
explore the robustness of findings to the point in the earnings distribution at which it is 
measured.   
This report further examines the GPG within the public sector in two main ways. First the 
GPG is compared between PRB and non-PRB occupations, and then each PRB is 
considered separately. As such, it provides new evidence on GPGs within PRB occupations 
and some of the first evidence internationally in relation to GPGs in occupations such as the 
police and prison service. Although the raw GPG is significantly narrower in PRB 
occupations, a larger proportion of the GPG is explained, particularly by broad occupational 
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groups, in non-PRB occupations. As a result, the unexplained GPG is actually at least as 
large in PRB occupations as non-PRB occupations and again reinforces the important 
distinction between the GPG and the adjusted or unexplained GPG as a measure of 
earnings inequality. Controlling for personal and work-related characteristics is also 
important in analysis across the earnings distribution, with the adjusted GPG being 
significantly greater in PRB occupations above the median and particularly at the top end of 
the earnings distribution. Indeed, PRB occupations exhibit a pronounced ‘glass ceiling’ 
effect. This has important implications for each PRB when considering their GPG but would 
also seem to be particularly important for future investigation by the SSRB which we are not 
able to consider here.  
Examination across the individual PRBs highlights substantial heterogeneity in the 
magnitude of the GPG and reinforces the need to consider the diversity of public sector 
employment when considering the GPG, something which is often neglected in the literature. 
The raw gap is largest in the DDRB at 20 per cent and considerably smaller in the NHSPRB 
and the PRRB at 5 and 8 per cent, respectively. Consistent with the analysis of PRB 
occupations in aggregate, the element of the GPGs within PRBs which can be explained is 
typically relatively small. Indeed, for the STRB virtually none of the GPG can be attributed to 
the personal and work-related characteristics within our model. This is particularly surprising 
given the detailed nature of the occupational controls available within ASHE, which account 
for elements of specialism and seniority within PRBs. As such, an unexplained GPG is 
evident across all of the PRBs, although heterogeneity remains with an unexplained GPG in 
the DDRB of 15 per cent nearly four times that found in the NHSPRB and PRRB. This 
suggests particular investigation is required among certain PRBs and that the current 
complementary review of the GPG in medicine is particularly timely. That the NHSPRB and 
PRRB have the narrowest unexplained GPGs is interesting given the stark gender 
differences in workforce composition among these occupations (see below). They are, 
however, both characterised by fairly flat age-earnings profiles for both men and women, 
which might indicate fewer opportunities for career progression, which in relative terms, will 
advantage women.  
The analysis confirms the concentration of females in the UK public sector and the PRBs in 
particular. It also highlights more substantial gender differences in workforce composition 
across PRBs, with the NHSPRB predominately female (80 per cent) and the PSPRB and 
PRRB predominately male (about 65-70 per cent). Despite this, the contribution of gender 
differences in the allocation of women across PRBs plays a relatively minor role to the public 
sector GPG, consistent with the importance of within occupation GPGs (see Stewart, 2015 
for example). Indeed, the raw GPG would be 15 per cent if there was no gender difference in 
the probability of working across PRBs whereas it would only be 4 per cent if there were no 
GPGs within public sector occupations. Nevertheless, personal characteristics also appear 
to have a limited role in explaining gender differences in occupation within the public sector 
which suggests a potentially important role for unobservable characteristics such as 
preferences and/or societal or employer barriers to entry into certain occupations.   
Consistent with the existing evidence, PRP is a much less prevalent form of reward in the 
public relative to the private sector (Bryson et al., 2017). While about 36 per cent of workers 
in the private sector received PRP in the last year the comparable figure for the public sector 
was 5 per cent. The prevalence is even smaller in PRBs at about 2 per cent. There is also 
an unexplained gender gap in the incidence of PRP across sectors, but, in relative terms, 
this is more pronounced in the public sector. Conditional on receipt of PRP, there is a gender 
gap in the amount of PRP, but this is considerably larger within the private sector. In this 
respect the evidence suggests sector is an important but neglected influence on the gender 
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gap in PRP that needs to be further considered in the international literature. PRB 
occupations are less likely to use PRP and while there remains a gender gap in incidence 
after accounting for work-related characteristics there is no unexplained gap in reward 
conditional on incidence in the public sector. As such, our evidence suggests that in terms of 
gender equality, the OME should focus on the incidence, or who receives PRP, when 
considering introducing payment systems relating reward to performance. 
5.2 Limitations and extensions 
Despite using rich data from multiple large-scale national surveys certain characteristics of 
individuals and their employment cannot be observed and measured. In particular, we rely 
on age as a proxy for actual labour market experience. Although the latter is rarely observed 
in survey data, based on evidence from studies where it is available, it tends to serve to 
narrow the unexplained GPG since age is likely to overestimate the actual labour market 
experience of women in particular. It may also be the case that the influence of gender on 
experience differs by sector. While the QLFS is able to supplement the information in ASHE, 
including by providing information on highest qualification, we do not explore the nature of 
education in more detail. For skilled occupations, like those in the PRBs, subject choice 
within higher education is likely to be an important driver of both occupation and pay, and in 
this regard gender differences are well-established and may further explain some of the 
differences observed. 
Moreover, some characteristics of individuals are inherently unobservable, including 
personality traits, preferences for risk and motivation for public sector work. These are 
potential determinants of both selection into public sector and PRB employment, and 
earnings. They have also previously been shown to differ considerably by gender and may 
therefore serve to further explain the public sector GPG. More generally, there might be 
unobserved characteristics which determine selection into the labour market, sector and 
occupation which are correlated with our explanatory variables and therefore potentially bias 
our OLS estimates of the GPG. While, given the increasing emphasis on within occupation 
pay gaps in the literature, it is not unusual to focus on the GPG within a particular 
occupation, as we have done, and future research by the OME might want to explore these 
selection processes in detail.  
The analysis of national data in this report has the advantage of facilitating the comparison 
across sectors and PRBs. However, complementary analysis of the separate PRB 
occupations could be undertaken using more specialised administrative payroll data, as we 
understand is currently being undertaken as part of the review of the GPG in medicine. 
Although the 4-digit occupation codes enable us to control for aspects of specialism and 
seniority within PRB occupations, administrative data would facilitate a more detailed 
examination of gender differences within occupations such as in terms of roles/job tasks 
(see, Reyes, 2007a, for example) and progression within specific occupations (see, McNabb 
and Wass, 1997). Analysis of specific PRBs would also facilitate more detailed examination 
of the impact of pay scales and pay awards on the GPG.86 This approach may also permit 
examination of PRBs with limited coverage such as the SSRB, which we are unable to 
consider but where the evidence of a ‘glass ceiling’ suggests a particular focus on gender 
equality might be important.  
While ASHE contains detailed information on work-related characteristics relating to the job, 
information on the company is relatively limited. As such, much of the information about the 
company or workplace is unobserved, including detailed information about equality policies 
and practices, such as flexible working which is identified as important to the GPG by 
                                                          
86
 The PRRB (2019), for example, highlights the range of GPGs by police force. 
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Chatterji et al. (2011). The use of company or workplace payroll information might also help 
in this regard and would appear complementary to, and enhance the value of, the publication 
of organisational GPGs and their exploration as part of the annual requirements of GPG 
reporting.  
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Akar, G., Balkan, B. and Tümen, S. (2013) ‘Overview of firm-size and gender pay gaps in 
Turkey: The role of informal employment. Ekonomi-tek-International Economics 
Journal, 2(3): 1–21. 
Apaydin, E. A., Chen, P. G., and Friedberg, M. W. (2018) ‘Differences in physician income 
by gender in a multiregion survey’, Journal of General Internal Medicine, 33(9): 1574–1581. 
Arrow, K. J. (1973) The theory of discrimination. In Discrimination in Labor Markets (pp. 3–
33), edited by Orley Ashenfelter and Albert Rees. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Arulampalam, W., Booth, A. L. and Bryan, M. L. (2007) ‘Is there a glass ceiling over Europe? 
Exploring the gender pay gap across the wage distribution’, ILR Review, 60(2): 163–186. 
Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body (2017) Forty-Sixth Report, March 2017.  
Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body (2019) Forty-Eighth Report, July 2017. 
Attanasio, O., Low, H. and Sánchez–Marcos, V. (2008) ‘Explaining changes in female labor 
supply in a life-cycle model’, American Economic Review, 98(4): 1517–1552. 
Bargain, O., Doorley, K. and Van Kerm, P. (2018) Minimum wages and the gender gap in 
pay: new evidence from the UK and Ireland, IZA Discussion Paper No 11502. 
Bailey, M. J. (2006) ‘More power to the pill: The impact of contraceptive freedom on 
women’s lifecycle labor supply’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1): 289–320. 
Bajorek, Z.M. and Bevan, S.M. (2015) ‘Performance-related-pay in the UK public sector: A 
review of the recent evidence on effectiveness and value for money’, Journal of 
Organizational Effectiveness: People and Performance, 2(2): 94–109. 
Baker, L. C. (1996) ‘Differences in earnings between male and female physicians’, New 
England Journal of Medicine, 334(15): 960–964. 
Bardasi, E. and Taylor, M. (2008) ‘Marriage and wages: A test of the specialization 
hypothesis’, Economica, 75(299): 569–591. 
Baron, J. and Cobb-Clark, D. (2010) ‘Occupational segregation and the gender wage gap in 
private- and public-sector employment: a distributional analysis’, Economic Record, 86(273): 
227–246. 
Barth, E. and Dale-Olsen, H. (2009) ‘Monopsonistic discrimination, worker turnover, and the 
gender wage gap’, Labour Economics, 16(5): 589–597. 
70 
   
Bartlett, R. and Callahan, C. (1984) ‘Wage determination and marital status: Another look’, 
Industrial Relations, 23(1): 90–96. 
Beaumont, P. (1981) Government as an Employer—Setting an Example. London: Royal 
Institute of Public Administration. 
Becker, G. (1957) The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Becker, G. (1964) Human capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference 
to education. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Becker, G. S. (1981), enlarged edition 1991. A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Becker, G. (1985) ‘Human capital, effort, and the sexual division of labor’, Journal of Labor 
Economics, 3(1): 33–38. 
Ben-Porath, Y. (1967) ‘The production of human capital and the life-cycle of earnings’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 75(4): 352–365. 
Bergmann B. (1974) ‘Occupational segregation, wages and profits when employers 
discriminate by race or sex’, Eastern Economic Journal, 1(2): 103–110. 
Blackaby, D., Murphy, P., O’Leary, N. and Staneva, A. (2012) ‘An investigation of the IFS 
public-private sector pay differential: A robustness check’, Swansea University Department 
of Economics Discussion Paper Series No 2012-09. Swansea, UK: Swansea University. 
Blank, R.M. (1985) ‘An analysis of workers' choice between employment in the public and 
private sectors’, ILR Review, 38(2): 211–224. 
Blanchflower, D. G. and Bryson, A. (2010) ‘The wage impact of trade unions in the UK public 
and private sectors’, Economica, 77(305): 92–109. 
Blau, F.D. and Kahn, L.M. (1997) ‘Swimming upstream: Trends in the gender wage 
differential in the 1980s’, Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1): 1–42. 
Blau, F.D. and Kahn, L.M. (2000) ‘Gender differences in pay’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(4): 75–99. 
Blau, F. D. and Kahn, L. M. (2017) ‘The gender wage gap: Extent, trends, and explanations’, 
Journal of Economic Literature: 55(3): 789–865.  
Blinder, A. S. (1973) ‘Wage discrimination: reduced form and structural variables’, Journal of 
Human Resources, 8(4): 436–455. 
Blundell, R., Dearden, L. and Meghir, C. (1996) The determinants of work-related training in 
Britain, London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Booth, A. L., Francesconi, M. and Frank, J. (2002) ‘Temporary jobs: stepping stones or dead 
ends?’, Economic Journal, 112(480): F189-F213. 
Booth, A. L., Francesconi, M. and Frank, J. (2003a) ‘A sticky floors model of promotion, pay, 
and gender’, European Economic Review, 47(2): 295–322. 
Booth, A. L., Francesconi, M. and Frank, J. (2003b) ’Labour as a buffer: Do temporary 
workers suffer?’. In New Features of Wage Determination and Institutions in Europe, edited 
by G. Fagan, F.P. Mongelli, and J. Morgan. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Bozio, A. and Disney, R. (2011) ‘Public sector pay and pensions’, In IFS Green Budget, 
Report C117. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Brown, R., Moon, M. and Zoloth, B. (1980) ‘Incorporating occupational attainment in studies 
of male-female earnings differentials’, Journal of Human Resources, 15(1): 3–28. 
71 
   
Brynin, M. (2017) ‘The gender pay gap’, Equality and Human Rights Commission Research 
Report, No: 109. 
Bryson, A. (2017) ‘Pay Equality after the Equality Act 2010: does sexual orientation still 
matter?’, Work, Employment and Society, 31(3): 483-500. 
Bryson, A. (2014) ‘Union Wage Effects’, IZA World of Labor, 35: 1-10. 
Bryson, A. and Forth, J. (2017) ‘Wage growth in pay review body occupations’, Report to the 
Office of Manpower Economics, June 2017. 
Bryson, A., Forth, J. and Stokes, L. (2017) ‘How much performance pay is there in the public 
sector and what are its effects?’, Human Resource Management Journal, 27(4): 581–597. 
Budig, M. J. and England, P. (2001) ‘The wage penalty for motherhood’, American 
Sociological Review, 66(2): 204–225. 
Business in the Community [BITC] (2015) ‘The gender pay gap: what employees really 
think’, September 2015.  
Cai, L., and Liu, A. (2011) ‘Public-Private Sector Wage Gap in Australia: Variation Along the 
Distribution.’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, 49(2): 362–390. 
Carroll, D., Parasnis, J. and Tani, M (2018) ‘Teaching, gender and labour market incentives’, 
IZA Discussion Paper No 12027. 
Chatterji, M., Mumford, K. and Smith, P. (2011) ‘The public-private sector gender wage 
differential: Evidence from matched employee-workplace data’, Applied Economics, 43(26): 
3819–3833. 
Chevalier, A. (2002) ‘Education, motivation and pay of UK graduates: are they different for 
women?’, European Journal of Education, 37(4): 347–369. 
Chevalier, A. (2007) ‘Education, occupation and career Expectations: Determinants of the 
gender pay gap for UK graduates’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 69(6): 819–
842. 
Chzhen, Y. and Mumford, K. (2011) ‘Gender gaps across the earnings distribution for full-
time employees in Britain: Allowing for sample selection’, Labour Economics, 18(6): 837–
844. 
Clark, K. and Lindley, J. (2009) ‘Immigrant assimilation pre and post labour market entry: 
evidence from the UK Labour Force Survey’, Journal of Population Economics, 22(1): 175-
198. 
Connolly, S. and Gregory, M. (2008) ‘Moving down: women’s part-time work and 
occupational change in Britain, 1991–2001’, Economic Journal, 118(526): 52–76. 
Cornwell, C. and Rupert, P. (1997) ‘Unobservable individual effects, marriage and the 
earnings of young men’, Economic Inquiry, 35(2): 285–294. 
Costa Dias, M., Joyce, J. and Parodi, F. (2018) ‘The gender pay gap in the UK: children and 
experience in work’, IFS Working Paper 18/02. 
Cribb, J. and Emmerson, C. (2016) ‘What happens when employers are obliged to nudge? 
Automatic enrolment and pension saving in the UK’. IFS Working Paper 16/19. 
Cribb, J., Emmerson, C. and Sibieta, L. (2014a) ‘Public sector pay in the UK’, IFS Report 97. 
Cribb, J., Disney, R. and Sibieta, L. (2014b) ‘The public sector workforce: past, present and 
future’, IFS Briefing Note BN145.  
de la Rica, S., Dolado, J. J. and Llorens, V. (2008) ‘Ceilings or floors? Gender wage gaps by 
education in Spain’, Journal of Population Economics, 21(3): 751–776. 
72 
   
de la Rica, S., Dolado, J. J. and Vegas, R. (2015) ‘Gender gaps in performance pay: new 
evidence from Spain,’ Annals of Economics and Statistics, 117/118: 41–59. 
Disney, R. and Gosling, A. (2003) ‘A new method for estimating public sector pay premia: 
Evidence from Britain in the 1990s’, CEPR Discussion Paper 3787, London. 
Dolton, P.J. and Makepeace, G.H. (1987) ‘Marital status, child rearing and earnings 
differentials in the graduate labor market’, Economic Journal, 97(388): 987–922. 
Dolton, P. and Makepeace, G. (2011) Public and private sector labour markets in Gregg P 
and Wadsworth J (eds) The Labour Market in Winter: The State of Britain, Oxford: OUP. 
Dolton, P., Makepeace, G., Marcenaro-Gutierrez, O. (2015) ‘Public sector pay in the UK: 
Quantifying the impact of the review bodies’, The Manchester School, 83(6): 701-724. 
Dolton, P. J., Makepeace, G. H. and van Der Klaauw, W. (1989) ‘Occupational choice and 
earnings determination: The role of sample selection and non-pecuniary factors’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 41(3): 573–594. 
Drolet, M. (2001) ‘The persistent gap: New evidence on the Canadian gender wage gap’, 
Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series No. 157. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. 
Elder, T., Goddeeris, J. and Haider, S. (2010) ‘Unexplained gaps and Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions’, Labour Economics, 17: 284–90. 
Evertsson, M. (2004) ‘Formal on-the-job training: A gender-typed experience and wage-
related advantage?’, European Sociological Review, 20(1): 79–94. 
Felstead, A., Gallie, D. and Green, F. (2002) ‘Work skills in Britain, 1986–2001’, Department 
for Education and Skills. 
Fernández, R. (2013) ‘Cultural change as learning: The evolution of female labor force 
participation over a century’, American Economic Review, 103(1): 472–500. 
Fernández, R. and Fogli, A. (2009) ‘Culture: An empirical investigation of beliefs, work, and 
fertility’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1): 146–177.  
Fernández, R., Fogli, A. and Olivetti, C. (2004) ‘Mothers and sons: Preference development 
and female labor force dynamics’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4): 1249–1299.  
Fortin, N. M., Bell, B. and Böhm, M. (2017) ‘Top earnings inequality and the gender pay gap: 
Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom’, Labour Economics, 47(C): 107–123. 
Forth, J. and Bryson, A. (2015) ‘Trade union membership and influence, 1999-2014’, 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), London. 
Forth, J., Bryson, A. and Stokes, L. (2016) ‘Are firms paying more for 
performance?’, International Journal of Manpower, 37(2): 323–343. 
Galor, O. and Weil, D.N. (1996) ‘The gender gap, fertility and growth’, American Economic 
Review, 86(3): 374–387. 
Gibbons, S., Overman, H.G. and Pelkonen, P. (2014) ‘Area disparities in Britain: 
Understanding the contribution of people vs. place through variance decompositions’, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 76(5): 745-763. 
Ginther, D., Sundstrom, M. and Bjorklund, A. (2008) ‘Does marriage lead to specialization in 
Sweden? An evaluation of trends in adult earnings before and after marriage’. Working 
Paper, University of Kansas. 
Ginther, D.K. and Zavodny, M. (2001) ‘Is the male marriage premium due to selection? The 
effect of shotgun weddings on the return to marriage’, Journal of Population 
Economics, 14(2): 313–328. 
73 
   
Goldin, C. (1990) Understanding the gender wage gap: An economic history of American 
women. Oxford University Press. 
Goldin, C. (2014) ‘A grand gender convergence: Its last chapter’, American Economic 
Review, 104(4): 1091–1119. 
Goldin, C. and Katz, L. (2002) ‘The power of the pill: Oral contraceptives and women’s 
career and marriage decisions’, Journal of Political Economy, 110(4): 730–770. 
Goldin, C. and Katz, L. F. (2016) ‘A most egalitarian profession: pharmacy and the evolution 
of a family-friendly occupation’, Journal of Labor Economics, 34(3): 705–746. 
Gravelle, H., Hole, A. R. and Santos, R. (2011) ‘Measuring and testing for gender 
discrimination in physician pay: English family doctors’, Journal of Health Economics, 30(4): 
660–674. 
Green, F., Machin, S. and Manning, A. (1996) ‘The employer size-wage effect: can dynamic 
monopsony provide an explanation?’, Oxford Economic Papers, 48(3): 433–455. 
Greene, J., El‐Banna, M. M., Briggs, L. A. and Park, J. (2017) ‘Gender differences in nurse 
practitioner salaries’, Journal of the American Association of Nurse Practitioners, 29(11): 
667–672. 
Greenwood, J., Seshadri, A. and Yorukoglu, M. (2005) ‘Engines of liberation’, The Review of 
Economic Studies, 72(1): 109–133. 
Grimshaw, D. (2000) ‘Public sector employment, wage inequality and the gender pay ratio in 
the UK’, International Review of Applied Economics, 14(4): 427–448. 
Grimshaw, D. and Rubery, J. (2007) ‘Undervaluing women's work’, Manchester: Equal 
Opportunities Commission. 
Harkness, S. E. (2005) ‘Pay inequality in gender’. In Maintaining Momentum: Promoting 
Social Mobility and Life Changes from Early Years to Adulthood (pp. 93–103), edited by S. 
Delorenzi, J. Reed, and P. Robinson.  London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Heinze, A. and Wolf, E. (2010) ‘The intra-firm gender wage gap: a new view on wage 
differentials based on linked employer–employee data’, Journal of Population 
Economics, 23(3): 851–879. 
Heitmueller, A. (2006) ‘Public-private sector pay differentials in a devolved Scotland’, Journal 
of Applied Economics, 9(2): 295–323. 
Hill, M. (1979) ‘The wage effects of marital status and children’, Journal of Human 
Resources, 14(4): 579–594. 
Hirsch, B. (2016) ‘Gender wage discrimination’, IZA World of Labor, 310: 1–10. 
Hirsch, B., Schank, T. and Schnabel, C. (2010) ‘Differences in labor supply to monopsonistic 
firms and the gender pay gap: An empirical analysis using linked employer-employee data 
from Germany’, Journal of Labor Economics, 28(2): 291–330. 
Hoque, K. and Bacon, N. (2014) ‘Unions, joint regulation and workplace equality policy and 
practice in Britain: evidence from 2004 WERS’, Work Employment and Society, 28(2): 1–20. 
Hoque, K. and Noon, M. (2004) ‘Equal opportunities policy and practice in Britain: Evaluating 
the ‘empty shell’ hypothesis’, Work Employment and Society, 18(3): 481–506. 
Jagsi, R., Griffith, K. A., Stewart, A., Sambuco, D., DeCastro, R., and Ubel, P. A. (2012) 
‘Gender differences in the salaries of physician researchers’, Jama, 307(22): 2410–2417. 
Jellal, M., Nordman, C. J. and Wolff, F. C. (2008) ‘Evidence on the glass ceiling effect in 
France using matched worker-firm data’, Applied Economics, 40(24): 3233–3250.  
74 
   
Jewell, S., Razzu, G. and Singleton, C. (2018) ‘Who works for whom and the UK gender pay 
gap?’, ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. 
Jirjahn, U., and Stephan, G. (2004) ‘Gender, piece rates and wages: evidence from matched 
employer-employee data’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28(5): 683-704. 
Jones, M. K. (2008) ‘Disability and the labour market: a review of the empirical 
evidence’, Journal of Economic Studies, 35(5): 405–424. 
Jones, M. K., Latreille, P. L., and Sloane, P. J. (2006) ‘Disability, gender, and the British 
labour market’, Oxford Economic Papers, 58(3): 407–449. 
Jones, M. K., Latreille, P. L. and Sloane, P. J. (2008) ‘Crossing the tracks? Trends in the 
training of male and female workers in Great Britain’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 46(2): 268–282. 
Jones, M., Makepeace, G. and Wass, V. (2018) ‘The UK gender pay gap 1997-2015: what is 
the role of the public sector?’, Industrial Relations, 57(2): 296–319. 
Joshi, H., Makepeace, G. and Dolton, P. (2007) ‘More or less unequal? Evidence on the pay 
of men and women from the British Birth Cohort Studies’, Gender, Work and 
Organization, 14(1): 37–55. 
Joshi, H., Paci, P. and Waldfogel, J. (1999) ‘The wages of motherhood: better or worse?’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23(5): 543–564. 
Killewald, A. and Gough, M. (2013) ‘Does specialization explain marriage penalties and 
premiums?’, American Sociological Review, 78(3): 477–502. 
Koenker, R. and Bassett, G. (1978) Regression quantiles, Econometrica, 46(1): 33-50. 
Koenker, R., and Hallock, K. F. (2001) ‘Quantile regression’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15(4): 143-156. 
Korenman, S. and Neumark, D. (1991) ‘Does marriage really make men more productive?’, 
Journal of Human Resources, 26(2): 282–307. 
Kunze, A., (2008) ‘Gender wage gap studies: consistency and decomposition’, Empirical 
Economics, 35(1): 63-76. 
Kunze, A. (2018) ‘The gender wage gap in developed countries’. In Oxford Handbook of 
Women and the Economy (pp. 369–393), edited by Susan L. Averett, Laura M. Argys, and 
Saul D. Hoffman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leaker, D. (2008) ‘The gender pay gap in the UK’, Economic and Labour Market Review, 
4(2): 19-24. 
Lee, V. E. and Smith, J. B. (1990) ‘Gender equity in teachers' salaries: a multilevel 
approach’, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 12(1): 57-81. 
Lekfuangfu, W., N. and Lordan, G. (2018) ‘Cross cohort evidence on gendered sorting 
patterns in the UK: The importance of societal movements versus childhood variables’, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 11872. 
Levanon, A., England, P. and Allison, P. (2009) ‘Occupational feminization and pay: 
Assessing causal dynamics using 1950–2000 US census data’, Social Forces, 88(2): 865–
891. 
Lewin, D. (2003) ‘Incentive compensation in the public sector: Evidence and 
potential’, Journal of Labor Research, 24(4): 597–619. 
Lindley, J. (2012) ‘The gender dimension of technical change and the role of task 
inputs’, Labour Economics, 19(4): 516–526. 
75 
   
Loh, E. S. (1996) ‘Productivity differences and the marriage wage premium for White males’, 
Journal of Human Resources, 31(3): 566–589. 
Longhi, S. and Brynin, M. (2017) ‘The ethnicity pay gap’. Equality and Human Rights 
Commission. 
Longhi, S. and Platt, L. (2008) ‘Pay gaps across equalities areas: an analysis of pay gaps 
and pay penalties by sex, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation and age using the 
Labour Force Survey’. Equality and Human Rights Commission. 
Lordan, G. and Pischke, J. (2016) ‘Does Rosie like riveting? Male and female occupational 
choices’. NBER working paper, 22495. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
USA.  
Loughran, D. S. and Zissimopoulos, J. M. (2009) ‘Why wait? The effect of marriage and 
childbearing on the wages of men and women’, Journal of Human Resources, 44(2): 326–
349. 
Machado, J. A. F. and Mata, J. (2005) ‘Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage 
distributions using quantile regression’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20(4): 445-465. 
Machin, S. and Puhani, P. A. (2003) ‘Subject of degree and the gender wage differential: 
evidence from the UK and Germany’, Economics Letters, 79(3): 393–400. 
McGee, A., McGee, P., and Pan, J. (2015) ‘Performance pay, competitiveness, and the 
gender wage gap: Evidence from the United States’, Economic Letters, 128: 35-38. 
McNabb, R. and Wass, V. (1997) ‘Male-female salary differentials in British Universities’, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 49(3): 328–343. 
Makepeace, G., Dolton, P. and Joshi, H. (2004) ‘Gender earnings differentials across 
individuals over time in British cohort studies’, International Journal of Manpower, 25(3/4): 
251–263. 
Makinson, J. (2000) ‘Incentives for change: Rewarding performance in national government 
ntworks, Public Services Productivity Panel, HM Treasury, London, available at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070604022341/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/601/A3/240.pdf. Accessed on 23/12/2018. 
Manning, A. (2000) ‘Movin’ on up: Interpreting the Earnings-Experience Profile’, Bulletin of 
Economic Research, 52(4): 261–295. 
Manning, A. (2011) Imperfect competition in the labor market. In Handbook of Labor 
Economics (pp. 973–1041), edited by Orley Ashenfelter and David Card. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Science. 
Manning, A. and Petrongolo, B. (2008) ‘The part‐time pay penalty for women in Britain’, The 
Economic Journal, 118(526): F28–F51. 
Manning, A. and Saidi, F. (2010) ‘Understanding the gender pay gap: what's competition got 
to do with it?’, ILR Review, 63(4): 681–698. 
Manning, A. and Swaffield, J. (2008) ‘The gender gap in early‐career wage growth’, The 
Economic Journal, 118(530): 983–1024. 
Matthews, D. (2010) ‘The changing face of public sector employment 1999-2009’, Economic 
and Labour Market Review, 4(7): 28–35. 
Metcalf, D., Hansen, K. and Charlwood, A. (2001) ‘Unions and the sword of justice: Unions 
and pay systems, pay Inequality, pay discrimination and low pay’, National Institute 
Economic Review, 176(1): 61-75. 
Millard, B. and Machin, A. (2007) ‘Characteristics of public sector workers’, Economic and 
Labour Market Review, 1(5): 46–55. 
76 
   
Mincer, J. (1958) ‘Investment in human capital and personal income distribution’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 66(4): 281–302. 
Mincer, J. (1974) Schooling, experience and earnings, New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Mincer, J. and Jovanovic, B. (1981) ‘Labor mobility and wages’. In Studies in Labor Markets 
(pp. 21–64), edited by Sherwin Rosen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mincer, J. and Ofek, H. (1982) ‘Interrupted work careers: Depreciation and restoration of 
human capital’, Journal of Human Resources, 17(1): 3–24. 
Mincer, J. and Polachek, S. (1974) ‘Family investments in human capital: earnings of 
women’, Journal of Political Economy, 82(2): 76–108. 
Mitra, A. (2003) ‘Establishment size, employment, and the gender wage gap’, Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 32(3): 317–330. 
Muench, U., Busch, S. H., Sindelar, J. and Buerhaus, P. I. (2016) ‘Exploring explanations for 
the female-male earnings difference among registered nurses in the United States’, Nursing 
Economics, 34(5): 214–223. 
Mumford, K. and Smith, P. N. (2007) ‘The gender earnings gap in Britain: Including the 
workplace’, The Manchester School, 75(6): 653–672. 
Mumford, K. and Smith, P. N. (2009) ‘What determines the part-time and gender earnings 
gaps in Britain: evidence from the workplace’, Oxford Economic Papers, 61(1): 56–75. 
National Crime Agency Remuneration Review Body (2018) Fourth Report. 
NHS Employers (2014) 2014/15 General Medical Services (GMS) Contract Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF): Guidance for GMS Contract 2014/15, available at 
https://www.nhsemployers.org/-/media/Employers/Documents/Primary-care-
contracts/QOF/2014-15/2014-15-General-Medical-Services-contract---Quality-and-
Outcomes-Framework.pdf. Accessed on 17/12/2018.   
NHS Pay Review Body Report (2019) Thirsty-Second Report - 2019. 
Ngai, L. R. and Petrongolo, B. (2017) ‘Gender gaps and the rise of the service 
economy’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(4): 1–44. 
Niederle, M. and Vesterlund, L. (2007) ‘Do women shy away from competition? Do men 
compete too much?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3): 1067–1101. 
Oaxaca, R. L. (1973) ‘Male-female wage differentials in urban labor markets’, International 
Economic Review, 14(3): 693–709. 
Ohsfeldt, R. L. and Culler, S. D. (1986) ‘Differences in income between male and female 
physicians’, Journal of Health Economics, 5(4): 335–346. 
Olsen, W., Gash, V., Vandecasteele, L., Walthery, P. and Heuvelman, H. (2010) ‘The gender 
pay gap in the UK 1995-2007’, Research report number 1, UK: Government Equalities 
Office. 
Olsen, W., Gash, V., Kim, S., Zhang, M. (2018) ‘The gender pay gap in the UK: evidence 
from the UKHLS’, Research report, UK: Government Equalities Office. 
Olsen, W. K. and Walby, S. (2004) ‘Modelling gender pay gaps’, EOC Working Paper Series. 
Office for National Statistics, (2018) ‘Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings: 2017 provisional 
and 2016 revised results’, Office for National Statistics Statistical Bulletin. 
Office for National Statistics. (2018) Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 1997-2018: 
Secure Access. [data collection]. 13th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6689, 
http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6689-12. 
77 
   
Office for National Statistics (2013) ‘Coverage and non-response errors in the Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings’, Information paper March 2013, UK: ONS. 
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2017) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, January - 
March, 2016. [data collection]. 4th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 7985, 
http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7985-4.  
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2017) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, April - June, 
2016. 2nd Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 8039, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8039-2.  
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2017) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, July - 
September, 2016. 3rd Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 8104, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-
8104-3.  
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2017) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, October - 
December, 2016. 2nd Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 8145, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-
8145-2.  
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2017) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, January - 
March, 2017. 2nd Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 8195, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-
8195-2. 
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2017) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, April - June, 
2017. UK Data Service. SN: 8235, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8235-1.    
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2017) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, July - 
September, 2017. UK Data Service. SN: 8292, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8292-1.  
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2018) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, October - 
December, 2017. UK Data Service. SN: 8326, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8326-1.  
Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division, Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. (2018) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, January - 
March, 2018. UK Data Service. SN: 8343, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8343-1. 
Office of Manpower Economics (2016) Business Plan 2017-2018, London.  
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Central Survey Unit, Office for National 
Statistics, Social Survey Division. (2018) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, April - June, 2018. 
UK Data Service. SN: 8381, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8381-1. 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Office for National Statistics, Social 
Survey Division. (2018) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, July - September, 2018. UK Data 
Service. SN: 8407, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8407-1. 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), Office for National Statistics, 
Social Survey Division. (2019) Quarterly Labour Force Survey, October - December, 2018. 
UK Data Service. SN: 8447, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8447-1. 
Phelps, E. S. (1972) ‘The statistical theory of racism and sexism’, American Economic 
Review, 62(4): 659–661. 
Phimister, E. (2005) ‘Urban effects on participation and wages: Are there gender 
differences?’, Journal of Urban Economics, 58(3): 513–536. 
78 
   
Police Remuneration Review Body (2019) Fifth Report England and Wales 2019. 
Prentice, G., Burgess, S. and Propper, C. (2007) ‘Performance-pay in the Public Sector: a 
review of the issues and evidence’, Office of Manpower Economics. 
Prison Service Pay Review Body (2019) Eighteenth Report on England and Wales 2019. 
Pudney, S. and Shields, M. (2000a) ‘Gender and racial discrimination in pay and promotion 
for NHS nurses’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(s1): 801–836. 
Pudney, S. and Shields, M. (2000b) ‘Gender, race, pay and promotion in the British nursing 
profession: estimation of a generalised ordered probit model’, Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 15(4): 367–399 
Ransom, M. R. and Lambson, V. E. (2011) ‘Monopsony, mobility, and sex differences in pay: 
Missouri school teachers’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 101(3): 
454–459. 
Ransom, M. R. and Oaxaca, R. L. (2010) ‘New market power models and sex differences in 
pay’, Journal of Labor Economics 28(2): 267–289. 
Rapaport, C. (1995) ‘Apparent wage discrimination when wages are determined by 
nondiscriminatory contracts’, American Economic Review, 85(5): 1263-1277. 
Review Body on Doctors’ and Dentists’ Remuneration (2017) Forty-Fifth Report 2017. 
Review Body on Senior Salaries (2017) Thirty-Ninth Annual Report on Senior Salaries 2017, 
Report No. 87. 
Review Body on Senior Salaries (2019) Forty-first Annual Report on Senior Salaries 2019, 
Report No. 91. 
Reyes, J. W. (2007a) ‘Reaching equilibrium in the market for obstetricians and 
gynecologists’, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97(2): 407–411. 
Reyes, J. W. (2007b) ‘Gender gaps in income and productivity of obstetricians and 
gynecologists’, Obstetrics & Gynecology, 109(5): 1031–1039. 
Ribar, D. C. (2004) ‘What do social scientists know about the benefits of marriage? A review 
of quantitative methodologies’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 998. 
Robinson, H. (2005) ‘Regional evidence on the effect of the national minimum wage on the 
gender pay gap’, Regional Studies, 39(7): 855–872. 
Robinson, J. (1933) The economics of imperfect competition. London: Macmillan. 
Rodgers, W. M. III and Stratton, L. S. (2010) ‘The male marital wage differential: Race, 
training, and fixed effects’, Economic Inquiry, 48(3): 722–742. 
Rubery, J. (2008) ‘Women and work in the UK: the need for modernisation of labour market 
institutions’. In Women and Employment: Changing Lives and New Challenges (pp. 289–
312), edited by J. Scott, S. Dex, and H. Joshi. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Rubery, J. and Grimshaw, D. (2015) ‘The 40-year pursuit of equal pay: A case of constantly 
moving goalposts’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 39(2): 319–343. 
Sandell, S. H. and Shapiro, D. (1980) ‘Work expectations, human capital accumulation, and 
the wages of young women’, Journal of Human Resources, 15(3): 335–353. 
School Teachers Review Body (STRB) (2013) Twenty-second report – 2013. 
School Teachers Review Body (STRB) (2019) Twenty-ninth report – 2019. 
Schultz, T. W. (1960) ‘Capital formation by education’, Journal of Political Economy, 68(6): 
571–583.  
79 
   
Schultz, T. W. (1961) ‘Investment in human capital’, American Economic Review, 51(1): 1– 
17. 
Siebert, W.S. and Young, A. (1983) ‘Sex and family status differentials in professional 
earnings’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 30(1): 18–41. 
Singleton, C. (2018) ‘The public-private sector wage differential in the UK: Evidence from 
longitudinal employee-employer data’, mimeo, University of Edinburgh. 
Stewart, M. B. (2014a) ‘Why is the gender pay gap higher in the private sector?’, mimeo, 
Economics Department, University of Warwick. 
Stewart, M. B. (2014b) ‘The London Difference in Gender Pay Gaps’, mimeo, mimeo, 
Economics Department, University of Warwick. 
Stewart, M. B. (2015) ‘The occupational dimension of the UK gender pay gap’, mimeo, 
Economics Department, University of Warwick. 
Swaffield J. K. (2000) ‘Gender motivation, experience and wages’, Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics, DP 417. 
Swaffield, J. K. (2007) ‘Estimates of the impact of labour market attachment and attitudes on 
the female wage’, The Manchester School, 75(3): 349–371. 
Topel, R. (1991) ‘Specific capital, mobility, and wages: Wages rise with job seniority’, Journal 
of Political Economy, 99(1): 145–176. 
Troske, K. R. (1999) ‘Evidence on the employer size-wage premium from worker-
establishment matched data’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(1): 15–26. 
Turnbull, P. and Williams, G. (1974) ‘Sex differentials in teachers’ pay’, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society Series A, 137(2): 245–258.  
UNISON (2017) ‘Perfomance related pay’, available at 
https://www.unison.org.uk/content/uploads/2017/05/Performance-related-pay.pdf. Accessed 
on 17/12/2018. 
Verdugo, R. M. and Schneider, J. M. (1994) ‘Gender inequality in female-dominated 
occupation: the earnings of male and female teachers’, Economics of Education Review, 
13(3): 251–264.  
Viitanen, T. (2014) ‘The motherhood wage gap in the UK over the life cycle’, Review of 
Economics of the Household, 12(2): 259–276. 
Waldfogel, J. (1997) ‘The effect of children on women’s wages’, American Sociological 
Review, 62(2): 209–217. 
Waldfogel, J. (1998) ‘The family gap for young women in the United States and Britain: Can 
maternity leave make a difference?’ Journal of Labor Economics, 16(3): 505–545. 
Wass, V. and McNabb, R. (2006) ‘Pay, promotion and parenthood amongst women 
solicitors’, Work, Employment and Society, 20(2): 289–308. 
Weaver, A. C., Wetterneck, T. B., Whelan, C. T. and Hinami, K. (2015) ‘A matter of 
priorities? Exploring the persistent gender pay gap in hospital medicine’, Journal of Hospital 
Medicine, 10(8): 486–490. 
Wharton, A. S. (2009) The sociology of gender: An introduction to theory and research. John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Winsor, T. (2011) Independent review of police officer and staff remuneration and conditions: 
Part 1: Report (Vol. 8024). The Stationery Office. 
80 
   
Work Foundation (2014) ‘A review of the evidence on the impact, effectiveness and value for 
money of performance-related pay in the public sector’, Report for the Office of Manpower 
Economics. 
Wright, B.E. (2001) ‘Public-sector work motivation: A review of the current literature and a 
revised conceptual model’, Journal of public administration research and theory, 11(4): 559–
586. 
Xiu, L. and Gunderson, M. (2013) ‘Performance pay in China: gender aspects’, British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 51(1): 124–147. 
 
  
81 
   
Appendices  
Table A.1. Defining PRB Occupations 
Review Body
i
 National coverage Occupation SOC 
2010 
code   
ASHE 
Region
ii
 
IDBR Legal 
status
iii
 
SIC 2007 code
iv
 
 
Review Body on Doctors’ and 
Dentists’ Remuneration
v
 
United Kingdom Medical practitioners 2211 Great Britain Public    
 Dental practitioners 2215 Great Britain Public   
NHS Pay Review Body United Kingdom Psychologists 2212 Great Britain Public   
  Pharmacists 2213 Great Britain Public   
  Ophthalmic opticians 2214 Great Britain Public   
  Medical radiographers 2217 Great Britain Public   
  Podiatrists 2218 Great Britain Public   
  Health professionals n.e.c. 2219 Great Britain Public   
  Physiotherapists 2221 Great Britain Public   
  Occupational therapists 2222 Great Britain Public   
  Speech and language 
therapists 
2223 Great Britain Public   
  Therapy professionals n.e.c. 2229 Great Britain Public   
  Nurses 2231 Great Britain Public   
  Midwives 2232 Great Britain Public   
  Paramedics 3213 Great Britain Public   
  Medical and dental technicians 3218 Great Britain Public   
  Nursing auxiliaries and HCAs 6141 Great Britain Public   
  Ambulance staff 6142 Great Britain Public   
  Dental nurses 6143 Great Britain Public   
  Non-medical staff: Managers 1000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities
vi
 
  Non-medical staff: 
Professionals 
2000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities 
  Non-medical staff: Assoc Prof 
and Technical 
3000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities 
  Non-medical staff: Admin and 
clerical 
4000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities 
  Non-medical staff: Skilled 
trades 
5000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities 
  Non-medical staff: Personal 
and protective service 
6000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities 
  Non-medical staff: Sales 7000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
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Notes: (i) The SSPRB and the NCARRB are excluded from the table as the relevant occupations cannot be identified separately. The AFPRB is not defined by Bryson and Forth (2017) as ASHE 
does not cover the Armed Forces. They are, however, included in the QLFS. (ii) Some PRBs only cover England and Wales while other PRBs extend to Scotland. Region information can be used to 
identify PRB remit employees. Note that the ASHE dataset available in the SDS only includes workplaces in Great Britain. (iii)  In some occupations (e.g. teachers), there are practitioners both within 
the PRB system (e.g. in state schools) and those outside it (e.g. private schools). In these cases, the public sector identifier in ASHE, which is taken from the IDBR, can be used to identify the remit 
group. (iv)  Some occupation codes capture a group of jobs across different industrial activities (e.g. SOC 2010=1173 Senior officers in fire, ambulance, prison and related services). In this case, the 
SIC (2007) can be used to identify the remit group. (v)  Some General Practitioners covered by the DDRB are excluded from the analysis as ASHE does not cover the self-employed, and earnings 
information for the self-employed is not collected within the QLFS. (vi) In the QLFS, it is not possible to separate 86.10/1 Hospital activities from 86.10/2 Medical nursing home activities. Hence, for 
QLFS, the classification is based on class 86.10 Hospital activities instead of sub-class 86.10/1. (vii) In the QLFS this is defined as ‘Local gov or council (inc police etc)’. (viii)  As academy schools 
are classified by the IDBR as public sector, in ASHE it is not possible to distinguish academy school teachers who are not within the STRB’s remit from teachers who are covered by the STRB.  
activities 
  Non-medical staff: Routine 
operatives and drivers 
8000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities 
  Non-medical staff: Elementary 9000s Great Britain Public 86.10/1 Hospital 
activities 
Police Remuneration Review 
Body 
England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland 
Senior police officers 1172 England and 
Wales 
Local 
authority only 
 
  Police officers (sergeant and 
below) 
3312 England and 
Wales 
Local 
authority 
only
vii
 
 
Prison Service Pay Review 
Body 
England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland 
Operational managers 1173 England and 
Wales 
Public 84.23 Justice and 
judicial activities 
  Prison officers 3314 England and 
Wales 
Public  
School Teachers’ Pay Review 
Body
viii
 
England and Wales Secondary education teaching 
professionals 
2314 England and 
Wales 
Public 85.3 Secondary 
education 
  Primary and nursery education 
teaching professionals 
2315 England and 
Wales 
Public 85.2 Primary education 
  Special needs education 
teaching professionals 
2316 England and 
Wales 
Public 85.2 or 85.3 Primary or 
Secondary education 
  Senior professionals of 
educational establishments 
2317 England and 
Wales 
Public 85.2 or 85.3 Primary or 
Secondary education 
Armed Forces' Pay Review 
Body 
 
United Kingdom Officers in UK armed forces  1171 Great Britain Public  
 COs and other ranks, UK 
armed forces 
3311 Great Britain Public  
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Table A.2. QLFS sample statistics for explanatory variables, by sector 
 Public Private Non-profit  
 All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female 
Age  44.70 45.09 44.53 42.40 43.16 41.62 45.03 45.99 44.58 
Work region (per 
cent)    
 
     
North East 4.64 4.58 4.66 4.30 3.97 4.64 3.72 3.70 3.74 
North West 12.97 11.63 13.51 11.99 11.86 12.12 9.82 11.30 9.13 
Yorkshire and 
Humber 10.40 9.13 10.92 9.63 9.43 9.85 9.28 9.90 8.99 
East Midlands 6.94 6.55 7.10 8.17 8.33 8.01 7.17 6.80 7.33 
West Midlands 7.77 7.11 8.04 8.54 8.88 8.20 7.80 8.70 7.38 
South West 8.31 8.08 8.41 9.39 9.35 9.43 7.48 6.80 7.80 
East 10.78 12.85 9.94 13.15 13.61 12.69 13.70 14.20 13.47 
London 11.80 11.71 11.84 13.61 13.57 13.64 14.33 14.90 14.07 
South East 10.16 11.43 9.64 9.55 9.45 9.65 13.83 10.90 15.18 
Wales 6.10 6.47 5.95 4.02 3.87 4.16 4.10 3.90 4.20 
Scotland 10.13 10.46 9.99 7.65 7.69 7.61 8.78 8.90 8.72 
Tenure (years) 11.38 12.14 11.07 8.03 8.72 7.32 7.75 8.16 7.56 
Contract type (per 
cent)    
 
     
Temporary 
employment 3.87 3.69 3.95 3.65 3.44 3.87 11.36 11.90 11.12 
Part-time 31.67 10.96 40.12 27.03 10.73 43.70 34.94 20.90 31.67 
Workplace size 
(number of 
employees)    
 
     
Less than 25 17.65 16.57 18.09 39.06 34.48 43.74 30.18 28.80 17.65 
25-49  15.23 9.60 17.53 13.32 12.85 13.79 12.63 8.80 15.23 
50-249  27.05 28.23 26.57 24.76 26.71 22.76 24.21 22.30 27.05 
250-499   6.72 8.85 5.85 7.94 8.46 7.40 6.16 5.60 6.72 
500+ 33.35 36.75 31.96 14.93 17.51 12.30 26.83 34.50 33.35 
Occupation           
Managers, 
directors and 
senior official 4.91 8.13 3.60 11.61 14.50 8.65 9.66 11.90 4.91 
Professional 
occupations 38.82 35.00 40.38 15.11 18.33 11.82 37.91 46.10 38.82 
Associate 
professional and 
technical 
occupations 15.98 26.20 11.82 13.84 14.85 12.81 17.80 16.70 15.98 
Administrative and 
secretarial 
occupations 13.84 7.80 16.31 11.97 4.57 19.55 11.33 4.80 13.84 
Skilled trades 
occupations 1.90 4.41 0.87 8.32 14.35 2.16 1.86 3.20 1.90 
Caring, leisure 
and other service 
occupations 15.66 7.38 19.04 8.44 2.72 14.28 14.24 10.70 15.66 
Sales and 
customer service 
occupations 1.71 1.64 1.74 11.07 6.35 15.91 2.27 1.50 1.71 
Process, plant and 
machine 
operatives 1.13 3.55 0.14 7.64 12.77 2.39 -* -* -* 
Elementary 
occupations 6.05 5.88 6.11 11.99 11.55 12.43 4.36 3.50 6.05 
Qualifications          
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Degree 46.53 48.15 45.87 27.89 28.92 26.85 59.50 66.60 56.23 
Other higher 
education 13.70 11.16 14.74 9.45 9.87 9.02 10.13 8.40 10.93 
A level 18.75 21.18 17.76 25.23 26.91 23.52 15.31 13.60 16.10 
O level 15.03 12.74 15.96 23.10 19.65 26.63 10.23 6.90 11.76 
Other 3.60 4.02 3.43 8.35 9.05 7.64 2.84 2.10 3.18 
None 2.40 2.75 2.25 5.98 5.61 6.35 1.99 2.40 1.80 
Married 56.81 61.12 55.06 48.59 52.91 44.17 53.54 58.30 51.34 
Disabled 16.28 14.07 17.18 14.85 12.33 17.43 17.52 14.40 18.96 
White 90.63 89.56 91.06 89.61 88.87 90.37 91.45 89.10 92.53 
Dependent child  40.02 34.25 42.37 36.68 32.94 40.50 34.12 29.30 36.35 
Year          
2016 33.49 33.36 33.54 32.75 33.20 32.29 32.48 32.90 32.29 
2017 33.14 33.36 33.05 33.89 33.75 34.04 33.14 33.50 32.98 
2018 33.37 33.28 33.41 33.36 33.05 33.67 34.38 33.60 34.73 
Quarter          
January - March 24.68 23.84 25.02 24.22 24.20 24.24 23.14 22.40 23.48 
April - June 24.96 25.92 24.57 25.04 25.02 25.05 25.25 26.40 24.72 
July-September 25.54 24.59 25.93 25.00 24.96 25.05 26.36 27.50 25.83 
October-
December 24.82 25.65 24.48 25.74 25.82 25.65 25.25 23.70 25.97 
Number of 
obs.(unweighted) 
12,439 3,603 8,836 32,362 16,368 15,994 3,168 1,000 2,168 
Notes: Individuals in Wave 1 are pooled across quarters from 2016/2017/2018. *Figure not presented due to lack of sufficient 
number of observations.   
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Table A.3. QLFS sample statistics for explanatory variables, within the public sector 
 Non-PRB Public PRB 
 All Male Female All Male Female 
Age  46.05 46.56 45.81 42.68 42.35 42.80 
Work region (per cent)       
North East 4.45 4.30 4.51 4.92 5.10 4.87 
North West 12.32 10.40 13.21 13.93 13.93 13.93 
Yorkshire and Humber 9.77 8.44 10.38 11.35 10.43 11.65 
East Midlands 6.49 5.92 6.75 7.60 7.72 7.56 
West Midlands 7.28 6.35 7.71 8.49 8.52 8.47 
South West 8.10 8.44 7.95 8.63 7.40 9.04 
East 11.30 13.63 10.23 10.01 11.39 9.54 
London 11.52 11.29 11.62 12.23 12.50 12.14 
South East 9.58 10.48 9.17 11.03 13.22 10.29 
Wales 6.46 7.20 6.12 5.56 5.10 5.72 
Scotland 12.73 13.55 12.35 6.26 4.70 6.79 
Tenure (years) 11.54 12.64 11.04 11.14 11.20 11.12 
Contract type (per cent)       
Temporary employment 4.19 3.83 4.36 3.40 3.42 3.39 
Part-time 33.79 13.00 43.38 28.52 7.17 35.69 
Workplace size (number of employees)       
Less than 25 21.63 19.81 22.47 11.71 10.51 12.11 
25-49  16.55 9.97 19.59 13.27 8.92 14.73 
50-249  28.53 27.74 28.89 24.85 29.14 23.42 
250-499   8.09 10.06 7.18 4.68 6.61 4.04 
500+ 25.19 32.42 21.86 45.49 44.82 45.71 
Occupation        
Managers, directors and senior official 6.44 9.12 5.20 2.64 6.29 1.42 
Professional occupations 20.21 25.82 17.63 66.54 52.15 71.37 
Associate professional and technical occupations 18.77 25.65 15.60 11.83 27.23 6.66 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 19.94 10.78 24.16 4.76 2.23 5.61 
Skilled trades occupations 3.00 6.43 1.41 -* -* -* 
Caring, leisure and other service occupations 18.41 7.46 23.45 11.57 7.25 13.02 
Sales and customer service occupations 2.65 2.26 2.83 -* -* -* 
Process, plant and machine operatives 1.80 5.20 -* -* -* -* 
Elementary occupations 8.79 7.29 9.48 1.96 3.26 1.52 
Qualifications       
Degree 37.29 41.84 35.19 60.30 59.95 60.41 
Other higher education 12.43 11.42 12.90 15.59 10.67 17.24 
A level 23.57 24.54 23.12 11.57 14.89 10.45 
O level 19.24 14.32 21.51 8.75 9.79 8.39 
Other 4.35 4.56 4.26 2.48 3.03 2.30 
None 3.12 3.32 3.02 1.32 1.67 1.20 
Married 55.71 59.82 53.82 58.46 63.54 56.75 
Disabled 17.01 14.49 18.17 15.19 13.30 15.82 
White 92.30 92.29 92.31 88.13 84.47 89.36 
Dependent child  37.32 30.04 40.67 44.05 42.12 44.69 
Year       
2016 33.24 32.00 33.82 33.86 35.91 33.17 
2017 33.14 33.66 32.90 33.14 32.80 33.25 
2018 33.62 34.34 33.29 33.00 31.29 33.57 
Quarter       
January - March 24.42 24.12 24.55 25.08 23.33 25.66 
April - June 24.93 26.20 24.34 25.02 25.40 24.89 
July-September 25.89 24.37 26.59 25.02 25.00 25.02 
October-December 24.76 25.31 24.51 24.89 26.27 24.43 
Number of obs.(unweighted) 7,442 2,347 5,095 4,997 1,256 3,741 
Notes: Individuals in Wave 1 are pooled across quarters from 2016/2017/2018. *Figure not presented due to lack of sufficient 
number of observations.   
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Table A.4. Gross hourly pay (£) at selected percentiles, by sector 
 10
th
  25
th
  50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
Public      
All 9 (17,550) 11 (21,450)   15 (29,250) 21 (40,950) 28 (54,600) 
Male 10 (19,500) 13 (25,350) 18 (35,100) 23 (44,850) 32 (62,400) 
Female 9 (17,550) 10 (19,500) 14 (27,300) 20 (39,000) 26 (50,700) 
Private      
All 8 (15,600)           9 (17,550)   12 (23,400) 18 (35,100) 28 (54,600) 
Male 8 (15,600) 10 (19,500)  13 (25,350)     20 (39,000)  31 (60,450) 
Female 8 (15,600) 8 (15,600) 10 (19,500) 15 (29,250) 24 (46,800) 
Non-profit       
All 8 (15,600) 10 (19,500)  14 (27,300) 20 (39,000) 28 (54,600)    
Male 9 (17,550) 11 (21,450) 16 (31,200) 24 (46,800) 31 (60,450) 
Female 8 (15,600) 9 (17,550) 13 (25,350) 19 (37,050) 26 (50,700) 
Notes: Figure 1a presents gross hourly pay across the entire distribution rather than at select percentiles. Hourly pay is 
rounded to the nearest pound as required by the UKDA’s disclosure policy. Approximate pro-rata annual salary levels are 
reported in parenthesis and are calculated on the basis of 37.5 hours a week x 52 weeks for all workers. 
 
Table A.5. Gross hourly pay (£) at selected percentiles, public sector 
 10
th
  25
th
  50
th
  75
th
  90
th
  
Non-PRB public      
All 9 (17,550) 10 (19,500) 14 (27,300) 20 (39,000) 26 (50,700) 
Male 10 (19,500) 12 (23,400)   16 (31,200)  22 (42,900)   29 (56,550) 
Female 8 (15,600) 9 (17,550) 12 (23,400) 18 (35,100) 24 (46,800) 
PRB      
All 10 (19,500)  13 (25,350) 18 (35,100) 22 (42,900) 30 (58,500) 
Male 11 (21,450) 15 (29,250) 19 (37,050)      25 (48,750)    39 (76,050) 
Female 10 (19,500) 12 (23,400) 17 (33,150) 22 (42,900) 27 (52,650) 
Notes: Figure 1b presents gross hourly pay across the entire distribution rather than at select percentiles. Hourly pay is 
rounded to the nearest pound as required by the UKDA’s disclosure policy. Approximate pro-rata annual salary levels are 
reported in parenthesis and are calculated on the basis of 37.5 hours a week x 52 weeks for all workers.  
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Table A.6. Full ASHE OLS pay regression results, public and private sector 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.164
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.211
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.197
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.132
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.113
***
 
(0.003) 
Public - 0.205
***
 
(0.005) 
0.160
***
 
(0.005) 
0.159
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.035
***
 
(0.005) 
Female × Public - 0.020
**
 
(0.006) 
0.017
**
 
(0.006) 
0.016
**
 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Age - - 0.067
***
 
(0.001) 
0.054
***
 
(0.001) 
0.037
***
 
(0.001) 
Age squared - - -0.001
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
***
 
(0.000) 
North West - - 0.041
***
 
(0.007) 
0.045
***
 
(0.007) 
0.025
***
 
(0.005) 
Yorkshire and Humber - - 0.007 
(0.007) 
0.014
*
 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
East Midlands - - 0.007 
(0.007) 
0.014
*
 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
West Midlands - - 0.046
***
 
(0.007) 
0.049
***
 
(0.007) 
0.027
***
 
(0.006) 
South West - - 0.048
***
 
(0.007) 
0.061
***
 
(0.007) 
0.027
***
 
(0.006) 
East - - 0.081
***
 
(0.007) 
0.091
***
 
(0.007) 
0.060
***
 
(0.006) 
London - - 0.352
***
 
(0.007) 
0.347
***
 
(0.007) 
0.244
***
 
(0.006) 
South East - - 0.141
***
 
(0.007) 
0.148
***
 
(0.007) 
0.087
***
 
(0.005) 
Wales - - -0.023
**
 
(0.008) 
-0.022
**
 
(0.008) 
-0.014
*
 
(0.006) 
Scotland - - 0.072
***
 
(0.007) 
0.068
***
 
(0.007) 
0.039
***
 
(0.006) 
Tenure (years) - - - 0.014
***
 
(0.000) 
0.010
***
 
(0.000) 
Tenure squared - - - -0.000
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
***
 
(0.000) 
Part-time - - - -0.211
***
 
(0.003) 
-0.064
***
 
(0.003) 
Temporary contract - - - -0.011
*
 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Firm size (log) - - - 0.005
***
 
(0.000) 
0.013
***
 
(0.000) 
Collective agreement - - - -0.052
***
 
(0.003) 
0.008
**
 
(0.003) 
Professional occupations - - - - 0.026
***
 
(0.006) 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
- - - - -0.209
***
 
(0.006) 
Administrative and 
secretarial occupations 
- - - - -0.452
***
 
(0.006) 
Skilled trades occupations - - - - -0.490
***
 
(0.006) 
Caring, leisure and other 
service occupations 
- - - - -0.616
***
 
(0.006) 
Sales and customer service 
occupations 
- - - - -0.662
***
 
(0.006) 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
- - - - -0.606
***
 
(0.006) 
Elementary occupations - - - - -0.712
***
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(0.005) 
Population size 22,247,515 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 145,554 
R
2
 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.25 0.50 
Notes: (i) Reference category for sector is private sector; for work region North East; and for occupation Managers, directors 
and senior officials. (ii) Each column also includes a constant term. (iii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iv) * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A.7. Full ASHE OLS pay regression results, public sector 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female -0.191
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.224
***
 
(0.007) 
-0.216
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.174
***
 
(0.006) 
-0.107
***
 
(0.005) 
PRB - 0.183
***
 
(0.009) 
0.187
***
 
(0.009) 
0.201
***
 
(0.009) 
0.078
***
 
(0.007) 
Female × PRB - 0.044
***
 
(0.011) 
0.050
***
 
(0.010) 
0.036
***
 
(0.010) 
-0.058
***
 
(0.008) 
Age - - 0.055
***
 
(0.001) 
0.047
***
 
(0.001) 
0.036
***
 
(0.001) 
Age squared - - -0.001
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
***
 
(0.000) 
North West - - 0.035
**
 
(0.012) 
0.043
***
 
(0.012) 
0.030
**
 
(0.009) 
Yorkshire and Humber - - -0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
East Midlands - - 0.012 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
West Midlands - - 0.019 
(0.013) 
0.025
*
 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.010) 
South West - - 0.019 
(0.012) 
0.034
**
 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
East - - 0.015 
(0.013) 
0.029
*
 
(0.013) 
0.024
*
 
(0.010) 
London - - 0.269
***
 
(0.012) 
0.272
***
 
(0.012) 
0.211
***
 
(0.009) 
South East - - 0.043
***
 
(0.012) 
0.059
***
 
(0.012) 
0.024
*
 
(0.009) 
Wales - - -0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
Scotland - - 0.079
***
 
(0.012) 
0.092
***
 
(0.012) 
0.032
***
 
(0.009) 
Tenure (years) - - - 0.011
***
 
(0.001) 
0.012
***
 
(0.001) 
Tenure squared - - - -0.000
***
 
(0.000) 
-0.000
***
 
(0.000) 
Part-time - - - -0.117
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.012
**
 
(0.004) 
Temporary contract - - - 0.052
***
 
(0.009) 
0.029
***
 
(0.007) 
Firm size (log) - - - -0.020
***
 
(0.001) 
-0.007
***
 
(0.001) 
Collective agreement - - - -0.020
*
 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Professional occupations - - - - -0.058
***
 
(0.013) 
Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
- - - - -0.372
***
 
(0.013) 
Administrative and 
secretarial occupations 
- - - - -0.559
***
 
(0.013) 
Skilled trades occupations - - - - -0.588
***
 
(0.018) 
Caring, leisure and other 
service occupations 
- - - - -0.688
***
 
(0.013) 
Sales and customer service 
occupations 
- - - - -0.482
***
 
(0.018) 
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
- - - - -0.579
***
 
(0.021) 
Elementary occupations - - - - -0.771
***
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(0.014) 
Population size 5,627,309 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 35,841 
R
2
 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.51 
Notes: (i) Reference category for PRB is non-PRB public; for work region North East; and for occupation Managers, directors 
and senior officials. (ii) Each column also includes a constant term. (iii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iv) * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A.8. Decomposition of the GPG, public and private sector, sensitivity analysis to 
hourly pay measures 
 Including overtime pay Annual earnings 
 Public Private Public Private 
Difference in mean log gross hourly pay 
between men and women 
0.194
***
 0.216
***
 0.222
***
 0.257
***
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
Difference due to characteristics (explained) 0.043
***
 0.123
***
 0.049
***
 0.150
***
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
 [22.14%] [56.70%] [22.03%] [58.17%] 
Difference due to coefficients (unexplained) 0.151
***
 0.094
***
 0.173
***
 0.108
***
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) 
 [77.86%] [43.30%] [77.97%] [41.83%] 
Population size 5,627,309 16,620,206 5,627,309 16,620,206 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 35,841 109,713 35,841 109,713 
Notes: (i) Decomposition analysis is performed using ASHE and Model (5). (ii) Decompositions are calculated using the 
relevant male coefficients as the baseline. (iii) Figures in ( ) are standard errors; figures in [ ] are proportions of overall GPG. (iv) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A.9. Decomposition of the GPG, public and private sector, sensitivity analysis 
 Excluding occupation Including detailed (4-
digit) occupation 
Full-time only Decomposition method 
(female coefficients) 
2017 data 
 Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Difference in mean log 
gross hourly pay between 
men and women 
0.191
***
 0.211
***
 0.191
***
 0.211
***
 0.129
***
 0.147
***
 0.191
***
 0.211
***
 0.197
***
 0.221
***
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Difference due to 
characteristics (explained) 
0.005 0.092
***
 0.084
***
 0.132
***
 0.012
***
 0.037
***
 0.063
***
 0.076
***
 0.056
***
 0.134
***
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
[2.78%] [43.72%] [44.0%] [62.6%] [9.29%] [25.15%] [33.18%] [35.93%] [28.21%] [60.58%] 
Difference due to 
coefficients (unexplained) 
0.185
***
 0.119
***
 0.107
***
 0.079
***
 0.117
***
 0.110
***
 0.127
***
 0.135
***
 0.142
***
 0.087
***
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
[97.22%] [56.28%] [56.0%] [37.4%] [90.71%] [74.85%] [66.82%] [64.07%] [71.76%] [39.42%] 
Population size 5,627,309 16,620,206 5,627,309 16,620,206 4,012,797 12,427,054 5,627,309 16,620,206 5,683,481 16,383,111 
Number of obs. 
(unweighted) 
35,841 109,713 35,841 109,713 24,673 78,841 35,841 109,713 37,602 109,588 
Notes: (i) Decomposition analysis is performed using ASHE and Model (5) unless otherwise stated. (ii) Decompositions are calculated using the relevant male coefficients as the baseline unless 
otherwise stated. (iii) Figures in ( ) are standard errors; figures in [ ] are proportions of overall GPG. (iv) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Figure A.1. QLFS decomposition of the GPG across the distribution, public and private sector 
(Model (6)) 
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Table A.10. Decomposition of the GPG, public sector, sensitivity analysis to hourly pay 
measures 
 Including overtime pay Annual earnings 
 Non-PRB  PRB Non-PRB  PRB 
Difference in mean log gross hourly pay 
between men and women 
0.226
***
 0.186
***
 0.259
***
 0.204
***
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) 
Difference due to characteristics (explained) 0.111
***
 0.002 0.127
***
 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
 [48.92%] [0.85%] [49.10%] [-2.00%] 
Difference due to coefficients (unexplained) 0.116
***
 0.184
***
 0.132
***
 0.208
***
 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) 
 [51.08%] [99.15%] [50.90%] [102.00%] 
Population size 3,046,955 2,580,354 3,046,955 2,580,354 
Number of obs. (unweighted) 20,193 15,648 20,193 15,648 
Notes: (i) Decomposition analysis is performed using ASHE and Model (5). (ii) Decompositions are calculated using the 
relevant male coefficients as the baseline. (iii) Figures in ( ) are standard errors; figures in [ ] are proportions of overall GPG. (iv) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A.11. Decomposition of the GPG, public sector, sensitivity analysis 
 Excluding occupation Including detailed (4-digit) 
occupation 
Full-time only Decomposition 
method  
(female coefficients) 
2017 data 
 Non-PRB  PRB Non-PRB  PRB Non-PRB  PRB Non-PRB  PRB Non-PRB  PRB 
Difference in mean log 
gross hourly pay between 
men and women 
0.224
***
 0.180
***
 0.224
***
 0.180
***
 0.126
***
 0.162
***
 0.224
***
 0.180
***
 0.232
***
 0.190
***
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Difference due to 
characteristics 
(explained) 
0.030
***
 -0.002 0.108
***
 0.087
***
 0.053
***
 0.004 0.135
***
 0.024 0.127
***
 0.008 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
[13.27%] [-0.90%] [48.2%] [48.3%] [42.12%] [2.74%] [60.43%] [13.55%] [54.89%] [4.10%] 
Difference due to 
coefficients (unexplained) 
0.194
***
 0.182
***
 0.116
***
 0.093
***
 0.073
***
 0.157
***
 0.089
***
 0.156
***
 0.104
***
 0.183
***
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
[86.73%] [100.90%] [51.8%] [51.7%] [57.88%] [97.23%] [39.57%] [86.45%] [45.11%] [95.90%] 
Population size 3,046,955 2,580,354 3,046,955 2,580,354 2,096,283 1,916,514 3,046,955 2,580,354 3,150,517 2,532,964 
Number of obs. 
(unweighted) 
20,193 15,648 20,193 15,648 13,296 11,377 20,193 15,648 21,839 15,763 
Notes: (i) Decomposition analysis is performed using ASHE and Model (5) unless otherwise stated. (ii) Decompositions are calculated using the relevant male coefficients as the baseline unless 
otherwise stated. (iii) Figures in ( ) are standard errors; figures in [ ] are proportions of overall GPG. (iv) * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
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Figure A.2. QLFS decomposition of the GPG across the distribution, public sector (Model (6)) 
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